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Abstract 
 
 
The number of Japanese firms in Brussels has increased since the creation of the 
European Single Market. At the same time, large European firms have become 
independent political actors and harmonized their lobbying pattern, creating a distinctive 
business-government relationship in the EU. Yet, it still remains to be examined whether 
Japanese firms are able to utilize their political options and conform to the new EU 
lobbying style, which features firms’ direct participation within the policymaking process.  
 
          This thesis, based on four detailed case studies in automobile and electronics 
sectors, explores the Europeanization of Japanese firms' lobbying strategies, and assesses 
how they have adapted to the constantly evolving EU public policymaking system. With 
reference to the actor-based models of interest groups and Europeanization literature, it 
provides an empirical investigation of interaction between traditional Japanese lobbying 
practices and the EU institutional environment in forming firms' preferences for 
particular lobbying strategies. Each case study is based on a number of interviews 
conducted in Brussels and Tokyo with firms, business associations, and EU institutions. 
In short, a key objective is to highlight the variations in the Europeanization of Japanese 
lobbying, with special attention to the firms' embeddedness in traditional business culture. 
In addition, this thesis seeks to identify the opportunities and constrains that make up the 
institutional logic of Japanese firms in pursuing a more Japanese or EU type of lobbying 
practice. 
 
          Overall, this thesis concludes that Japanese firms have restructured their political 
behaviours to suit the EU policymaking process. However, the degree of such 
Europeanization of lobbying strategies has significantly varied across sectors and firms 
due to ranging influence from several institutional factors. In other words, the underlying 
nationality of the firm remains the vitally important determinant in the nature of its 
lobbying strategy formulation, and is much more persistent in the face of Europeanization 
than existing studies generally assume. 
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1. Introduction: Japanese lobbying in the EU 
 
Business interests have come to embody a significant force in the EU 
policymaking process, affecting the ways in which agendas and legislations are shaped. 
Large European firms have become independent political actors and harmonized their 
lobbying pattern, creating a distinctive business-government relationship in the EU (Coen 
1997, 1998, 2003, Greenwood 2003, Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998, Richardson 1996, 
2000, 2001, Wilson 2003). Many studies use an institutionlaist research perspective to 
examine the mechaisms producing particular interest group behaviours and outcomes in 
the EU. As a consequence of this normalization, systematic comparisons become 
increasingly important. In the context of Europeanization, many studies have examied the 
transformtion of interest intermediation by comparing national traditions and focusing on 
how they were translated to the European level or how the EU led to convergence 
between national modes of interest represenattion (Coen 1998, Wilts 2001).  
While we are hardly the first to explore the Europeanization of business lobbying, 
our specific focus is quite different from that of previous studies. As we will discuss in 
the next chapter, the study of EU lobbying has typically treated large multinational firms 
as homogenous groups, increasing harmonizing their political behaviour at EU level. In 
contrast, we study the persistence of national characteristics in firms’ lobbying strategies. 
Since the mid-1990s, Japanese firms have begun to generate more political capital and 
credibility in the European Union with the creation of the European Single Market and 
abolition of several trade measures such as voluntary export restrains (Kewley 2002). Yet, 
they have no member state to champion their concerns in the Council of Ministers and 
they are not used to the concept of direct lobbying due to the traditional Japanese 
business-government relationship. It still remains to be examined whether Japanese firms 
are able to utilize their political options and conform to the EU lobbying style, which 
features firms’ direct participation within the policymaking process.   
Japanese firms in the EU face two sequential decisions: whether to lobby 
individually or collectively (Olson 1965, Pijnenburg 1998, Oliver 1993) and whether to 
use information or financial incentives as their instrument (Blau 1964, Levine and White 
1961, Hillman and Hitt 1999, Aplin and Hegarty 1980). In Japan firms mainly represent 
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their interests collectively, using financial incentive instruments, whereas in the EU large 
firms prefer individual lobbying based on information instruments. If Japanese firms have 
fully adjusted to the EU policymaking process, they should demonstrate the same 
preferences for the set of the lobbying strategies as European firms, as indicated by the 
existing theories of lobbying. We explore the mechanism of the Europeanization of 
Japanese lobbying by focusing on these two choices that firms make in order to 
participate in the policymaking process. In other words, we aim to explore whether the 
Western concept of elite pluralism could be applied to the Japanese firms as a non-
European actor. As an explanatory effort, we aim to work towards a more holistic model, 
recognizing that various streams of factors must be taken into consideration. Drawing on 
a number of resource dependency and institutional views (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 
Bouwen 2002, McCathy and Zald 1978, Cress and Snow 1988, Boddewyn 1993, 
Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Hull 1993), we hypothesize that Japanese firms’ lobbying 
strategies are influenced by EU, sectoral and corporate factors with varying efficacy. 
Some aspects of Europeanization theories are difficult to quantify and measure 
empirically, partly because they involve unquantifiable and difficult-to-impute concepts 
such as social values and norms. However, the difficulty of quantifying is mitigated by 
the fact that Japanese lobbying practices in the EU are always assessed in a comparative 
institutional spectrum, which has the European lobbying pattern at one end and the 
traditional Japanese one at the other end. Accordingly, it is the difference between, rather 
than the absolute magnitude of, Japanese firms’ lobbying practices in the EU and EU 
lobbying pattern that matters. 
In short, this research is about how Japanese firms conduct lobbying in the EU. 
The goals of our theoretical framework are twofold. One is to clarify to what extent 
Japanese firms have adopted to the EU policymaking process by focusing two aspects of 
their lobbying strategies: form of interest representation and instrument.  The other is to 
identify the opportunities and constraints that make up the institutional logic of Japanese 
firms in choosing a particular lobbying strategy. Examination of these points will allow 
the opportunity to clarify and assess the persistence of national business-government 
characteristics within Japanese lobbying in the EU. We aim to explore whether the 
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Western concept of elite pluralism can be applied to Japanese firm as non-European 
actors in the EU policymaking process.  
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The major purpose of this study is to fill the gap between literature on the EU 
business-government relationship and on Japanese firms’ political behaviour. In a wider 
sense, we aim to advance the understanding of participation of non-Western actors within 
the EU policymaking process. Many other scholars have studied the nature of business 
lobbying in the EU (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Greenwood 1998, 2003; Grant 2000, 
Coen 1997, 1998, 2003; Richardson 2000; Eising 2004; Pijnenburg 1998). Through their 
analyses, we have gained significant knowledge and understanding about the ways in 
which large firms interact with the policymakers. Traditionally, studies of interest 
representation can be classified into two categories in terms of their level of focus: micro- 
and macro- levels. Micro-level studies of lobbying investigate the interaction between 
interest groups and policymakers. Most importantly at the micro-level of lobbying studies, 
the leading authority is Olson (1965). He challenged the basis of interest group analysis 
by questioning whether like-minded interests would automatically associate. Collective 
action theory has undergone enormous growth and elaboration since Olson, with a major 
shift from focusing on individual decisions to focusing on group structure and interaction. 
Other important micro-level studies of lobbying include pressure politics and rent-
seeking (Becker 1983, Grossman and Helpman 2001), the provision of information by 
interest groups (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961), and organizational resource of 
interest groups (Cress and Snow 1998). In addition to the micro-level studies of lobbying, 
the main subjects of most macro-level studies have been structural, focusing on the extent 
to which different social interests are politically represented, on the question of whether 
interest representation has a monopolistic, oligopolistic, or egalitarian structure (Streeck 
and Schmitter 1991), and whether the state is a neutral arbiter (Truman 1951) or a broker 
of interests (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987). Thus, many macro-level approaches to 
interest representation have strongly descriptive and prescriptive elements, allowing 
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researchers to describe and categorize different systems of interest representation and to 
investigate the effectiveness of different institutional constellations. Besides, the 
categorization facilitates the comparative study of political systems (Wilson 1990). In an 
EU context, by applying macro-level theories of lobbying, the development of the 
business-government relationship has been studied in a number of theories including 
corporatism, pluralism and elite pluralism. While national business associations are still 
vital policy channels for European business interests, large firms have become 
independent political actors in the EU (Coen 1997, 2001), representing their interests 
either individually or  collectively through sectoral associations and ad hoc coalitions 
with other likeminded firms. 
The development of a distinct business-government relationship at EU level is 
significant in that it challenges traditional forms of collective industrial action. The 
growing regulatory competencies of the EU have allowed these large firms to bypass 
long established national lobbying channels in influencing European legislations and 
programmes. Many large multinational firms have established a sophisticated political 
capacity that allows them to develop multi-level and ad hoc political alliances. This 
political coordination has standardized the ways of business interest representation across 
issues and altered national public policy systems. Several studies have illustrated the 
emergence of complex issue networks and more horizontal European interest 
communities (Richardson 2000, Coen and Dannreuther 2003). In this context of 
Europeanization, there are several works which examined the transformation of interest 
intermediation by comparing national traditions and studying how they were translated to 
EU level or how the EU led to convergence between national modes of interest 
representation (Coen 1998, Beyers 2002). The investigation of corporatist, pluralist and 
elite pluralist business-government relationships has also led to the comparative study of 
different national and sectoral patterns of interest representation (Greenwood 1997, 
Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998, Streeck and Schmitter 1991).  
Generally, one of the broadest conclusions of the studies on varying national 
business lobbying traditions is that EU politics does affect the ways in which national 
groups relate to their governments and organize themselves at EU level, although some 
national political traditions may continue to matter to some extent. Many existing studies 
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treat large firms as a relatively homogeneous group, increasingly becoming European 
regardless of their nationality, and claim that, within the single European market, firms 
have harmonized their lobbying activity and become pan-European political actors. The 
consequence of increasing direct lobbying strategies among firms has been the creeping 
institutionalization of forum style politics and the creation of issue networks that have 
harmonized firms’ lobbying patterns at EU level.  
 
However, although many Japanese firms have been recognized as some of the 
largest in industries such as electronics and automobiles, not much Japanese lobbying has 
been observed and few studies examine whether, and if so how, Japanese firms have re-
structured their political organization and developed credibility to adjust to the EU 
policymaking process. Most studies of Japanese business have concentrated on state-level 
negotiations, FDI and their management systems in the EU market. There has been little 
research on the effect of institutional conditions that make up the logic of Japanese firms 
to choose particular modes of lobbying in the EU. While EU policies affect the ways in 
which business interests relate to their governments or EU institutions, it is not clear as 
what are the conditions that determine the degree of transformation of Japanese firms as 
non-European actors. Japanese firms are different from European and American rivals in 
many aspects. Needless to say, they have no member state to champion their concerns in 
the Council of Ministers and are not used to direct lobbying, due to the traditional 
Japanese business-government relationship. Japanese business interests are traditionally 
and institutionally intertwined with the policymakers, leading to a lack of direct lobbying 
among firms (Zhao 1993, Ohtsu and Imanari 2002). Japanese politics is often seen by the 
elitist perspective, which is based on the concept of tripartite power elites composed of 
the leaders of the ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party), the bureaucracy and organized 
business. According to this perspective, these three major groups comprise a regular and 
effective alliance and control decision-making on major issues, although it emphasizes 
the bureaucracy rather than other political or economic leaders (Muramatsu, Ito and 
Tsujinaka 2001). Japanese political and business circles are inseparably connected to the 
bureaucracy, comprising a united power nucleus. One of the most well-known terms for 
this model is ‘Japan Inc.’, suggesting the most extreme and intertwined nature of 
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government, bureaucracy and business. Japanese politics is also described as 
“bureaucratic and mass inclusionary pluralism”, “patterned pluralism” or 
“compartmentalized pluralism” in which the monopolistic role of the bureaucracy in the 
policymaking process has been intact, but the roles of other political actors have also 
become increasing important, while the Western pluralist assumption that policymaking 
is carried out in free competition among various actors is still clearly hindered by the elite 
groups and hierarchically organized social structure (Zhao 1993, Tsujinaka 1997, 
Muramatsu, Ito, and Tsujinaka 2001, and Kono2003). Under such conditions, business 
associations traditionally dominate the business lobbying scene and direct lobbying by 
individual firms is very rare. Firms extensively use financial incentives to influence 
policymakers instead of information. It is interesting to explore how these national 
characteristics are transformed into the EU policymaking process.  
From existing observations, the development of Japanese business lobbying in the 
EU can be roughly divided into two stages: from the mid-1980s to 1993 (pre-Treaty of 
European Union) and from 1994 to the present day (post-TEU). The first period of 
Japanese lobbying is largely characterized by the EU-Japan trade disputes, strong 
initiatives of Japanese Ministries and low associability and autonomy of firms (Gilson 
2000, Mason 1997, Abe 1999, Belderbos 1997), while the second period featured 
expanding EU regulatory competencies, and firms’ growing awareness and efforts to 
blend into the European corporate landscape (Kewley 2002). This transformation of 
Japanese lobbying in the EU indicates that Japanese firms’ strategies have become 
Europeanized to some extent and highlights their political capacities to learn and adjust to 
the hosting political environment. Although how much of the observed localization of 
Japanese lobbying can be attributed to the supranational nature of the EU and the 
difference in domestic structures between Japan and the EU still needs to be examined.   
Moreover, most existing case studies on Japanese lobbying abroad are often too 
descriptive and tend to lack theoretical foundation in their analyses. That is, they do not 
systematically explain in detail why Japanese firms adapted certain lobbying strategies in 
a given situation, and how their policy preferences for particular lobbying channels are 
formed. Besides, most studies examine Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies in the context 
of FDI or the EU-Japan trade disputes. Therefore, they consider the issues by mainly 
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looking at state-level negotiations between the politicians and bureaucrats of Japan and 
the EU, and pay less attention to firms’ initiatives and policy preferences. As Japanese 
MNEs themselves become more important individual actors in a more interdependent 
international economy, their political capacities, such as seeking strategic alliances and 
negotiating with governments and other stakeholders, must be taken into account as ever 
more vital determinants of public policy outcomes in a changing EU order. As the EU 
regulatory competences have strengthened in many policy areas, such as environmental 
issues, it is necessary to examine how Japanese firms have conducted lobbying in these 
new policy fields. The limited relevance of previous studies has necessitated a theoretical 
reassessment of Japanese lobbying in the EU. 
 
 
1.2 Our argument 
 
In order to provide a sound theoretical basis to investigate the Europeanization of 
Japanese firms, it is important to stress that we focus on this issue primarily at the 
horizontal level of the EU policy formulation as opposed to top-down or bottom-up 
perspectives. Our argument draws attention to two aspects of lobbying strategies. They 
are the form of interest representation and the instrument. Recognizing that EU 
institutions have increased their regulatory competencies and that the process of business 
representation has taken on a very distinct logic at EU level with the development of 
forum style business-government relationship, we explore how Japanese firms have 
reacted to those opportunities in diverse ways at the EU tier of a multi-level system. 
Japanese firms in the EU are expected to adopt an EU lobbying style as well as retaining 
some of their national characteristics with varying degrees. With regard to the ways in 
which European firms relate to their national governments (Schmidt 1996, Coen 1998, 
Greenwood 2003), many large firms are now able to bypass long established national 
lobbying channels in influencing European legislations and programmes although these 
national routes still remain useful. Yet, the applicability of such Europeanization to non-
European firms still remains to be tested. Although it is claimed that many multinational 
firms are increasingly more ‘multi’ and less ‘national’ than in the past, this is not always 
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true of Japanese firms. This is because formal government policies and informal 
administrative guidance, as well as social norms effectively embedded in the structure of 
business networks, have encouraged firms to consider and act in the national interests 
whenever and wherever possible (Zhao 1993; Yoshimatsu 2000; Ohtsu and Imanari 
2002). In this sense, the underlying nationality of the firm may remain as the vitally 
important determinant of the nature of its lobbying strategy formulation. Fundamentally, 
the nationality is given by historical experience and the institutional and ideological 
legacies of that experience.  
We develop a mechanism of lobbying strategy formulation wherein firms that 
have decided to be politically active face two sequential decisions; organization of 
interest representation and instrument. These two critical decisions that Japanese firms 
have to make in the EU are essentially the dependent variables of our analysis. The first 
decision a firm must make in formulating lobbying strategy is its form of interest 
representation, whether to pursue political action alone or with others. The first decision 
is theoretically pinned down by the logic of collective action (Olson 1965, Oliver 1993, 
Jordan 1998). Individual action refers to solitary efforts by individual firms to affect 
public policy. Collective action refers to the collaboration and cooperation of two or more 
firms in the policy process. Olson used the concept of rational pursuit of interests on the 
part of the potential member to show how membership would not arise if benefit could be 
delivered without the cost of membership. In an EU context, the Olson-style argument 
provides a micro-foundation for theories of elite pluralism or studies of the varying 
power of industry interests (Coen 1997, Jordan 1998). That is, both European and 
national business associations often fail to respond to the quickly changing and complex 
EU lobbying environment. Of course, there are still times when large firms do not want 
to take the lead on particular issues. For example, firms generally prefer that industry 
associations speak out on European social policy matters. Sensitive issues can often be 
deflected to the association as opposed to the firms themselves. Yet, generally speaking, 
membership incentives for such traditional business associations have been reduced. As a 
result, firms have become more proactive and developed political capacities to utilize a 
wide variety of political channels either independently or collectively through ad-hoc 
alliances with other countervailing interests.   
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After a firm decides to pursue lobbying individually or collectively, its next 
decision relates to the specific instruments it should employ. Many scholars interested in 
lobbying instruments have developed lists of specific strategies or tactics that firms may 
use to complete in the policymaking process. Several exchange theorists suggest two 
general or generic political strategies that firms and interest groups may use to target 
policymakers and compete in the policymaking process based on the fundamental 
resources exchanged: information and financial incentive (Blau 1964, Levine and White 
1961, Hillman and Hitt 1999). According to these theories, the interaction of private and 
public organizations can be conceptualized as a series of inter-organizational exchanges. 
The organizations involved in the exchange make an implicit or explicit cost benefit 
analysis; on the basis of which they decide with whom to interact. The exchange relation 
is only likely to be durable when the exchange is reciprocal and both sides receive 
benefits from the exchange, which are equally distributed between the exchanging parties. 
The choice between an information or financial incentive strategy largely depends on 
what kind of resource policymakers need the most. By applying this model to the analysis 
of Japanese lobbying in the EU, it is possible to see how Japanese firms conduct lobbying 
in the EU and draw an interesting comparison with European firms if there is any 
difference in their lobbying strategies.  
 
An analysis of institutional factors that are likely to influence the incentives of 
Japanese firms to choose certain types of lobbying is essential in order to systematically 
understand the logic of Japanese lobbying. The business-government relationship is a 
subsystem of a more encompassing society, polity and culture. It is therefore assumed 
that the dynamics of the interaction between Japanese firms and the EU policymaking 
process cannot be studied without examination of the institutional factors. These can be 
classified into three categories: EU, sectoral, and corporate factors. With reference to a 
number of actor-level theories of interest groups, examination of these institutional 
factors allows us to develop a series of hypotheses about an interactive mechanism 
between Japanese firms and the EU policymaking process. These factors underpinning 
the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying are not mutually exclusive. The normative 
structure of business-government relations is not fully captured if one only focuses on 
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organizational characteristics of political institutions. Therefore, we aim to work towards 
a more holistic model, recognizing that various streams of factors must be taken into 
consideration. 
In terms of EU factors, firms’ decisions regarding their form of representation and 
instrument are closely related to the varying demand of the EU institutions for 
information. According to the resource dependence perspective, organizations are not 
internally self-sufficient. Policymakers require resources from the environment and 
therefore have to interact with those organizations or groups who control the resources 
they need (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 258). An important consequence is that 
policymakers become interdependent with those organizations with which they interact. 
Resource dependencies matter because neither EU institutions nor interest groups can 
autonomously pursue and achieve their political goals. The more technical and 
complicated the policy is, the more likely Japanese firms are given access to the 
policymaking process since the level of resource dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese 
firms are likely to conduct more direct lobbying and less collective action through 
national associations. Alternatively, if the policy deals with few technical matters and 
concerns national interests, it is likely that Japanese firms are not given much access to 
the policymaking process since the level of resource dependency is relatively low. 
Therefore, they are likely to conduct more collective lobbying through national or 
European associations than direct lobbying. With regard to a firm’s decision for the 
lobbying instrument, the more technical and complicated the policy is, the more likely 
Japanese firms are given access to the policymaking process since the level of resource 
dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese firms are more likely to use an information 
strategy to influence the policymakers than a financial incentive strategy.  Alternatively, 
if the policy deals with few technical matters and concerns national interests, it is likely 
that Japanese firms are not given much access to the policymaking process since the level 
of resource dependency is relatively low. Therefore, Japanese firms may try to buy the 
political influence through financial incentive strategy. 
 A sector’s institutional setting is also an important variable which affects 
Japanese lobbying. The ability to gain support for issues may be affected by 
fragmentations in society (Coleman 1988). Generally speaking, in more pluralist 
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structures, the institutional arrangements result in a variety of interests coming into play 
in the policy arena (Hayes 1992), resulting in a fragmentation of political and economic 
power (Vogel 1996). Insiders can be simply actors that are frequently consulted or actors 
that are actively involved in bargaining and policy negotiation or in the implementation 
of policy solutions (Grant 2004). Such insider and outsider division can be found in a 
sector as well. In other words, the formation of lobbying strategies in the policymaking 
process is also affected by the institutional setting of the sector. That is, for outsiders or 
those who are relatively new to the sector, the opportunity to affect public policy on 
specific issues in systems with predominant actors is more limited than in systems that 
open to individual special interest group pressure and that have a greater probability of 
developing negative sum or zero-sum policies. Fragmentation in a sector can be explored 
in terms of power relationships in the sector. Firms are aware of the strength of their 
position relative to their rivals. That is, the power relationship in a sector is mainly 
related to the presence of dominant European rivals, which leaves little room for Japanese 
firms to blend into the sector on the equal terms. In other words, the less hostile the sector 
is towards Japanese firms, the easier it is for them to blend into the policymaking process. 
In a sector with a higher number of dominant European rivals, Japanese firms are more 
likely to conduct collective lobbying through national business associations than 
individual lobbying. Similarly, the presence of predominant actors in a sector relates to a 
firm’s lobbying instrument. Core insiders tend to dominate the information flow in a 
sector, leaving little opportunity for Japanese firms to utilize their technical expertise. 
Firms in a narrow product diversification may not have the opportunity to outshine their 
strong rivals by using an information strategy because the scope of required information 
is very narrow. Under such conditions, firms may choose to use a financial incentive 
strategy to influence the policymakers. 
 In addition, the reason why a particular Japanese firm is pursuing a more direct or 
collective type of lobbying strategy may sometimes be best understood by enquiring 
explicitly into not only the supranational and concerned sectoral factors but also 
corporate specific factors. Organizational resources should play a role in the decisions of 
lobbying strategy formulation. Resource mobilization theorists emphasize the importance 
of resources in interest mobilization (McCathy and Zald 1978, Cress and Snow 1988). 
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Individual action loads all costs directly on the participating firms, whereas in collective 
action, such as national business associations, the cost of political action is shared among 
members (Olson 1965). Larger firms with more spare resources and dominant firms in an 
industry often prefer individual rather than collective actions. They have the requisite 
resources for individual action, and such independent action may allow them to affect a 
government policy in a way that best favours the firm. Some firms may also have more 
intangible resources. In other words, some Japanese firms may simply possess more 
lobbying resources and experience than others. These firms are naturally more likely to 
be able to pursue a European style of lobbying. Resourceful Japanese firms may also find 
it easier to conduct an information strategy than those firms without sufficient resources. 
In addition, given the importance of credibility in informational lobbying, those Japanese 
firms that lack the resources to conduct an information strategy may choose a financial 
incentive strategy, such as hiring personnel with direct political experience in order to 
compensate for their lack of resources. 
  
Our investigation of lobbying strategy formulation helps us understand the impact 
of increasing European integration upon non-European business actors in the EU. In 
other words, our analysis assesses whether the Western concept of elite pluralism could 
be applied to Japanese firms as non-European actors in the policymaking process. Most 
importantly, in contrast to previous research, our study aims to highlight the persistence 
of national characteristics in the lobbying behaviour of firms in the face of 
Europeanization. The underlying nationality of firms and their national business culture 
may constitute nevertheless powerful cultural norms that define appropriateness with 
regard to the way Japanese firms operate in the political system. This proposed 
framework needs to be confronted with the empirical reality. This study offers four case 
studies: automobile trade policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s, electronics trade 
policies during the same period, the End of Life Vehicle Directive of 2000 and the Waste 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) and Restrictions of the use of certain 
Hazardous Substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) Directives of 2003. 
The case studies draw a structured and focused comparison of Japanese automobile and 
electronics firms, in order to develop the existing explanatory framework of the 
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Europeanization of business interests. On the basis of 30 detailed interviews with firms, 
business associations and EU institutions, we provide an empirical investigation of 
interaction between traditional Japanese lobbying practices and the EU institutional 
environment in forming firms’ preferences for particular lobbying strategies. This study 
concludes that Japanese firms have restructured their political behaviours to suit the EU 
policymaking process; however, the ways in which they have participated in the EU 
policymaking process are different from European firms. The EU institutional 
environment does not affect the logic of Japanese lobbying to the same degree as 
European firms. Convergence of lobbying strategies may be apparent at the level of 
lobbying instruments, but below the surface, where the roots of leading Japanese firms 
remain lodged, our research suggests a durable source of resistance. Underlying 
nationality of firms still remains a vital determinant in the formulation of Japanese 
lobbying strategies in the age of Europeanization.  
  
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
 Our research seeks to contribute to scholarship on transnational lobbying by 
tracking the development of Japanese lobbying in the EU, with special attention to the 
interaction between the EU policymaking process and traditional patterns of Japanese 
lobbying. We begin in Chapter 2 by reviewing previous studies of the EU business-
government relationship and Japanese business interests. The chapter does not review all 
studies of lobbying, a task that would be all but impossible, given the enormous size of 
the literature. However, we do focus on the specific claims that mark our point of 
departure. That is, although many Japanese firms have been recognized as some of the 
largest in industries such as electronics and automobiles, hardly any Japanese lobbying 
has actually been observed and few studies examine whether, and if so how, Japanese 
firms have re-structured their political organization and developed credibility to adjust to 
the EU policymaking process. Instead, many existing studies of Japanese lobbying 
abroad take their cases from US politics (Yamada 1982, Shinoda 1989, Choate 1990, 
Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995) and, in an EU context, many studies were done on 
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subjects such as Japanese FDI and business management and the EU-Japan trade disputes. 
These studies do not primarily focus on Japanese firms’ lobbying preferences for political 
channels and they do not examine the changing nature of Japanese business lobbies.  
In addition, there has been a general consensus that large firms have become 
independent political actors and harmonized their lobbying patterns, creating a distinctive 
business-government relationship in the EU. Most EU lobbying studies treat large firms 
as a relatively homogeneous group in this process of Europeanization (Jordan 2002, Coen 
1997), and do not pay enough attention to the national differences that may still remain 
significant to some extent. Japanese firms are different from European and American 
rivals in many aspects. Needless to say, they have no member state to champion their 
concerns in the Council of Ministers, and are not used to direct lobbying due to the 
traditional Japanese business-government relationship. In this sense, Europeanization 
may not affect the ways in which Japanese firms relate to their national government to 
the same degree as European firms. Japanese lobbying abroad is often a mixture of 
adaptation to the hosting environment and extension of the domestic experience (Risse 
1995, 2003, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995). There is no doubt that Japanese lobbying 
in the EU has undergone a substantial transformation over the years, but not much direct 
lobbying has been observed yet either. Despite widespread FDI throughout Europe and 
their growing awareness of direct lobbying, it still remains to be examined to what extent 
Japanese firms have adjusted to the EU and whether there are any patterns in the process 
of the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying, in which firms have had to develop a 
relatively new concept of direct lobbying. 
Chapter 3 examines the main theoretical model of our study. It is a challenge to 
develop theoretical ideas in the field of European interest politics, which is known for its 
diversity and complexity. In this chapter, an attempt is made to develop a model of 
lobbying strategy formulation in order to study the Europeanization of Japanese firms. 
Lobbying strategies involve a set of decisions for firms. The first decision of whether to 
lobby individually or collectively through business associations is theoretically pinned 
down by the logic of collective action (Olson 1965, Oliver 1993, Jordan 1998) while the 
second decision of whether to use an information or financial incentive strategy is drawn 
from exchange models (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961). Our investigation of 
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lobbying strategy formulation helps us understand the impact of increasing European 
integration upon non-European business actors in the EU. Recognizing that many large 
European and American firms have become independent political actors (Coen 1997, 
1998; Richardson 2000; Jordan 2002), our analysis assesses whether the Western concept 
of elite pluralism could be applied to the Japanese firms as non-European actors in the 
policymaking process. In the EU, large firms prefer direct lobbying to collective lobbying 
through European and national associations within the policymaking process, based on 
their information and technical expertise. It is claimed that many multinational firms are 
increasingly more ‘multi’ and less ‘national’ than in the past (Cowels 1998; Jordan 2002). 
However, this is not always true of Japanese firms. In Japan, business associations 
traditionally dominate the business lobbying scene and direct lobbying by individual 
firms is very rare. Firms extensively use financial incentives to influence policymakers 
instead of information. This is because formal government policies and informal 
administrative guidance, as well as social norms effectively embedded in the structure of 
business networks, have encouraged firms to consider and act in the national interests 
whenever and wherever possible (Zhao 1993; Yoshimatsu 2000; Ohtsu and Imanari 
2002). In this sense, the underlying nationality of the firm may remain as the vitally 
important determinant of the nature of its lobbying strategy formulation, and be much 
more persistent in the face of Europeanization than existing studies generally assume.  
If Japanese firms have fully adjusted to the EU policymaking process, they should 
demonstrate the same preferences for the form of interest representation and the 
instrument as European firms addressed by the existing theories of lobbying. As an 
explanatory effort, with reference to resource dependency, the insider and outsider model, 
and organizational resources, we also proposed a set of EU, sectoral and corporate factors 
that are likely to affect a firm’s choice for the form of interest representation and 
instrument. The interaction of these variables in the EU forms the central connecting 
thread of this study, and generates a set of testable hypotheses for empirical testing in the 
subsequent chapters. 
Having identified current debates in the study of the EU policymaking process 
and set out the theoretical approach of our research, Chapter 4 explains the methodology 
to test the hypotheses and systematically analyze the Europeanization of Japanese 
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lobbying. The distinctive contribution of our research is the investigation of Japanese 
lobbying strategies by focusing on their embeddedness in national lobbying practices. We 
develop the research design, which is centered on a structured and focused comparison of 
a set of case studies. A case study approach enables us to investigate the details of 
Japanese lobbying, but it is also subject to several criticisms such as small sample sizes 
and difficulty of generalizing the results. Therefore, care must be taken in choosing 
particular cases and collecting data (Lijphart 1971, Gerring 2004, de Vaus 1996, Yin 
2003, Geddes 1990, Mahoney, 2000). The chapter explained a number of criteria for 
selecting four case studies and the measures for the dependent and independent variables 
which are the main focus of the subsequent chapters. The questions of how Japanese 
firms lobby in the EU and what constitute their institutional logic in developing a 
particular lobbying strategy are best analyzed by a comparative case study approach. We 
chose automobile trade policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s, electronics trade 
policies during the same period, the End of Life Vehicle Directive of 2000, and the Waste 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) and Restrictions of the use of certain 
Hazardous Substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) Directives of 2003. 
In each case study we will particularly look at both the form of interest representation of 
firms and their instruments in the lobbying process, and examine the impact of EU, 
sectoral, and corporate factors upon their particular choice of lobbying pattern. Empirical 
evidence for these case studies mainly came from the 30 interviews with a number of 
stakeholders in Brussels and Tokyo, and secondary resources such as existing documents 
and archival records. 
Chapters 5 through 7 provide the main empirical analysis in the research. We 
begin in Chapter 5 with two case studies of automobile and electronics firms’ lobbying 
strategies against the EC trade measures from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Trade 
policies symbolized the troubled transnational relations between Japan and the European 
Community during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The EC had taken a range of trade 
policy measures since the early 1980s to protect European industries, such as the 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), antidumping, and local content rules, often 
specifically targeting Japanese firms. Under such conditions, Japanese firms had to 
generate political capital and lobby the EC to influence its trade policies to their own 
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benefit for the first time in the European policymaking process. The automobile and 
electronics firms constituted one of the most important aspects of Japanese business 
lobbying during this period, as both sectors had developed the most fully-fledged 
European operations of all Japanese manufacturing sectors. In an automobile context, 
trade disputes culminated in the agreement between the Japanese government and the EC 
in July 1991, effectively placing numerical limits on Japanese automobile exports to the 
EC as a whole and to specified member countries until 1999. This landmark accord 
stipulated that free trade in automobiles would be completed by 2000 and set a 
transitional period to allow European manufacturers to adapt. Nonetheless this agreement 
constituted Europe’s principal policy response to the Japanese automobile challenge as 
unification approached. Similarly, Japanese electronics firms were subject to a series of 
EC trade policy measures during this period, although these disputes did not lead to a 
creation of single trade accord between Japan and the EC like the automobile case. The 
most important instrument of trade policy was undoubtedly antidumping. A wave of 
antidumping actions, concentrated in the second half of the 1980s, targeted Japanese 
electronics firms and often led to the imposition of duties. In addition, the EC later 
amended its antidumping law to make it applicable to Japanese assembly plants in 
Europe. This was effectively administered as local content rule. These two cases provide 
good illustrations of the formative period of Japanese lobbying in Europe; how Japanese 
automobile and electronics firms reacted to the trade barriers and chose a certain 
lobbying strategy. This chapter lays a contextual analysis of the early years of Japanese 
lobbying in the EC, which constitutes the basis for the longitudinal and cross-sectoral 
comparison with the case studies in the following chapters. It provides a window into the 
further case studies of Japanese lobbying in the post- TEU period, which highlight the 
transformation of Japanese lobbying. 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide the empirical tests of our arguments in the recent case 
studies, and thus mark a significant departure from previous studies. Although there are a 
number of studies on Japanese FDI patterns or management mechanisms in Europe, there 
are fewer that deal with the influence of firms’ lobbying on public policy or which 
examine the evolution of Japanese business interest representation in the EU. Chapter 6 
focuses on Japanese automobile firms and the ELV Directive. In short, the ELV directive 
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is concerned with cars, vans and certain three wheeled vehicles and aims to make vehicle 
dismantling and recycling more environmentally friendly. The directive sets clear 
quantified targets for reuse, recycling and recovery of vehicles and their components, 
encouraging producers to manufacture new automobile products with a view to their 
recyclablity. The ELV policymaking process provides a good case study to highlight how 
Japanese automobile firms tried to restructure their strategies in the post-TEU period and 
to what extent they managed to blend into the European automobile market in terms of 
lobbying. Japanese automobile firms have been producing in Europe since the 1970s and 
their sales now count for about 11% of European market. However, in a lobbying context, 
the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) has been the dominant 
business interest group, and the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) 
and Japanese firms are still forced to continue as separate lobbies. In this sense, the ELV 
policymaking process was more institutionalized with fewer stakeholders than other 
similar EU waste management policies, such as the case of the WEEE/RoHS directives 
and electronics industry. Hence, this case is very interesting as one of the prime examples 
in which Japanese firms tried to maximize their business interests from a relatively 
disadvantaged position to compared to their European rivals, and ended up with varying 
lobbying strategies across firms.  
Chapter 7 focuses on Japanese electronics firms and the WEEE/RoHS Directives. 
The WEEE Directive regulates the management of waste from a wide and disparate range 
of electrical and electronic consumer appliances, as well as professional equipment such 
as washing machines, TVs, radios, shavers, PCs, printers, medical equipment, vending 
machines, and toys. Producers are now responsible for taking back and recycling 
electrical and electronic equipment and consumers are able to return their equipment free 
of charge. In addition, the RoHS directive requires the substitution of various heavy 
metals (lead, mercury, cadmium, and hexavalent chromium) and brominated flame 
retardants (polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) or polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDE)) 
in new electrical and electronic equipment put on the market from the 1st July 2006. The 
case of the WEEE/RoHS directives is one of the few policies in which Japanese firms 
actively took part in the lobbying process and managed to carve out their major concerns 
in the directives at the end. The empirical tests in these chapters have two objectives. One 
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is to clarify to what extent Japanese firms have adapted to the EU policymaking process 
by focusing two aspects of their lobbying strategies: form of interest representation and 
instrument.  The other is to identify the opportunities and constraints that make up the 
institutional logic of Japanese firms to transform their lobbying strategies.  
Chapter 8 concludes our study. This chapter reviews our main arguments and 
evidence about the opportunities and constrains that make up the institutional logic of 
Japanese lobbying in the EU with reference to the enduring national characteristics. We 
then discuss the normative implications of our study. If our argument is correct, what are 
the implications for the study of non-European actors in the EU policymaking process? 
That is, the underlying nationality of firms may remain as the vital determinant of their 
political behaviour in the EU. In a wider sense, we aim to advance understanding of the 
participation of non-Western actors within the EU policymaking process. The concept of 
elite pluralism, which features direct participation of firms based on the exchange of 
information within the EU policymaking process, may not easily apply to non-European 
firms. In the age of Europeanization, the underlying nationality of firms and their national 
business culture still constitute nevertheless powerful cultural norms which define 
appropriateness with regard to the way Japanese firms operate in the political system. 
Examination of these points will also allow the opportunity to identify and suggest 
avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.  
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2. Business–government relationships in Japan and the EU 
 
For over twenty years, lobbying in the European Union (EU) has attracted the 
interests of many scholars, who have produced a number of studies of interest groups at 
national, supranational, and transnational level. In the field of European business and 
politics, many empirical studies have been undertaken (Mazey and Richardson 1993; 
Greenwood 1998, 2003; Coen 1997, 1998, 2003; Richardson 2000; Eising 2004), and it is 
now widely perceived that many European and American firms appear to have 
established a sophisticated political capacity that allows them to develop new multi-level 
and ad hoc political alliances to maximize their interests. The development of business 
interests is significant in that it challenges traditional forms of industrial collective action 
in Europe. The growing regulatory competencies of the EU have allowed large firms to 
bypass long established national lobbying channels in influencing European legislations 
and programmes. Therefore, the firms which succeed are those that have the flexibility to 
adapt to the issues and to utilize a wide variety of political channels at multiple levels. 
Large firms have established a strong EU presence, and a distinct EU business-
government relationship, which has set the standard for business lobbying across sectors 
in Brussels.  
 In this context of Europeanization, there are several further examples of research 
which examine the transformation of interest intermediation by comparing national 
traditions and studying how they were translated to the European level, or how the EU 
led to convergence between national modes of interest representation (Coen 1998; Beyers 
2002). One of the broadest conclusions of these studies is that EU policies do affect the 
ways in which national actors relate to their governments although national political 
traditions continue to matter to some extent. However, very few studies have attempted to 
explore the degree to which non-EU large firms adapt to an existing kind of EU lobbying 
practices, except several studies on trans-Atlantic comparison (Coen 1999, 2004; Cowels 
1996).  
 In this sense, Japanese firms in the EU deserve a closer examination as they are 
unique and different from their European and American rivals. They have come to 
embody significant market forces in a number of sectors in the EU. However, in a 
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lobbying context, they have no member state to champion their concerns in the Council 
of Ministers and they are not used to the concept of direct lobbying, due to the traditional 
Japanese business-government relationship. Examination of Japanese firms’ lobbying 
strategies provides an interesting insight into their adaptation to the EU business-
government relationship. Most of the existing studies of Japanese lobbying abroad look 
almost exclusively at cases in the USA or the EC-Japan trade disputes during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Although they have provided important insights into firms’ lobbies and their 
outcomes, the limited relevance of previous studies to the constantly evolving EU 
policymaking process has necessitated a theoretical reassessment of Japanese lobbying. 
Along with the growing political and economic importance of the EU, and as most trade 
disputes were largely resolved by the early 1990s, Japanese firms have also re-structured 
their lobbying strategies to maximize business interests since the mid 1990s.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows: We shall firstly review major existing lobbying 
literature in both general and EU context to present the development of EU business-
government relationship. Where we depart from general treatment of participation of 
business interests at EU level, we especially focus on large multinational firms’ lobbying 
strategies within the policymaking process. Then, in order to draw a comparison with the 
EU lobbying pattern, the Japanese business-government relationship is explained in detail, 
with special attention to firms’ preferences for collective lobbying through their business 
associations. In addition, the chapter refers to previous studies on the Japanese business 
interests abroad and points out the need for a reassessment of Japanese firms in current 
EU policymaking process. Overall, examination of these points will allow the 
opportunity to assess and clarify theoretical approaches of previous works, existing 
debates, and research agenda for Japanese lobbying in the EU to develop our research 
questions and hypotheses in subsequent chapter.  
 
 
2.1 Theories of business-government relationship  
 
 Studies of lobbying and interest representation have an important and long 
tradition. They can be broadly classified into two categories in terms of their level of 
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focus: micro- and macro-levels. Micro-level studies of lobbying investigate the 
interaction between interest groups and policymakers. Most importantly at the micro-
level of lobbying studies, the leading authority is Olson (1965). He challenged the basis 
of interest group analysis by questioning whether like-minded interests would 
automatically associate. He challenged accepted wisdom in his day that 1) if everyone in 
a group has interests in common, then they will act collectively to achieve them; and 2) in 
a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannize and exploit the 
minority (Truman 1951). Using behavioural principles derived from economics, Olson 
used the concept of rational pursuit of interests on the part of the potential member to 
show how membership would not arise if benefit could be delivered without the cost of 
membership.  
His research argues that individuals in any group attempting collective action 
have incentives to “free ride” on the efforts of others if the group is working to provide 
public goods. Individuals do not “free ride” in groups which provide benefits only to 
active participants. Public goods are goods which are non-excludable (i.e. one person 
cannot reasonably prevent another from consuming the good) and non-rival (one person’s 
consumption of the good does not affect another’s, or vice-versa). Hence, without 
selective incentives to motivate participation, collective action is unlikely to occur even 
when large groups of people with common interests exist. In this light, the public interest 
group seems more prone to free riders because it has few selective and material 
incentives to offer. Thus, mobilization problems faced by business and non business 
groups are different. There is an advantage to business in this non symmetry. It is also 
noted that large groups face relatively high costs when attempting to organize for 
collective action while small groups face relatively low costs. Furthermore, individuals in 
large groups gain relatively less per capita of successful collective action; individuals in 
small groups gain relatively more per capita through successful collective action. Hence, 
in the absence of collective incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group 
size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their common interest than small 
ones. As a result, not only is collective action by large groups difficult to achieve, even 
when they have interests in common, but situations could also occur where the minority, 
which is bound together by concentrated selective incentives, can dominate the majority. 
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This argument is widely used to describe the emergence of business interest groups as 
being dominant both numerically and politically in many Western countries.  
 Collective action theory has undergone enormous growth and elaboration since 
Olson, with a major shift from focusing on individual decisions to focusing on group 
structure and interaction. Other important micro-level studies of lobbying include 
pressure politics and rent-seeking (Becker 1983, Grossman and Helpman 2001), the 
provision of information by interest groups (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961), and 
organizational resource of interest groups (Cress and Snow 1998). 
In addition to the micro-level studies of lobbying, the main subject of most 
macro-level studies has been structural, focusing on the extent to which different social 
interests are politically represented, on the question of whether interest representation has 
a monopolistic, oligopolistic, or egalitarian structure (Streeck and Schmitter 1991), and 
whether the state is a neutral arbiter (Truman 1951) or a broker of interests (Dunleavy 
and O’Leary 1987). Thus, many macro-level approaches to interest representation have a 
strongly descriptive and prescriptive element, allowing researchers to describe and 
categorize different systems of interest representation and to investigate the effectiveness 
of different institutional constellations. Besides, the categorization facilitates the 
comparative study of political systems (Wilson 1990).  
In an EU context, by applying macro-level theories of lobbying, the development 
of the business-government relationship can be divided into three distinctive periods that 
set the theoretical foundation to examine large firms at EU level. Each period 
corresponds to the following theoretical models of lobbying.  
 
2.1.1 Corporatism 
 
There was a clear attempt to introduce a European variant of corporatism to the 
policy process during the pre-Single European Act (SEA) period (1953-1985). 
Corporatism is defined as ‘a system of interest representation in which the constituent 
units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered categories, recognized or licensed by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
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observing certain controls in their selection of leaders, and articulation of demands and 
supports’ (Schmitter 1974: 934). Corporatism involves the coordinated, cooperative, and 
systematic management of the national economy by the state, centralized unions, and 
employers, presumably to the benefit of all three actors.  
In an EU context, multinational firms were kept out of the initial stage of 
European integration and shunned in favour of trade associations, even though they were 
among the earliest to think in pan-European terms (Greenwood 2003). Besides, firms 
were reluctant to organize themselves at EC level and had little incentive to alter their 
traditional means of lobbying as they could safely rely on unfavourable European policy 
being blocked by their national governments at the Council of Ministers (Hull 1993). The 
limited amount of direct lobbying could also be explained by the policy areas in which 
the Commission had a mandate. The broad policy area of the formative stages of the EC 
did not represent the core business areas of the firms. Under such conditions, European 
wide business interest organizations had little political implications, although some of 
those groups had existed since the early 1950s in industrial sectors such as coal, steel and 
agriculture. It is pointed out that “members of the earliest big business groups were 
company leaders, who organized for selective social incentives and gathered over 
sumptuous dinners and cocktails: learning about the Community’s institutional 
arrangements and industrial programmes that might impact their firms was of secondary 
concern” (Cowels 1998: 109). That is, the broad single policy area prior to the SEA did 
not represent the core business areas of firms, but rather the broader trading environment 
of industry. It was rare for firms to have developed a specific policy initiative when it 
was easier to let its favoured national government lobby for their preferred market 
conditions.  
 
2.1.2 Pluralism  
 
During the period following the passage of the SEA in 1987, pluralist 
arrangement of business lobbying appeared to be prevalent. As a normative theory, 
pluralism is one of the underpinnings of traditional liberal democracy, best summarized 
by Dahl (1986: 4-33). As a descriptive scheme, pluralism typically has been used to 
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characterize interest group activity in systems where groups put pressure on political 
elites in a relatively disorganized and competitive manner. This is in contrast to the well-
ordered and cooperative interaction between interest groups and policymakers that is 
implied under corporatism. In terms of the equality and fairness of interest representation, 
pluralist studies of interest representation tend to conclude that representation is generally 
fair, as under represented groups of actors will be involved if their interests are not 
sufficiently taken into account by policymakers (Truman 1951). The government appears 
mainly as a neutral broker between different interests. 
The SEA called for movement towards a single internal market, and strengthened 
the competencies of the Commission in a number of policy fields, such as environmental 
policy, regional policy, and industrial policy. It also introduced the qualified majority 
voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers, suggesting that the loss of veto by the member 
states increased the risk of unfavourable policy outcomes at the end of the policy process. 
Firms came to realize that the corporatist lobbying at the Council would have limited 
impact on the drafting European directives, and thus became more proactive at the policy 
formulation stage with the Commission. As a result, this strengthened European policy 
area creating a complex pluralist lobbying environment where firms had to establish 
some sort of political credibility to put pressure on political elites. This is in contrast to 
the well-ordered and cooperative interaction between interest groups and political 
authorities that is implied by corporatism. There was a sharp rise in the volume and 
diversity of business interests represented at European level. It was estimated in 1992 that 
there were no less than 3,000 special interest groups of varying types in Brussels with up 
to 10,000 employees working in the lobbying sector (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998).  
  
2.1.3 Elite Pluralism 
 
The pluralist trend was further strengthened by the Treaty of European Union in 
1992. As a result, by the early 1990s, the Commission experienced access overload of 
interest groups, and thus sought to regulate entry for firms and other groups into the 
policymaking process by encouraging the establishment of quasi-formal industrial forums. 
While these forums pursue collective goods, they generally have a more focused agenda-
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setting role than the pre-existing European federations, and benefit greatly from being the 
sum of like-minded firms. With the success of these privately generated forums, the 
Commission has also set up a number of sector forums, such as the Automobile 
Workshop, the Transport Network Round Table. Successful firms must develop expertise 
and familiarity with issues, individuals, and groups involved in policymaking process. 
Large firms, such as Daimler-Benz and BP, have been invited to participate in high-level 
forums that discuss broad developments of the EU policies. With the weakening of 
traditional national lobbying channels, firms have recognized that the EU policymaking 
process consists of a number of issue sub-systems that require complex and flexible 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998). These alliances 
can be temporary ad hoc groups based around fast changing single issues (Pijenburg 1997; 
Baumgartner and Leech 2001) or more permanent pan-European groupings organized 
around formalized relationships with the EU policymakers and among members such as 
European Automobile Manufactures Association (ACEA).Thus, a large part of European 
business interest representation has become based on the limited number of forum style 
arrangements between EU institutions and selected firms. The Commission can pull in 
firms; it invites some firms to participate in the policymaking process and rival firms 
outside the forums must restructure their lobbying to also participate.  
The pluralist approach to understand the EU policymaking process has come 
under attack from Olson-style micro-level theories of collective action, which argued that 
certain interests are less likely to organize and hence to be politically influential (Olson 
1965). Among macro-level studies, this argument provides a micro-foundation for 
theories of elite pluralism (Schattschneider 1960, Coen 1997). Elite pluralism is defined 
as ‘a system where access is generally restricted to a few policy players for whom 
membership is competitive and strategically advisable, but not compulsory or enforceable 
as in the corporatist model, and where the numerous points of access to the policy process 
and the interdependency of many of these channels hinder the identification of an 
institutional hierarchy’ (Coen 1997: 98). In this sense, Brussels has become an insider’s 
town, where operating effectively depends upon a dense network of interpersonal and 
intergovernmental links, and where it is difficult for outsiders to exercise any influence. 
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2.1.4 Emergence of distinctive business-government relationships in the EU 
 
While national business associations are still vital policy channels for European 
business interests, large firms have become independent political actors in the EU (Coen 
1997, 2001), representing their interests either individually or  collectively through 
sectoral associations and ad hoc coalitions with other likeminded firms. Business groups 
are the predominant category of European interest groups, constituting 63% of all 
European-level interest groups in one survey (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). Around 
950 formally constituted business interest associations are organized at, and addressed to, 
EU level, accounting for approximately two-thirds of all EU groups. Approximately 350 
firms have some form of European representation in Brussels, and over a third of those 
are from the USA, 5% from Japan, 9% from both France and the UK, and 7% from 
Germany (Coen 1999, 2007). They are coordinated and staffed with senior managers and 
specialized government affairs directors. This highlights that increased interest in direct 
lobbying at EU level was not confined to the member states. Concern on the part of non-
EU firms and business organizations that completion of the single market might create a 
protectionist fortress of Europe has promoted the widespread awareness for lobbying at 
EU level among non-European firms. It is pointed out that whilst Eastern European and 
Chinese interests continued to rely largely upon diplomatic representation in Brussels, 
American and Japanese firms were among the first groups which opened lobbying offices 
in Brussels (Gilson 2000, Hughes 2001).  
When lobbying under the current elite pluralist environment, firms seek to 
establish networks with the policymakers and gain political credibility by mainly 
exchanging insider and technical information (Broscheid and Coen, 2003). The desire by 
large firms to participate directly in the EU policymaking process is reciprocated by the 
Commission’s demand for quick and reliable information as well (Bouwen 2002, 
McLaighlin and Jordan 1993; Mazey and Richardson 1993). The Commission 
bureaucracy has approximately 16,000 members, the size of a larger city administration 
(van Schendelen 1996: 26). Thus, it relies to a large extent on private actors to supply it 
with information and to help it draft legislation. Financial campaign contributions which 
are prevalent in the US and Japan are not a part of business lobbying strategy in the EU 
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(Titley 2005). Successful firms need to exchange their technical information in return for 
the access to the policymakers. By utilizing such technical information, they lobby on 
policy formulation and revision at the Commission and the EP, as well as decision 
making at the Council. A successful lobby requires a number of vertical and horizontal 
strategies. Firms must be aware of where a policy is initiated, what the alternative 
pressure points are, and who has the potential veto points in the process (Coen 2003). 
Creating a working relationship requires time and an element of give and take. However, 
while trust can be developed through the provision of credible information over time, it 
can be lost in a much shorter period. Therefore, firms have come to invest a lot of 
resources to collect reliable technical information and maintain contacts with the 
policymakers at all times. The EU policymaking process is highly segmented, with a high 
degree of specialization geared around the input of professional expertises, over which 
business interests may have a monopoly against other interest groups. As a result, firms 
have a strategic resource advantage in lobbying and take a prominent role in both 
formulation and implementation of EU policies (Coen 1997, Bouwen 2002, Joos and 
Waldenberger 2005, and Jordan 2002). 
The EU business-government relationship is more long-term and trust based than 
the competitive and fragmented one which is found in the USA. EU lobbying is 
essentially more consensual rather than adversarial (Titley 2005). It is usually more 
important to reach agreement than for one side to win. In any case, there are usually too 
many ‘sides’ for any single one to emerge as the sole victor. Unlike the situation in the 
US, where defensive lobbying is a widely used tactic aiming to block legislation, it is not 
in the nature of EU lobbying to stop something or kill it. In Brussels, lobbyists must learn 
to speak softly, softly (Woll 2006: 461). This consensus-oriented lobbying style has some 
of its origins in the fact that the European nation state has always been rather 
interventionist and the EU has had to step up its regulatory activity with the creation of 
the single market. This means a commitment to free markets but with extensive social 
and labour market regulation. The EU has produced a political environment where the 
administrative bureaucracies and the business interests have to work together to realize 
the policy objectives. Yet, during consultation and revision periods, firms negotiate hard 
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to minimize any negative impacts upon their interests before a final decision is made 
(Pedler, 2002).   
 
2.1.5 Europeanization of lobbying practices among large firms 
 
The development of a distinct business-government relationship at EU level is 
significant in that it challenges traditional forms of industrial collective action. The 
growing regulatory competencies of the EU have allowed these large firms to bypass 
long established national lobbying channels in influencing European legislations and 
programmes. Many MNEs have established a sophisticated political capacity that allows 
them to develop multi-level and ad hoc political alliances. This political coordination has 
standardized the ways of business interest representation across issues and altered 
national public policy systems. Several studies have illustrated the emergence of complex 
issue networks and more horizontal European interest communities (Richardson 2000, 
Coen and Dannreuther 2003). 
In this context of Europeanization, there are several works which examined the 
transformation of interest intermediation by comparing national traditions and studying 
how they were translated to EU level or how the EU led to convergence between national 
modes of interest representation (Coen 1998, Beyers 2002). The investigation of 
corporatist, pluralist, and elite pluralist business-government relationships has led to the 
comparative study of different national and sectoral patterns of interest representation 
(Greenwood 1997, Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998, Streeck and Schmitter 1991).  
Varying national business lobbying traditions in which firms are embedded may 
explain the different degree of Europeanization and the speed of change among firms in 
the EU. It is claimed that “in countries such as the US and UK, where there had been a 
long tradition of competing for government attention, adapting to the lobbying 
opportunities in the EU came as second nature.”(Coen 1998: 97) For example, Jordan 
(2002) analysed the Europeanization of British environmental policies and argued that 
Europeanization was an outcome of Britain’s evolving response to European integration 
and an important part of the broader process of bringing that about. In addition, there are 
some cultural and historical traditions that hindered firms’ mobility. In countries such as 
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France, Germany and Italy, where business had an institutional lobbying arrangement 
with the state, it took longer to recognize that national channels were diminishing in 
importance. German big business, for example, became involved in European business 
groups rather belatedly given its strong national industry associations (Cowles 1998). 
There is no doubt that increased internationalization has freed large firms from the 
constraints of national governments; the reality has often been that firms, in the past, 
conformed to the national political institutions and regulations for the purposes of 
domestic access and influence. The establishment of a multi-level policymaking process 
with a number of access points has induced a more formal political internationalization of 
business interests and provided a legal alternative for access to the EU policymakers.  
Generally, one of the broadest conclusions of these studies is that the EU politics 
do affect the ways in which national groups relate to their governments and organize 
themselves at EU level, although some national political traditions may continue to 
matter to some extent. Many existing studies treat large firms as a relatively 
homogeneous group, increasingly becoming European regardless of their nationality, and 
claim that, within the single European market, firms have harmonized their lobbying 
activity and become pan-European political actors. The consequence of increasing direct 
lobbying strategies among firms has been the creeping institutionalization of forum style 
politics and the creation of issue networks that have harmonized firms’ lobbying patterns 
at EU level.  
 
2.1.6 Persistence of national characteristics in the face of Europeanization 
 
Despite the convergence of strategies and business interests in Brussels, we can 
still expect some national business-government characteristics to persist in the 
foreseeable future. Very few scholars have examined how non-European and American 
firms have adapted to the constantly evolving EU lobbying environment. More 
specifically, Japanese firms are unique and different from their European and American 
rivals. They have come to embody significant market forces in a number of sectors in the 
EU. There are about 900 Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the EU including 271 in the 
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UK, 144 in France, and 133 in Germany.
1
 However, in a lobbying context, they have no 
member state to champion their concerns in the Council of Ministers, and unlike 
American firms, they are not used to the concept of direct lobbying due to the traditional 
business culture. For Japanese firms, adjusting their lobbying strategies to the EU 
policymaking process is transnational in its nature as opposed to supranational for 
European firms. Needless to say, growing EU institutions do not affect the way which 
Japanese firms relate to their national government. Thus, Japanese firms in the EU are 
likely to develop their lobbying strategies on the basis of their national lobbying pattern.  
In order to support this claim, transnational relations literatures present an 
interesting account for convergence of EU and Japanese lobbying practices. That is, 
while several transnational relations theories consider the transnational diffusion effects 
of cultural values and norms or the impact of international communication networks on 
public attitudes and national societies (Thomas, Meyer, et al 1987, Willets 1982), Risse 
(1995, 2003) specifically argues that focusing on the differences of domestic structures, 
which are shaped differently by the specific historical experiences in different countries, 
permits us to gain analytical leverage to explain various kinds of transnational relations. 
Transnational relations are defined as “regular interactions across national boundaries 
when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an international organization” (Risse-Kappen 1995; 3). In this sense, 
foreign lobbies are the prime example of transnational actors and an important element in 
the process of internationalization. The impact of transnational actors and coalitions on a 
hosting state’s policies is likely to vary according to “differences in domestic structures, 
i.e. the normative and organizational arrangements which form the state, structure society, 
and link the two in the polity” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 6). The domestic structures of the 
hosting political environment are likely to act in determining the ability of transnational 
actors to bring about policy changes. In other words, the notion of domestic structures 
refers to the political institutions of the state, to societal structures, and to the policy 
networks linking the two. Domestic structures encompass the organizational apparatus of 
political societal institutions, their routines, the decision-making rules and procedures 
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incorporated in law and custom, as well as the values and norms embedded in the 
political culture. 
The major proposition put forward by these concepts is that variations in domestic 
structures account for differences in the policy impact of transnational coalitions and 
actors. Structures of governance, both domestic and international, interact in determining 
the policy impact of transnational actors. The differences of domestic structures which 
firms encounter abroad induce the transformation and some extent of localisation of 
foreign lobbies in each hosting country. In other words, a foreign firm’s lobbying 
strategies to influence policies in the various issue areas are mediated, filtered and 
refracted by the hosting environments. This clearly shows that foreign lobbies are a bi-
cultural product shaped by both the hosting and original political environments. That is to 
say, foreign lobbies are based on their domestic experiences and patterns of business-
government relations as well as adaptation of hosting country’s social norms, culture, 
business tradition, and other institutional settings. The concept of domestic structure 
concerns the incorporation of political culture. Insights from new institutionalism are 
therefore included, in particular the emphasis on communicative action, duties, social 
obligations, and norms of appropriate behaviour. Therefore, in order to investigate how 
Japanese firms have re-structured their lobbying strategies in the EU, it is important to 
have a clear idea of Japanese business-government relationship in which these firms are 
deeply rooted. 
 
 
2.2 Japanese business-government relationship 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Model 
 
 Speaking of the significance of the nationality of the firm which is underpinned 
by the historical and social legacies of the state, we now need to turn to the examination 
of the Japanese business-government relationship. It is necessary to have an 
understanding of these issues in order to fully capture the development of Japanese 
lobbying in the EU.  
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Japanese politics is often seen by the elitist perspective, which is based on the 
concept of tripartite power elites composed of the leaders of the ruling party (Liberal 
Democratic Party), the bureaucracy, and organized business. According to this 
perspective, these three major groups comprise a regular and effective alliance and 
control decision-making on major issues, although it emphasizes the bureaucracy rather 
than other political or economic leaders (Muramatsu, Ito and Tsujinaka 2001). Japanese 
political and business circles are inseparably connected to the bureaucracy, comprising a 
united power nucleus. One of the most well-known terms for this model is ‘Japan Inc.’, 
suggesting the most extreme and intertwined nature of government, bureaucracy and 
business.  
 Recent studies of Japanese politics point out that the roles of politicians, business, 
and mass participation have become more and more prominent. It appears that, since the 
early 1990s, Japan has entered a more pluralistic stage in its politics and policymaking 
process. For example, Blaker, Giarra and Vogel (2002) argue that Japan is in many ways 
fragmented and pluralistic. It is without question a vertically organized society, however 
it is also structured horizontally and at each level there are numerous groups, fiercely 
assertive of their own interests, locked in competition with one another. In this sense, 
Japanese politics is sometimes described as “bureaucratic and mass inclusionary 
pluralism”, “patterned pluralism” or “compartmentalized pluralism” in which the 
monopolistic role of the bureaucracy in the policymaking process has been intact, but the 
roles of other political actors have also become increasing important, while the Western 
pluralist assumption that policymaking is carried out in free competition among various 
actors is still clearly hindered by the elite groups and hierarchically organized social 
structure (Zhao 1993, Tsujinaka 1997, Muramatsu, Ito, and Tsujinaka 2001, and 
Kono2003). This political setting provides an institutional basis for firms and other 
interest groups to play their political function.  
Under such political setting where business and government are closely 
intertwined, the concept of harmony (Wa) is essential to maintain their relationship. That 
is, business related policies are mostly drafted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI), and METI traditionally stresses that business policy should serve the 
long-term interests of Japan to enhance its economic propensity and social stability 
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through growing technological autonomy and the pursuit of a policy of international 
cooperation (Vogel 1996, Nester 1993, McCargo 2000). As a result, the Japanese 
business community also stresses that firms should serve the long term interests of Japan 
as a whole. It emphasizes long term profits through cooperating and networking with 
other countervailing groups. Japanese firms prefer to participate in one kind of meeting or 
another in the field in which they specialize or in related fields, in order to solidify and 
expand their social contacts. In addition, many Japanese business organizations show a 
strong tendency to develop close ties with other groups and firms whose immediate 
interests appear quite different from their own, demonstrating a Japanese characteristic of 
building as large a group of connections as possible, on the basis of what many 
Westerners might regard as minimum common interests (Kubota 1997). The concept of 
harmony traditionally expresses this norm and is deeply rooted in Japanese society. 
Under such political conditions, there is a clear lack of direct lobbying among firms’ 
strategies within the Japanese policymaking process. Instead, it is crucial for firms to 
maintain an informal relationship with national policymakers to secure their policy goals 
and quietly solve any problems. The Japanese business-government relationship is 
characterized by the extensive use of informal political activities of firms, which integrate 
their business interests into the policymaking process and make the boundary of public 
and private spheres blur. Informal settings are an important element of the Japanese 
business-government relationship in the way policymakers can listen and hear business 
interests which they might otherwise ignore.  
Emphasis on harmony in the Japanese business-government relationship seems 
contradictory to the fundamental nature of business lobbying, in which business interests 
must exchange insider information for the favoured policy outcomes or put some kind of 
pressure on policymakers to influence their decisions. Japanese firms seem to focus on 
maintaining stability in the policymaking process while they still need to conduct 
lobbying to feed their interests into politics. One important question is posed here. If 
emphasis on harmony is so important to Japanese firms, how can it be created and 
sustained within business lobbying practices? In order to answer the question, we begin 
by disaggregating Japanese firms’ lobbying patterns which enable them to incorporate 
lobbying and harmony. 
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2.2.2 Lobbying Pattern in Japan 
 
Firstly, due to a long tradition of business activism and the existence of a 
hierarchically organized business community, Japanese firms show strong tendencies for 
collective action (Zhao 1993) through national business associations. These associations 
are well connected to each other and with politicians and bureaucrats. To be more precise, 
there are three different groups within the Japanese business community, each 
representing different hierarchical levels of economic groups; the top level is zaikai (the 
leaders of major economic organizations), the second is gyokai (the industrial groups), 
and the third is individual firms (Ogata 1977; Stockwin 1999; Yoshimatsu 2000). Zaikai 
are regarded as representative of big business interests including top economic 
organizations, such as the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (keidanren), 
the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (nihon shoko kaigisho or nissho), the 
Japanese Committee for Economic Development (keizai doyukai), and the Japanese 
Federation of Business Managers (nikkeiren). Keidanren is regarded as the bastion of big 
business because its leaders are drawn from such circles and its corporate members 
occupy a disproportionate position of the whole. Keidanren has the most extensive range 
of interests and most intensive activities. It is concerned with numerous domestic issues, 
not only economic but also social and political as well as international problems. While 
Keidanren deals with the government, it does not have much to do with labour-
management relations. This is left to the Nikkeiren. Keizai Doyukai is a more informal 
group, bringing together relatively progressive middle managers from somewhat less 
politically constrained companies. Unlike the three others, Nissho represents the interests 
of medium-sized or small business firms. It is not as fiercely independent or assertive as 
other zaikai organizations. It was created under national law, receives some state support, 
and cooperates more directly with the bureaucracy. Although each zaikai organization 
represents a different group within the Japanese business community, they all tend to 
maintain reasonably friendly relations with each other and co-operate closely on many 
matters including those that do not fall neatly into the jurisdiction of one zaikai 
organization or another. They are the heads of Japan’s multinational corporations and 
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exercise significant political power over Japanese politics. Although it is said to cost a 
few million dollars a year for a firm to send out one of its most senior officers as a zaikai 
leader, these positions are regarded as being highly prestigious and so they are actively 
sought after by Japan’s top business leaders.
2
 These zaikai leaders are often described as 
Prime Ministers of business community, and invited to participate in many very 
important political events in Japan including, for example, state dinners for visiting heads 
of state.  
Gyokai is equivalent to an industrial sector representing specific interests, which 
range from manufacturing to finance and from small to large sized industries. Gas (Japan 
Gas Council), electricity (JEITA: Japan Electronics and Information Technology 
industries Association), automobile (JAMA: Japan Automobile Manufacturers 
Association), and steel (Japan Iron and Steel Federation), for example, are considered 
among the most powerful gyokai in the business society.  A gyokai’s function is to 
coordinate competitive interests among individual firms within their respective spheres. It 
is at this level that industries have close contact with responsible bureaucrats as the 
gyokai represents interests of a sector as a whole against governmental and foreign 
pressure. A zaikai, on the other hand, does not represent any particular industrial sector, 
however it mediates conflicts between gyokai and coordinates national economic goals 
with the government (Abe 1999).  
Finally, since zaikai and gyokai are more politically powerful in Japan, individual 
firms tend to follow the decisions of their business associations. It is traditionally the case 
that an individual is seen as subordinate to the group to which he or she belongs. The 
effect of such traditional norm is that individual Japanese firms are reluctant to take 
initiatives and initiate lobbying on their own. Most lobbying is initiated collectively 
under the initiatives of business associations. This strong tendency for collective action 
inevitably leads to a clear lack of desire for direct lobbying among firms. 
What is significant with these business groups at three different levels are their 
objectives and functions in the Japanese policymaking process. These groups have a 
different level of counterpart in the bureaucracy and among politicians. While zaikai 
interacts with high-level bureaucrats and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)/other 
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parties’ senior leaders, gyokai and individual firms communicate with bureaus and 
sections of the Ministries and certain politicians with interests in particular policy areas. 
It appears that top Japanese business leaders from these zaikai organizations continue to 
devote a large amount of their time to matters that are national in scope and far broader 
than any particular concerns directly related to the specific firms that continue to pay 
their salaries.  
 
Secondly, informal networks are some of the most effective mechanisms by 
which to coordinate different interests and to achieve consensus among political elites. 
Given the centralized powerful bureaucracy and a long tradition that heavily values social 
harmony and cooperation, informal networks give firms broader options, provide more 
flexibility for bargaining and compromise and reduce the risk of offending the domestic 
or international actors involved (Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1995). Such networking is 
based on informal and personalized means, such as financial contribution, fine-dining and 
offers of prestigious positions in the private sector to retired bureaucrats (amakudari). 
Some degree of informal networking between firms and policymakers is prevalent in 
most countries. However, with regard to their usage, there is a clear difference in degree 
and scope of intensity between Japan and the EU. The use of personalized/informal 
networks for political influence and mobilization in Japan is a more visible and frequent 
activity than in many other industrialized countries.  
Japanese businesses often exercise significant political power through financial 
backing of the political parties. This is especially so when we note that of Japan’s three 
(previously four) principal zaikai organizations, only Keidanren plays a publicly 
acknowledged role in collecting funds from leading Japanese firms and major gyokai 
organizations. It used to distribute these funds mainly among Japan’s conservative 
political parties, although it ceased its role in political fund-raising in 1994 after a series 
of political scandals involving big firms and politicians. Until 1993, donation quotas were 
assigned to each industrial organization such as the Japan Iron and Steel Federation and 
the Federation of Electric Power Companies. Huge amounts were collected from 
affiliated companies, and then Keidanren distributed the donations through the National 
Political Association to political parties including the Liberal Democratic Party and the 
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now-disbanded Democratic Socialist Party. For example, the total annual amount of 
political funds handled by Keidanren in this process usually ranged from 120 to 140 
million dollars per year (Kubota 1996, 1997). Despite the fact that political donations to 
individual politicians or their personal fundraising organizations were banned in 2000, for 
the 2002 national election campaigns, donations to political parties from firms and 
industrial organizations reached about 26 million dollars. In 2004, a new method for 
political donations through Keidanren was introduced. It now provides guidelines as a 
reference for companies and industrial organizations when they make political donations. 
These guidelines comprise evaluations of the policies of political parties, indicating their 
practical strengths and track records. After referring to these guidelines, companies and 
organizations independently decide on the recipients and the amounts of their donations. 
Many gyokai organizations and individual firms continue to donate large sums of money 
to the political parties at both national and local levels. The rest of the financial 
contributions from the business world to the parties and politicians consist of membership 
fees and purchase of tickets for fund raising events. These tickets may well be sold 
unofficially though individuals using an informal person to person organizational 
structure. The business community tries to see its goals realized by having Keidanren 
unify and channel donations exclusively to those parties that accept its demands not only 
in such areas as tax reform and industrial policies but also in diplomatic, defense and 
security areas. In this sense, Japanese business interests can buy political influence.  
 Furthermore, Japanese business interests have a close network with bureaucrats 
as well, although manipulation takes a different form from the case of the business-
politician network. While public employees are paid reasonably well and expect a decent 
retirement, and therefore have less acute needs for money than politicians, they are not 
immune to certain temptations. It is pointed out that they do enjoy fine wining and dining 
especially when their own wages or pocket money exclude this, and it is nice to have an 
occasional round of golf at the expense of some big firms, especially if they bet on the 
game and win a lot of money when their host turns out to be a poor golfer. Then there are 
the real bribes (Woronoff 1986, Okumura 2000). Yet, more than anything, the 
bureaucracy is aided by the practice of amakudari (literally “descent from heaven”), 
which enable retired bureaucrats to move to the private sector and hold responsible and 
 45 
prestigious positions as second careers. This enables leaders of industries and big 
businesses to cultivate intimate relations and establish a close-knit social network with 
bureaucrats. For example, the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Association routinely imports 
high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Transport to fill its top positions. The Japan 
Association of Pharmaceutical Organizations makes it a rule to have former officials of 
the Ministry of Health and Wealth as its leaders. These ex-bureaucrats are valuable assets 
for an industry; through them the business world can manoeuvre officialdom into the 
decisions it prefers. The other side of the coin is that bureaucrats know that they will be 
likely to end up occupying important positions in the corporate world, so see no harm in 
developing and maintaining congenial relations with representatives of the business 
world. Out of 1268 senior bureaucrats who retired from their Ministries in 2005, 553 of 
them (43.5%) went to work for the industrial associations and other business 
organizations. From 1999 to 2004, about 3,700 retired bureaucrats took up the senior 
position in the business sectors.
3
 The exercise of such informal instruments to politicians 
and bureaucrats indicate that Japanese firms do not hesitate to buy access to the 
policymakers and invest large sums of money to create favourable political environments 
for themselves.  
 
Thirdly, Japanese firms’ style of consultative lobbying involves a wide range of 
behind-the-scenes consensus building (nemawashi). In contrast to the EU practice, the 
Japanese consultative process is characterized by mainly top-down one way interaction, 
in which business actors are rather passive in terms of policy input contributions. This 
working style has deep roots in Japanese social norms and practices. This can be defined 
as a system of careful and thorough consultations, before a decision is arrived at by 
general consensus, to avoid open confrontation (Zhao 1993, Ohtsu and Imanari 2002, 
Kono and Clegg 2001). As discussed earlier, actions such as taking risks and initiatives, 
being assertive and inventive tend not to be rewarded within Japanese society which 
values harmony (Zhao, 1993). This tradition makes the Japanese uncomfortable with 
outspokenness in social gatherings, especially in a formal setting. The effect of these 
attitudes is evident at the negotiating table, where Japanese diplomats rarely make bold 
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moves or propose new initiatives, and where a change in the personnel of Japanese 
delegation rarely alters the complexion or dynamic of the discussions. In other words, 
individual contact and connection may be casual in the beginning and may not 
necessarily result in obligation. Nevertheless, as personal connection deepens, mutual 
obligations based on mutual interests begin to mount, and individual consultation 
becomes necessary. Contacts and mutual trusts can be established for all negotiating 
parties, and disputes can be solved quietly through compromise. In practice, the results of 
these behind-the-scenes activities often take the form of a Ministry giving advice, 
suggestions, instructions, and warnings to business interests, although these are without 
statutory basis. As there are many retired bureaucrats in business due to the widespread 
practice of amakudari, they often help to deal with the policy guidance provided by the 
Ministries (Sugimoto 1997). This indirect style indeed reflects Japan’s traditional cultural 
emphasis on the importance of maintaining harmony among the Japanese as well as with 
foreigners.  
As a result, the Japanese business-government relationship is extremely 
consensual. Many Japanese firms are rather eager to accept the policy guidance provided 
by politicians and bureaucrats at the negotiation table to avoid open confrontation. The 
idea of extensive consensus building often slows the process of coordinating positions 
within the policymaking process. Thus, the informal way of manoeuvring may sometimes 
provide mixed and uncertain messages externally, thereby creating confusion in 
communication with foreigners. As Japan’s economy matures further, the society will 
advance in the direction of greater political pluralism. Popular demand for more active 
political participation is expected to continue to grow. Japanese politics will move more 
toward a more inclusive direction. Policy debate in open forums will become more 
frequent, and special interest groups will be more proactive and skilful, thereby 
increasing their political influence. Nonetheless, in the immediate future and for some 
time to come, most of the basic characteristics of Japanese business lobbying are unlikely 
to change drastically. Table 1 summarizes the patterns of business lobbying in the EU 
and Japan. 
 
 
 47 
Table 2.1  Patterns of business lobbying in the EU and Japan 
 
 
 EC/EU Japan 
 
Organization of interest 
representation: 
 
How do individual business 
actors organize? 
Direct representation 
 
Pan-European and sectoral 
organization 
 
Ad-hoc coalitions 
 
Collective action through national 
and sectoral organizations 
 
Hardly any direct representation 
 
 
Instruments: 
 
What methods and 
resources are available? 
Consultation (both formal and 
informal) based on technical 
information 
 
Outsider strategies limited 
 
Lobbying on formulation and 
revision at supranational level 
 
Decision lobbying through 
national routes 
Financial contributions 
 
Amakudari 
 
Informal consultation 
 
Style of consultative 
lobbying: 
 
How do business actors 
express their demands? 
Constructive 
 
Consensus-oriented 
Passive 
 
Behind-the-scenes consensus 
building 
 
 
 
2.3 Previous studies of Japanese lobbying abroad 
 
 Japanese business lobbying in the EU is still a relatively new and much needed 
area of research in the discipline of public policy. There are a limited number of studies 
that focus on the roles of Japanese firms and their political capacities, such as in seeking 
strategic alliances and negotiating with other stakeholders. Most existing studies have 
tended to discuss the issue of how the government controls and administers the private 
sector in the context of FDI or trade policies (Mason 1997, Belderbos 1997, Gilson 2000). 
There are fewer that deal with the influence of firms’ lobbying on public policy or which 
examine the evolution of Japanese business interest representation in the EU. In addition, 
many existing studies of Japanese lobbying abroad take their cases from US politics 
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(Yamada 1982, Shinoda 1989, Choate 1990, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995), although 
some of the theoretical approaches in these studies are also relevant to the study of 
Japanese firms in the EU and deserve some examination as well.  
 
2.3.1 US  
 
Katzenstein and Tsujinaka (1995) considered the difference in the political 
strategies and tactics adopted by the American automobile and the Japanese electronics 
industries. They analysed the difference in how American firms typically pursue their 
political objectives in Japan and how Japanese firms typically proceed in the USA, in 
terms of the difference in domestic structures of both countries.  In short, the Japanese 
government spends a great deal of money and effort trying to create a favourable public 
climate in the USA by investing in well-placed officials, many of them former members 
of the US government, who enjoy excellent access to key decision makers. The attention 
to image building and creation of a favourable public climate in America are distinctive 
features of Japan’s transnational relations with the United States, which are rooted in both 
the constraints under which foreign lobbies operate, as well as the political importance of 
a favourable public climate in Japan’s domestic politics (Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 
1995). Japan’s lobbies in the American policymaking process reflect some characteristics 
of America’s domestic structure. Due to the weakness of the American party system, 
Japanese lobbies, in times of political need, target individuals, Congressional districts and 
individual states rather than national political institutions. Since the 1950s, Japanese 
institutions and firms have spent an enormous amount of time, energy, and resources in 
mastering the American political process (Hansen and Mitchell 2001). The network of 
institutional and individual contacts they have built is both deep and broad. This lobbying 
strategy also corresponds in part to the Japanese domestic lobbying pattern in which 
firms must informally cultivate political channels with bureaucrats, politicians and other 
stakeholders. It is claimed that there is little doubt that the Japan lobby in the United 
States is the largest and most effective foreign efforts to influence legislation, 
policymaking, and public attitudes in this country (Uchida 2000). With its American face, 
the Japanese lobby has become almost integrated into the fundamental structure of advice 
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giving, consultation and governance in Washington (Shinoda 1989, Katzenstein and 
Tsujinaka 1995). Several cultural characteristics of domestic structures, such as the 
Japanese decision-making norm of reciprocal consent and the American notation of 
liberal pluralism, are only partly embodied in explicit regulations, but constitute 
nevertheless powerful cultural norms which define appropriateness with regard to the 
way decisions should be made in the political system. Japanese firms’ approaches to the 
US policymaking process are partly an extension of their own domestic experiences, as 
well as being shaped by the political setting of the USA.   
The Americanization of Japanese lobbying is also confirmed in several other 
studies. For example, Shinoda (1989) investigated how the Japanese automobile industry 
lobbied the US government to ban the Domestic Content Bill in 1983. Similarly, 
Yoshimasu (2000) looked at the internationalization of the Japanese automobile and 
electronics industries in the US markets.  
These findings may imply that the theoretical foundation, which focuses on the 
transformation of domestic lobbying patterns and convergence with the hosting 
environment, seems also relevant and applicable for the study of Japanese business 
lobbies operating in other area of the world. However, it goes without saying that the US 
policymaking process is very different to that of the EU; what works there has not 
necessarily worked in the past in Europe and may not necessarily even work in the 
present environment in the Single European Market.  
 
2.3.2 EC/EU  
 
In an EU context, there are some studies which look at the structure and actors of 
the European policymaking process in relation to Japanese business interests. Kewley 
(2002) analysed Japanese lobbying in the automobile industry since the 1970s and 
identified the gradual processes in which they have re-structured their lobbying strategies. 
According to his observations, there was no significant Japanese lobbying at the 
European level until the 1980s: Japan did not view the Community as a whole, but 
preferred to conduct trade bilaterally with its constituent parts; the member states or their 
domestic industries. Most trade between Japan and the EC was conducted bilaterally at 
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the member state level, whereby Japan agreed to accept Voluntary Restraint Agreements 
(VRAs) in its exports, or alternatively, export restraint was exercised by Japanese firms 
sectorally, known as Voluntary Export Restrictions (VERs). Thus, Japanese firms did not 
attempt to lobby the EC because their strategic trade objectives were being realized to a 
large extent through the acceptance of such agreements. 
Yet since the 1980s, due to the severe economic conditions in the European 
market and Japan’s aggressive export-oriented EC policies, the EC and some member 
states have become more hostile towards Japanese investment. Thus, it became 
increasing important for Japanese firms to lobby to secure their policy objectives, and this 
was largely carried out indirectly through supportive member states, especially the UK, 
and in conjunction with the Japanese government and its Ministries, especially the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) since 2001). On the issue of exports to the EC/EU, many decisions 
were at MITI’s discretion: MITI handled negotiations to estimate European market 
growth, decided the scale of total Japanese exports, and allocated export quotas to 
individual firms. Under such conditions, the participation of Japanese automobile firms in 
MITI’s policymaking process was not usually exposed to the public, in that their more 
important contacts were often held at an informal level (Ando 2005). Several studies have 
also been undertaken to examine troubled trade disputes between Japan and the EC 
during this period. For example, Belderbos (1997) dealt with various aspects of the 
internationalisation of Japanese electronics firms and the role of trade policies in shaping 
Japanese firms’ trade and investment behaviour in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Similarly, Mason (1997) examined aggressive FDI patterns of the Japanese automobile 
and electronics industries in the European market and how they challenged and 
negotiated with EU institutions and firms to solve the trade related disputes. Abe (1999) 
claimed that automobile disputes symbolized the troubled trade relations between Japan 
and the EC in the 1980s, and focused on Japan’s automobile trade policy towards the EC 
to understand this transnational negotiation, with special attention to the power 
relationship between the automobile firms and MITI. More generally, Gilson (2000) 
clarified the processes that have mediated Japan-EU political relations since the 1950s by 
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focusing on both the internal and external driving forces that have promoted change and 
development within this bilateral relationship over the past few decades. 
These existing studies about Japanese firms in the EU provide some empirical 
understanding of their lobbying behaviours in certain sectors and policy areas. For 
instance, in the automobile sector, Japan and the EC signed an agreement in 1991 which 
stipulated that free trade in automobiles be completed by 1999 and set a transitional 
period to allow European manufacturers to adapt. Since the agreement, officials from the 
Japanese government and the Commission have held biannual meetings to control the 
flow of Japanese cars into Europe. Most case studies tend to set MITI as a key Japanese 
lobbying actor and argue that the accord of 1991 confirmed the role of MITI in trade 
control and, by avoiding commitment to restricting transplanted cars, the accord also 
allowed transnational development between Japanese firms and European actors. In 
addition, individual firms tended to rely on JAMA to express their opinions as a whole 
industrial sector rather than commenting independently on foreign trade issues.  
In addition, the rapid increase in Japanese electronics firms’ FDIs in the late 
1980s and early 1990s created a series of similar trade disputes between Japan and the 
EC, concerning products such as colour televisions, videocassette recorders and compact 
disc players. That is, the EC have taken a range of trade policy measures since the early 
1980s to protect the electronics industry, often specifically targeting Japanese firms. A 
voluntary export restraint was negotiated for Japanese VCRs in 1983. The most important 
instrument of trade policy has undoubtedly been antidumping. A wave of antidumping 
actions, concentrated in the second half of the 1980s, targeted Japanese electronics firms 
and often led to the imposition of duties. When the Japanese firms appeared to respond 
by investing in EC manufacturing operations in order to bypass antidumping measures, 
the EC amended its antidumping law to make it applicable to Japanese assembly plants as 
well. This amendment was effectively administered as local content rule. It was invoked 
seven times from 1987 to 1990. All cases involved Japanese firms, and five cases 
targeted electronics products (Belderbos 1997). Along with the creation of the European 
single market and increasing localization of Japanese FDIs in Europe, trade measures 
targeting Japanese firms in the 1980s, such as national quotas, local content rules, VERs 
and the discretionary use of rules of origins, were either abolished or severely restricted 
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in use by the GATT code. Thus, many of the trade policy-related concerns and requests 
that Japanese firms had were largely resolved by the early 1990s.  
Since the mid 1990s, the EU has institutionalized its bargaining position with 
business and strengthened the competences of its regulatory power. This has created a 
policymaking process with a number of access points at EU level. Besides, Japan’s 
inability to disengage itself from the long-term economic downturn has eased European 
anxiety and hostility over the seriousness of the competitive challenge once posed by 
Japan. The recession also brought about a revision of the role of the Ministries. That is, 
the Japanese government has become more concerned with bringing foreign investment 
into Japan, and consequently the Ministries’ abilities to influence firms’ European market 
strategies have been diminished to some extent (Hughes 2001, Kudo 2001). In other 
words, MITI’s role in the EU, that is providing a framework for communication and 
consensus building between government and business, has been significantly reduced and 
the mid 1990s was a significant turning point for Japanese firms in the EU, as most trade 
disputes between Japan and the EC/EU were resolved by the early 1990s. The EU 
regulatory issues, such as environmental policy and safety standards, have become more 
important concerns for Japanese firms in the EU since the mid 1990s. Besides, the 
automobile accord expired in 1999 and this included the elimination of national 
restrictions, such as the French 3% registration limitation. Monitoring of automobile 
export levels was also completely abolished in 2000. Therefore, at face value at least, the 
EU market appears to have been liberalized. 
Under such conditions, Japanese firms have become more proactive and tried to 
fully exploit policy channels. Many firms opened antennae offices in Brussels to monitor 
the EU affairs in the early 1990s, although firms and business organizations in Brussels 
still have strong budgetary or personnel links with the Ministries. Furthermore, the recent 
elite pluralist environment of the EU policymaking process has encouraged Japanese 
firms to establish several forums and organizations such as the EU-Japan Business 
Dialogue Round Table in 1995 and the Japan Business Council in Europe (JBCE) in 1998, 
although their policy successes have still been limited. With the creation of public affairs 
divisions in Brussels, staffed by those knowledgeable in the workings of the EU 
institutions, Japanese firms’ lobbying campaigns may also be initiated directly with the 
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Commission or the European Parliament. It is pointed out that Japanese firms with a high 
profile in the EU, such as Toyota, Sony and Canon, are actively developing their own 
public affairs divisions and a localization policy is a primary factor in recruitment of 
personnel for these positions (Nakayama, Boulton and Pecht 1999, Takahashi 2001).  
Belderbos (1997) argued that the Japanese manufacturing presence in Europe is 
still growing and firms are expected to continue investing at the slower pace. As Japanese 
subsidiaries become more established producers, they will increasingly be seen as 
insiders, and judged less on their owner’s nationality. Nevertheless, the prevailing view 
of Japanese firms as outsiders is changing, although it is doubtful if such firms will ever 
become fully naturalized. Similarly, Kewley (2002) concluded that, by the end of the 
1990s, many Japanese firms still remained manifestly Japanese, but at the same time they 
were able to exploit policy channels in the EU more fully, although it was still uncertain 
whether these newly found advantages would be utilized to the full. 
From existing observations, the development of Japanese business lobbying in the 
EU can be roughly divided into two stages: from the mid-1980s to 1993 (pre-Treaty of 
European Union) and from 1994 to the present day (post-TEU). The first period of 
Japanese lobbying is largely characterized by the EU-Japan trade disputes, strong 
initiatives of Japanese Ministries and low associability and autonomy of firms, while the 
second period featured expanding EU regulatory competencies, and firms’ growing 
awareness and efforts to blend into the European corporate landscape. This 
transformation of Japanese lobbying in the EU indicates that Japanese firms’ strategies 
have become Europeanized to some extent and highlights their political capacities to 
learn and adjust to the hosting political environment. Although how much of the observed 
localization of Japanese lobbying can be attributed to the supranational nature of the EU 
and the difference in domestic structures between Japan and the EU still needs to be 
examined.   
Moreover, most existing case studies are often too descriptive and tend to lack 
theoretical foundation in their analyses. That is, they do not systematically explain in 
detail why Japanese firms adapted certain lobbying strategies in a given situation, and 
how their policy preferences for particular lobbying channels are formed. Besides, most 
studies examine Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies in the context of FDI or EU-Japan 
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trade disputes. Therefore, they consider the issues by mainly looking at state-level 
negotiations between the politicians and bureaucrats of Japan and the EU, and pay less 
attention to the firms’ initiatives and policy preferences. As Japanese MNEs themselves 
become more important individual actors in a more interdependent international economy, 
their political capacities, such as seeking strategic alliances and negotiating with 
governments and other stakeholders, must be taken into account as ever more vital 
determinants of public policy outcomes in a changing EU order. Furthermore, as EU 
regulatory competences have strengthened in many policy areas, such as environmental 
issues, it is necessary to examine how Japanese firms have conducted lobbying in these 
new policy fields.  
 
  
2.4. Conclusion  
 
As many writers such as Coen (1997, 1998, 2003), Greenwood (2003), Jordan 
(2002), Mazey and Richardson (1993), Richardson (2000), and Mahoney (2007) have 
observed, many European and American firms appear to have established a sophisticated 
political capacity that allows them to develop new multilevel and ad hoc political 
alliances to maximize their interests. However, although many Japanese firms have been 
recognized as some of the largest in industries such as electronics and automobiles, 
hardly any Japanese lobbying has been observed and few studies examine whether, and if 
so how, Japanese firms have re-structured their political organization and developed 
credibility to adjust to the EU policymaking process. Instead, many existing studies of 
Japanese lobbying abroad take their cases from US politics (Yamada 1982, Shinoda 1989, 
Choate 1990, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995) and, in an EU context, many studies were 
done on subjects such as Japanese FDI and business management and EU-Japan trade 
disputes. These studies do not primarily focus on Japanese firms’ lobbying preferences 
for political channels and they do not examine the changing nature of Japanese business 
lobbies. Therefore, the limited relevance of previous studies to the constantly evolving 
EU policymaking process has necessitated a theoretical reassessment of Japanese 
lobbying. 
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Japanese firms are different from European and American rivals in many aspects. 
Needless to say, they have no member state to champion their concerns in the Council of 
Ministers, and are not used to direct lobbying due to the traditional Japanese business-
government relationship. Japanese business interests are traditionally and institutionally 
intertwined with the policymakers, leading to a lack of direct lobbying among firms 
(Zhao 1993, Ohtsu and Imanari 2002). In short, Japanese lobbying is characterized by 
heavy reliance on national and sectoral organizations, financial and personalized 
instruments to access the policymakers, and passive and unconstructive negotiation 
manner in order to both maintain harmony and feed their views at the same time. In Japan, 
firms are not independent political actors within the policymaking process, and prefer 
lobbying through business associations.  
In understanding the development of Japanese lobbying in the EU, the mid 1990s 
seems to be the turning point (Kewley 2002).  Until the early 1990s, trade policies 
dominated EU-Japan transnational relations, and most negotiations to promote Japanese 
business interests were largely carried out by MITI. Under such conditions, firms and 
business organizations mainly lobbied member states and kept close contact with 
Japanese Ministries. By contrast, since the mid 1990s, as the EU regulatory competencies 
have expanded to a variety of policy areas and most of the trade disputes between the EU 
and Japan have been resolved, firms can no longer rely on the Ministries to secure their 
policy objectives and have had to become more proactive to feed their views in the EU.  
As we discussed, there has been a general consensus that large firms have become 
independent political actors and harmonized their lobbying pattern, creating a distinctive 
business-government relationship in the EU. Most EU lobbying studies treat large firms 
as a relatively homogeneous group in this process of Europeanization (Jordan 2002, Coen 
1997), and do not pay enough attention to the national differences that may still remain 
significant to some extent. Europeanization does not fundamentally affect the ways in 
which Japanese firms relate to their national government. Their lobbying patterns are 
often a mixture of an adaptation of the hosting environment and an extension of the 
domestic experience (Risse 1995, 2003, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995). There is no 
doubt that Japanese lobbying in the EU has undergone a substantial transformation over 
the years, but not much direct lobbying has been observed yet either. Despite widespread 
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FDI throughout Europe and their growing awareness of direct lobbying, it still remains to 
be examined to what extent Japanese firms have adjusted to the EU and whether there are 
any patterns in the process of the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying, in which firms 
have had to develop a relatively new concept of direct lobbying. In recognising both the 
Europeanization of lobbying practices among large firms and the embeddedness of 
Japanese firms in the concept of harmony, the next chapter will develop a theoretical 
model to explore these questions further. 
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3. Mechanism of Japanese lobbying formulation in the EU  
 
The possibility was raised in the last chapter that Japanese firms are yet to 
conform to the EU lobbying style, which features firms’ direct participation within the 
policymaking process, although they occupy a large share of the EU market in several 
major industries. Most studies of Japanese lobbying have concentrated on the state-level 
negotiations and descriptions of widening participation of firms into the EU market. 
However, there has been little research on the effect of institutional conditions which 
make up the logic of Japanese firms to choose particular modes of lobbying in the EU. 
One of the major lessons that has been drawn from the existing literature is the diversity 
and complexity of EU lobbying, which make reliable generalizations very difficult. 
While EU policies affect the ways in which business interests relate to their governments 
or EU institutions, it is not clear as what are the conditions that determine the degree of 
transformation of Japanese firms. Based on their information and technical expertise, 
large firms prefer direct lobbying to collective lobbying through European and national 
associations within the EU policymaking process. However, in Japan, business 
associations traditionally dominate the business lobbying scene and direct lobbying by 
individual firms is very rare. Firms extensively use financial incentives to influence 
policymakers instead of information.  
If Japanese firms have fully adjusted to the EU policymaking process, they should 
demonstrate the same preferences for the form of interest representation and the 
instrument as European firms addressed by the existing theories of lobbying. We aim to 
explore whether the Western concept of elite pluralism can be applied to Japanese firms 
as non-European actors in the policymaking process. In other words, Japanese firms in 
the EU face two sequential decisions: whether to lobby individually or collectively and 
whether to use information or financial incentives as their instrument. We explore the 
mechanism of Europeanization of Japanese lobbying by focusing on these two choices 
that firms make in order to participate in the policymaking process. They are the 
dependent variables of our analysis.  
As an explanatory effort, the aim of this study is also to identify the opportunities 
and constraints that make up the institutional logic of Japanese lobbying strategies in the 
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EU in pursuing a more Japanese or EU type of lobbying strategy.  In recognizing that 
transformation of Japanese lobbying is not a uniform process and there is variation across 
sectors and firms, we develop a theoretical framework to study the interaction between 
the EU policymaking process and Japanese firms, and explain the institutional conditions 
that shape Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies with different efficacy. There are several 
factors that shape the incentives of Japanese firms to get in touch with EU policymakers. 
These factors underpinning the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying are not mutually 
exclusive. The normative structure of business-government relations is not fully captured 
if one only focuses on organizational characteristics of political institutions. Therefore, 
we aim to work towards a more holistic model, recognizing that various streams of 
factors must be taken into consideration. Drawing on a number of resource dependency 
and institutional views, we argue that Japanese firms’ lobbying strategy is shaped by the 
EU, sectoral and corporate factors. They are the independent variables of our analysis 
that affect the likelihood of specific political action being formulated by firms. 
The first section of this chapter presents the theoretical foundations of the new 
framework to consider the Europeanization of Japanese firms and enduring national 
lobbying practices in the context of the EU tier of multilevel governance. In particular, it 
clarifies lobbying strategies regarding the form of interest representation and lobbying 
instrument. Most lobbying strategies can be understood in terms of two general 
dimensions: organization of interest representation and instrument. These two dimensions 
represent the mechanism of decisions firms make in formulating lobbying strategy. The 
second section identifies three sets of factors that appear to play a role in the decision of 
Japanese firms to shape their lobbying strategies and lays out the theoretical expectations 
about how these three groups of factors should influence Japanese lobbying in the EU. 
Examination of these points will also generate several specific and testable hypotheses 
about the mechanism of Europeanization of Japanese lobbying and enduring national 
characteristics, which produces particular behaviours and outcomes. 
 
 
3.1 Dependent variable: Japanese firms’ choice of lobbying mode in the EU 
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In order to provide a sound theoretical basis to investigate Europeanization of 
Japanese firms, it is important to stress that we focus on this issue primarily at the 
horizontal level of the EU policy formulation, as opposed to top-down or bottom-up 
perspectives. Japanese firms’ lobbying strategy formulation in the EU policymaking 
process is our main focus. Recognizing that EU institutions have increased their 
regulatory competencies and that the process of business representation has taken on a 
very distinct logic at EU level, with the development of forums style business-
government relationships, we explore how Japanese firms have reacted to those 
opportunities in diverse ways at the EU tier of a multilevel system. It is important to note 
that EU politics has matured over the years since the creation of single market and 
developed into a unique polity. At the start and end of the EU policymaking process, 
inter-governmentalists continue to argue that the Council of Ministers is the main focus 
of EU political activity. Yet, regardless of the unquestionable locus of power, we see 
limited direct lobbying activity at EU level via the Council Secretariat, Coreper, or via 
the Permanent representations (Coen 2007). Moreover, we can no longer see 
Europeanization of business lobbying in terms of bottom up management or top down 
coordination, but as a managed multilevel process with numerous feedback loops and 
entry points. In this sense, there is now a distinctive EU style of policymaking which 
distinguishes itself from member states’ politics. It is reasonable to treat the EU as a unit 
of analysis comparable to other nation states, which embody unique sets of institutions, 
political culture, and policymaking mechanisms.   
In addition, public policy analysis allows us to understand the process of 
Europeanization through unpacking the EU policymaking process to examine the 
interaction of policymakers and business interests.  The public policy debate has 
developed a number of behaviourist assumptions for allocation to the EU as a political 
system (Hix 1999), as a regulatory state (Majone 1997), and as a system of multilevel 
governance (Marks et al. 1996, Streeck et al. 1997). As a result, there are now a number 
of actor-based studies of agenda-setting and advocacy coalitions at EU level (Coen 1998, 
Sabatier 1998, Mazey and Richardson 2001). These actor based approaches are 
complimented by a range of new institutionalist approaches that introduce structuring 
variables by focusing on the changing arenas in which these policy makers make their 
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decisions, and set their agenda (Coen 2003: 258). In addition, there are some studies 
which examine the impact of beliefs and norms on EU policymaking (Radaelli 2002), and 
draw on the methodological frameworks of constructivism and the sociological 
institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). 
As reviewed in the last chapter, Japanese firms in the EU are expected to adopt 
EU lobbying style as well as retaining some of their national characteristics with varying 
degrees. With regard to the ways in which European firms relate to their national 
governments (Schmidt 1996, Coen 1998, Greenwood 2003), many large firms are now 
able to bypass long established national lobbying channels in influencing European 
legislations and programmes although these national routes still remain useful. Yet, the 
applicability of such Europeanization to non-European firms still remains to be tested. 
Although it is claimed that many multinational firms are increasingly more ‘multi’ and 
less ‘national’ than in the past, this is not always true of Japanese firms. This is because 
formal government policies and informal administrative guidance, as well as social norms 
effectively embedded in the structure of business networks, have encouraged firms to 
consider and act in the national interests whenever and wherever possible (Zhao 1993; 
Yoshimatsu 2000; Ohtsu and Imanari 2002). In this sense, the underlying nationality of 
the firm may remain as the vitally important determinant of the nature of its lobbying 
strategy formulation. Fundamentally, nationality is given by the historical, institutional 
and ideological legacies of that experience.  
In the following section, we develop a mechanism of lobbying strategy 
formulation wherein firms that have decided to be politically active face two sequential 
decisions; organization of interest representation and instrument. Those two critical 
decisions that Japanese firms have to make in the EU are essentially the dependent 
variable of our analysis.  
 
3.1.1 Organization of interest representation: individual or collective lobbying?  
 
The first decision a firm must make in formulating a lobbying strategy is its form 
of interest representation, whether to pursue political action alone or with others. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Olson (1965) delineates two levels of participation that 
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individuals or interest groups may adopt when active in the policymaking process: 
individual and collective. Individual action refers to solitary efforts by individual firms to 
affect public policy. Collective action refers to the collaboration and cooperation of two 
or more firms in the policy process.  
The definitions of individual and collective action are not always easy to apply in 
practice. Collective lobbying is defined as the investment of resources by individual firms 
and the bringing together of these firms in the collective pursuit of a common interest, 
which may result in selective or collective benefits. It is important that firms invest 
resources in this pursuit; without this level of commitment, it is not possible to describe 
their action as collective. Equally, they must be brought together in the sense of 
belonging to a movement and gaining membership of an organization, regardless of how 
formal the organization. This signals a commitment to an ongoing effort, irrespective of 
the motive for membership. As we have hinted already, organizations may be highly 
informal and ad hoc in nature. While federations of national associations and direct 
membership groups are well known types, recent years have seen the growth of collective 
structures in Europe which are not formal groups, but rather platforms, coalitions, and 
alliances linking different types of interests in various degrees of permanence. Informal 
groups have emerged primarily around large firms, and range from visible groups with a 
loose organization to privately organized ad hoc groups. Some are issue based, others are 
built around sectors, while others are cross sectoral. Pijnenburg (1998) notes that ad hoc 
coalitions are characterized by low levels of formalization and high levels of autonomy 
for the coalition’s members, compared to formal organizations. They are established in 
the short to medium term for the duration of a single legislative or regulatory debate. 
While some issue coalitions may last longer, they remain a coalition of autonomous 
groups and do not establish their own direct membership or organizational structure. 
There is usually a coalition leader organizing the efforts of the members, regular 
meetings and joint lobbying actions such as joint letters, advertisements or press 
conferences. There are very often an official name for the coalition and a secretariat 
acting as the headquarters of the coalition (Berry 1989). Ad hoc coalitions are most often 
composed of different types of firms or associations representing different sets of 
interests. The concept of ad hoc coalitions should not be confused with Sabatier’s (1988) 
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concept of advocacy coalitions, which is a much broader theoretical construct than a 
discrete set of groups that have organized themselves for a single issue fight.  
 For the purpose of our research, we define the concept of collective lobbying as 
lobbying through national business associations, and do not include ad-hoc coalitions in 
this definition. Rather, ad-hoc coalitions can be seen as part of direct lobbying strategies 
by firms. In other words, the mobilization of large firms results in the creation of ad hoc 
coalitions. This implies that successful firms have developed strategic political capacities 
to lobby directly or form an ad hoc coalition with other countervailing interest groups 
without relying on their national associations.  
In an EU context, the Olson-style argument provides a micro-foundation for 
theories of elite pluralism or studies of the varying power of industry interests (Coen 
1997, Jordan 1998). That is, both European and national business associations often fail 
to respond to the quickly changing and complex EU lobbying environment. Of course, 
there are still times when large firms do not want to take the lead on particular issues. For 
example, firms generally prefer that the industry associations speak out on European 
social policy matters. Sensitive issues can often be deflected to the association as opposed 
to the firms themselves. Yet, generally speaking, membership incentives for such 
traditional business associations have been reduced. As a result, firms have become more 
proactive and developed political capacities to utilize a wide variety of political channels 
either independently or collectively through ad-hoc alliances with other countervailing 
interests. Large firms in the EU are expected to prefer direct lobbying to traditional 
collective lobbying. Elite pluralism assumes that the preferred order of forms of interest 
representation in the EU is 1) individual firms, 2) European associations, and 3) national 
associations. As a result, the relationships between large European firms and their 
national actors are no longer the most defining factor of firms’ lobbying practices at EU 
level. By contrast, Japanese firms heavily rely on national business associations for 
lobbying and direct action by firms is very rare in the Japanese business-government 
relationship. In order to maintain the corporate relationship among policymakers, 
business associations and firms, Japanese business interests have demonstrated several 
unique lobbying mechanisms such as amakudari, extensive use of behind-the-scene 
negotiation, and financial contribution to the ruling party.  
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If Japanese firms have fully adjusted to the EU policymaking process, they should 
demonstrate the same order of preferences for the form of interest representation as 
addressed by the existing theories of lobbying. Therefore, in order to investigate the 
degree of Japanese firms’ adaptation to EU lobbying and applicability of elite pluralism 
to non-European business actors, we use firms’ preferred form of lobbying, whether 
direct or collective though business associations, as the first dependent variable of our 
analysis.  
 
3.1.2 Instruments: information or financial incentives strategy?  
  
After a firm had decided to pursue lobbying individually or collectively, its next 
decision relates to the specific instruments it should employ. Many scholars interested in 
lobbying instruments have developed lists of specific strategies or tactics that firms may 
use to compete in the policymaking process. In the 1960s, sociologists developed 
exchange models for the study of inter-organizational relationships (Blau 1964, Levine 
and White 1961: 587). These models offer an interesting framework, which analyses the 
interaction between business interests and policymakers. According to these theories, the 
interaction of private and public organizations can be conceptualized as a series of inter-
organizational exchanges. The organizations involved in the exchange make an implicit 
or explicit cost benefit analysis; on the basis of which they decide with whom to interact. 
The exchange relation is only likely to be durable when the exchange is reciprocal and 
both sides receive benefits from the exchange, which are equally distributed between the 
exchanging parties. Thus, exchange theory suggests two general or generic political 
strategies that firms and interest groups may target policymakers and use to compete in 
the policymaking process based on the fundamental resources exchanged: information 
and financial incentive (Hillman and Hitt 1999). The choice over information or financial 
incentive strategy largely depends on what kind of resource policymakers need the most. 
Firstly, those using the information strategy seek to affect public policy by providing 
policymakers specific information about preferences for policy or policy positions and 
may involve providing information on the costs and benefits of different issue outcomes 
(Aplin and Hegarty 1980). The target of this political strategy is the policymakers, and 
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the good provided is information. Secondly, the financial incentive strategy also targets 
policymakers directly. Users of this strategy, which is called ‘direct pressure’ by Alpin 
and Hegarty (1980), attempt to influence public policy by directly aligning the incentives 
of the policymakers with the interests of the principals though financial inducements. 
This strategy includes such tactics as providing financial support, PAC contributions in 
the US, paid travel expenses or personal services, which involve having a representative 
of a firm in a political position, hiring personnel with direct political experience (Getz 
1993). This category of political strategy is similar to that of ‘absorption’ described by 
Ring, Lenway, and Govekar (1990), in that these actions attempt to absorb a part of the 
external political environment into the firm, either by hiring or direct financial incentives. 
It is important to note that although lobbying instruments can be classed in one of two 
generic categories, the use of one lobbying strategy does not preclude the use of the other. 
Rather, a configuration of instruments may be used (Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings, 1993). A 
firm may use a combination of lobbying instruments in an attempt to enhance its 
competitive position in the policymaking process.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, in the EU firms mainly exercise an 
information strategy to influence the policymakers, whereas in Japan firms mainly choose 
a financial incentive strategy, such as financial contribution to the ruling party and 
amakudari. This is due to institutional differences in the business-government 
relationships in the EU and Japan. If Japanese firms have fully adjusted to the EU 
policymaking process, they should initiate more of an information strategy than a 
financial incentive one. Therefore, in order to investigate the degree of Japanese firms’ 
adaptation to EU lobbying and applicability of elite pluralism to non-European business 
actors, we use firms’ preferred instruments, whether information or financial incentive 
strategies, as the second dependent variable of our analysis. 
 
 Overall, our model of lobbying strategy formulation is summarized in Figure 1. 
As discussed above, under the current elite pluralist political environment in the EU, 
large firms select individual lobbying (I), using information (IN) as their instrument to 
influence policymakers (IIN). By contrast, under the bureaucratic and mass inclusionary 
pluralist political environment in Japan, firms select collective lobbying (C), using 
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financial incentives (FI) as their instrument to influence policymakers (CFI). Yet, it 
remains to be examined how Japanese firms in the EU form their lobbying strategies.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Model of lobbying strategy formulation 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Independent variables: Institutional, sectoral, and corporate factors 
 
An analysis of institutional factors that are likely to influence the incentives of 
Japanese firms to choose and conduct certain types of lobbying is essential in order to 
systematically understand the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying. The business-
government relationship is a subsystem of a more encompassing society, polity and 
culture. It is therefore assumed that the dynamics of the interaction between Japanese 
firms and the EU policymaking process cannot be studied without examination of the 
institutional factors. These can be classified into three categories: EU, sectoral and 
corporate factors. With reference to a number of actor-level theories of interest groups, 
examination of these institutional factors allows us to develop a series of hypotheses 
about an interactive mechanism between Japanese firms and the EU policymaking 
process.  
 
Decision 1 
Form of interest representation  
Decision 2 
Instrument 
Decision 2 
Instrument 
I*IN 
(EU) 
I*FI C*IN C*FI 
(Japan) 
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3.2.1 EU institutional factors 
 
The exchange model of Levine and White (1961) is closely related to the resource 
dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Whereas both theories emphasize 
the importance for organizations of exchanging resources, resource dependency focuses 
more closely on the ensuing interdependence between the interacting organizations 
(Pfeffer 1997: 63). According to the resource dependence perspective, organizations are 
not internally self-sufficient. They require resources from the environment and therefore 
have to interact with those organizations or groups in the environment who control the 
resources they need (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 258). An important consequence is that 
organizations become interdependent with those organizations with which they interact. 
This interdependence can lead to the development of attempts at inter-organizational 
influence. Firms’ decisions regarding their form of representation and instrument are 
closely related to this resource dependency.  
In the context of the EU policymaking process, resource dependencies matter 
because neither EU institutions nor interest groups can autonomously pursue and achieve 
their political goals. As discussed in the previous chapter, resource dependencies 
motivate interest groups and EU policymakers to exchange information and negotiate 
with their counterparts. Bouwen (2002) suggests that the ‘access goods’ of interest 
organizations account for the access patterns. He compares the access of three forms of 
organizations: firms, EU associations and national associations, claiming that these types 
of organizations deliver different ‘access goods’. The argument centres on the kind of 
information that these organizations can provide. Supposedly, firms are best at delivering 
expert knowledge about market and technology, EU associations control information 
about the so-called ‘encompassing European interest’ of their members, and national 
associations command information about the ‘encompassing national interest’ of their 
members. To be more precise, large firms often have big R&D divisions and are therefore 
particularly good at expert knowledge. Yet, for most large European firms, it is difficult 
to claim to provide information about the European encompassing interest since only the 
individual firm is involved in the articulation of the interest. Associations are not as good 
as individual firms at providing expert knowledge because they have fewer resources and 
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have to deal with a wider range of issues. Because of their multilayered organization 
structure, they can be distant from the market reality. European associations are 
specialized in building consensus positions by channelling the different opinions of their 
members. This allows the European associations to present an encompassing European 
perspective on their sector and thereby provide good quality information about the 
European encompassing interest. The internal decision-making processes for building 
consensus are complex and negatively affect the efficient provision of access goods. 
National associations tend to enjoy good relations with their governments. They are 
specialized in bundling their member firms’ needs and interests, which allows them to 
represent the national sector interest and to provide high quality information about the 
domestic encompassing interest. National associations have to deal with many policy 
issues and are therefore generalists rather than specialists. Like European associations, 
national associations tend to be not very good at providing expert knowledge.  
In terms of demand for access goods, EU institutions have a varying degree of 
interests. The most desired information is something most critical for the fulfilment of 
their legislative role. The Commission is considered to be the most important point of 
contact for interest groups in the EU (Mazey and Richardson 2002: 135-136). The 
Commission plays a central role in the EU legislative process. The drafting of proposals 
takes place in the first phase of the policymaking process and requires a substantial 
amount of expert knowledge. Because of understaffing and severe budget constraints in 
the Commission, expert knowledge is the critical resource to obtain from interest groups 
for its legislative work.  Besides, it is geared towards promoting common European 
interests, as well as promoting its own position. To play its role, the Commission needs 
information about the European encompassing interest and is not interested in the 
domestic encompassing interest. The Commission has a substantial interest in the 
European access good because it can help to identify common European interests 
(Bouwen 2002: 379).  
In other words, the nature of policies is an important factor to influence the access 
pattern of business interests. If a policy deals with technical standards or the regulation of 
sophisticated products, such as pharmaceuticals, substantive expertise is very important. 
On the other hand, for policy that has a high level of political salience in the member 
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states, the Commission requires information on the preferences of relevant actors in 
several states (Broscheid and Coen 2007). Furthermore, with regard to nature of policy, 
emphasis on the intergovernmental or multilevel approach is still a function of the type of 
policy under discussion, that is to say, the degree to which a policy is regulatory, 
distributive, and redistributive (Coen 1998, Richardson 2001,Wallace and Wallace 2000: 
199). Hence, on regulatory issues such as Environmental policy, the Commission can be 
seen to be taking a policy lead, but member states show a great reluctance to hand over 
redistributive powers, such as taxation, to the supranational level.  
Although access is not equal to influence, the study of the access patterns helps to 
identify the features of different forms of business interests that assume crucial positions 
in EU policy networks, as well as important patterns of the EU business-government 
relationship. In short, resource dependency theory suggests that preferred orders of 
interest organizational form in the Commission are firstly individual firms, secondly 
European associations, and finally national associations. In addition, given that it is 
supposed to represent supranational interests but that its members are responsible to 
national voters, the European Parliament is mostly interested in the information provided 
by EU associations about the encompassing European interest, followed by the 
knowledge of national associations about their domain. However, Bouwen (2002) does 
not find empirical support for the hypothesized rank orders. According to his data, EU 
associations maintain more contacts with the Commission than firms, and these have 
more frequent access than national associations. His conclusion would be that the 
Commission depends more on the European encompassing interest than on economic and 
technical knowledge. Overall, it is clear that both firms and European associations enjoy 
better access to the Commission than national associations.  
In a Japanese context, the more technical and complicated the policy is, the more 
likely Japanese firms are given access to the policymaking process since the level of 
resource dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese firms are likely to conduct more direct 
lobbying and less collective action through national associations. Alternatively, if the 
policy deals with few technical matters and concerns national interests, it is likely that 
Japanese firms are not given much access to the policymaking process, since the level of 
resource dependency is relatively low. Therefore, they are likely to conduct more 
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collective lobbying through national or European associations than direct lobbying. Thus 
we assert the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: For technical and regulatory policy issues, Japanese firms are 
more likely to conduct individual lobbying than collective lobbying through 
national business associations.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: For non-technical and redistributive policy issues, Japanese 
firms are more likely to conduct collective lobbying through national 
business associations than individual lobbying. 
 
With regard to a firm’s decision for the lobbying instrument, the key determinant 
is also closely related to the resource dependency and the nature of political institutions, 
irrespective of the form of interest representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, in 
the EU, financial incentive strategy is not the most effective lobbying instrument. Custom 
and law limit the scope for corporate donation, and in any case, the campaign costs of 
individual politicians are very low compared to the countries such as the USA and Japan. 
Besides, the personnel at the Commission frequently move from one department to 
another, reducing the risk of capture with interest groups.  
In a Japanese context, the more technical and complicated the policy is, the more 
likely Japanese firms are given access to the policymaking process since the level of 
resource dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese firms are more likely to use an 
information strategy to influence the policymakers than a financial incentive strategy.  
Alternatively, if the policy deals with few technical matters and concerns national 
interests, it is likely that Japanese firms are not given much access to the policymaking 
process, since the level of resource dependency is relatively low. Therefore, Japanese 
firms may try to buy the political influence through a financial incentive strategy. Thus, 
we assert the following:  
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Hypothesis 2a: For technical and regulatory policy issues, Japanese firms in 
the EU are more likely to use an information strategy to influence the 
policymakers than a financial incentive strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Hypothesis 1b: For non-technical and redistributive policy 
issues, Japanese firms are more likely to use a financial incentive strategy to 
influence the policymakers than an information strategy 
 
3.2.2 Sectoral factors 
 
Each industrial sector has its own institutional characteristics and they are also 
important determinants that influence the potential for lobbying strategy formulation. To 
be more precise, the ability to gain support for issues may be affected by the 
fragmentation in society (Coleman 1988). Generally speaking, in more pluralist structures, 
the institutional arrangements result in a variety of interests coming into play in the 
policy arena (Hayes 1992), resulting in a fragmentation of political and economic power 
(Vogel 1996). Insiders can be simply actors that are frequently consulted or actors that 
are actively involved in bargaining and policy negotiation or in the implementation of 
policy solutions (Grant 2004). Such insider and outsider division can be found in a sector 
as well. In other words, the formation of lobbying strategies in the policymaking process 
is also affected by the institutional setting of the sector. That is, for outsiders or those 
who are relatively new to the sector, the opportunity to affect public policy on specific 
issues in systems with predominant actors is more limited than in systems that open to 
individual special interest group pressure and that have a greater probability of 
developing negative sum or zero-sum policies.  
In the political process of a pluralistic environment, interest groups and firms do 
not have to compromise with other groups. The policymakers may write or vote for 
policy that represents a compromise among their constituents, but the actual groups do 
not have to reach consensus across a variety of issues. A more pluralistic institutional 
environment creates the incentive for groups and firms to assert their own interests on 
specific issues in the political process (Murtha and Lenway 1994). The competition 
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among interest groups in a more pluralist political environment is constantly changing, 
thereby presenting opportunities for firms to act selectively. Thus, the likelihood of firms 
participating individually in politics is greater in a more pluralist environment (Hillman 
and Keim 1995). Owing to the limited opportunity structure, firms in a less pluralist 
industrial sector will choose to participate in the policymaking process collectively rather 
than individually.  
 Sectoral factors also affect a firm’s decision for the lobbying instrument. To be 
more precise, a sector’s degree of product diversification is crucial. Firms in a single 
product or narrow product diversified sector inevitably have a narrower focus on political 
issues because they are concerned with limited industry domains (Hoskisson and Hitt 
1990). Therefore, it is hard for firms in such sectors to find a policy niche and outweigh 
their rivals by proving information to the policymakers.  
In an EU context, while pluralism, elite-pluralism, corporatism, and their variants 
represent high-level theories of entire political systems, a number of meso-level 
approaches have focused on the inclusiveness of interest representation at the sub-system 
level, particularly the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists (Broscheid and 
Coen 2003, Grant 2004). Depending on their level of exclusively, such sub-systems have 
been characterized as iron triangles (Freeman 1965), subgovernments (Jordan and 
Richardson 1979), issue networks (Helco 1978), or advocacy coalitions (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier 1994). Although the term ‘European market’ may imply a single uniform 
entity, in reality it contains a variety of industrial sectors, each with a different set of 
characteristics. That is, business lobbying in the EU is characterized by sectoral 
differences, and each sector can be seen as a big policy system of interest representation, 
consisting of a number of competing interest groups. Although the Commission attempts 
to be open and transplant in its interaction with business interests, nevertheless a core of 
insiders is often established within a sector. In this context, the insider-outsider model 
provides an important insight into European lobbying, by connecting the system-level 
theory with an explicit actor-level foundation (Broscheid and Coen 2003). Within a 
policy system, there is often a significant divide between relatively few groups with 
privileged status and a greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less 
influential positions. Many groups are granted access to decision makers, however few 
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have a significant influence over substantive policy outcomes. Access merely leads to 
consultation, while privileged access leads to bargaining and negotiation (Maloney, 
Jordan, and McLaughlin 1994). This insider-outsider division in a sector can be explained 
by the nature of policies being drafted (Broscheid and Coen 2007) as we already 
explained for the EU factors. However, it is also rooted in a sector’s fundamental 
institutional settings. Fragmentation in a sector can be explored in terms of power 
relationships in the sector. Firms are aware of the strength of their position relative to 
their rivals. That is, the power relationship in a sector is mainly related to the presence of 
dominant European rivals, which leaves little room for Japanese firms to blend into the 
sector on equal terms. In other words, the less hostile the sector is towards Japanese firms, 
the easier it is for them to blend into the policymaking process. Thus we assert the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: In a sector with a lower number of dominant European rivals, 
Japanese firms are more likely to conduct individual lobbying than collective 
lobbying through national business associations.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: In a sector with a higher number of dominant European 
rivals, Japanese firms are more likely to conduct collective lobbying through 
national business associations than individual lobbying.  
 
 Similarly, the presence of predominant actors in a sector relates to a firm’s 
lobbying instrument. Core insiders tend to dominate the information flow in a sector, 
leaving little opportunity for Japanese firms to utilize their technical expertise. In addition 
to the insider and outsider division, a sector’s product diversification is also important in 
a firm’s decision for the lobbying instrument. In a sector with wide product 
diversification, Japanese firms can also spot policy niches, develop specialized political 
knowledge and form relationships with policymakers within their domains of interest. 
However, firms in a narrow product diversification may not have the opportunity to 
outshine their strong rivals by using an information strategy because the scope of 
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required information is very narrow. Under such conditions, firms may choose to use a 
financial incentive strategy to influence the policymakers. Thus, we assert the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: In a sector with more product diversification, Japanese firms 
are more likely to use an information strategy to influence the policymakers 
than a financial incentive strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: In a sector with less product diversification, Japanese firms 
are more likely to use a financial incentive strategy to influence the 
policymakers than an information strategy.  
 
3.2.3 Corporate factors  
  
 Organizational resources should play a role in the decisions of lobbying strategy 
formulation. Resource mobilization theorists emphasize the importance of resources in 
interest mobilization (McCathy and Zald 1978, Cress and Snow 1988). Individual action 
loads all costs directly on the participating firms, whereas in collective action, such as 
national business associations, the cost of political action is shared among members 
(Olson 1965). Larger firms with more slack resources and dominant firms in an industry 
often prefer individual rather than collective actions. They have the requisite resources 
for individual action, and such independent action may allow them to affect a government 
policy that best favours the firm. Some firms may also have more intangible resources. 
For example, firms with experience influencing public policy have knowledge about the 
process that firms without such experience are unlikely to have. Firms with this 
knowledge are more likely to act independently whereas firms without such knowledge 
may feel it necessarily to act collectively.  
 Overall, firms with fewer resources favour collective action. Collective action 
should provide a more forceful voice than any one firm, assuming constrained firm-level 
resources. Regardless of the dues structure for business associations, member firms pool 
their resources, resulting in lower per-firm costs of political action (Chong 1991). Instead 
of each firm monitoring the political process and attempting to influence this process 
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alone, the business association performs these functions in a collective manner, thereby 
creating economies of scale. Member firms also collectively pool their knowledge which 
should enable them to capture synergies or other intangible resources by integrating their 
knowledge bases.  
 Organizational resources also affect a firm’s decision for the lobbying instrument. 
In other words, credibility is a resource that affects the success of informational lobbying 
(Boddewyn 1993, Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Hull 1993). To have influence, 
information providers must be perceived by policymakers as credible. In addition, Sethi 
(1982) found that the most important determinant of success in lobbying was the 
reputation of the source. In order to develop such credibility, large firms often have big 
R&D divisions and are therefore particularly good at expert knowledge. Thus, credible 
firms have an advantage over less credible firms using an information strategy. 
In an EU context, corporate factors refer to firm-specific variables such as size, 
technological asset, market share and experience in the European market. In other words, 
the capacities of interest organizations have an effect on their access to the policymakers. 
It is trivial to state that not all firms are equally well equipped to take political action at 
EU level (Eising 2007). Even within the same industrial sector, variation in the 
Europeanization of Japanese firms may exist for a number of reasons, including 
differences between firms in terms of size, human asset specificity, managerial 
competence and the nature of entrepreneurship. Indeed, some firms have appeared to be 
able to generate more political capital than others within the same sector. The importance 
of resources in interest group mobilization and advocacy efforts are often pointed out 
(Cress and Snow 1998; Mahoney 2007). In order to mobilize for a policy debate, resource 
poor groups need to identify resource sources and spend resources conservatively. 
Wealthy groups on the other hand do not face the same type of hurdles to mobilize. As an 
issue rises on the agenda, resource rich interest groups can more easily conduct lobbying 
to participate in the policymaking process without having to rely on likeminded interests. 
Having set out the EU and sectoral institutional settings in which Japanese firms develop 
particular lobbying strategies, we should also note that these strategies involve corporate 
resources. In observing business lobbying, it is often overlooked that the take-up of a 
political channel or certain strategy is a function of costs and benefits as well. The reality 
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is that firms of all sizes face internal budget constrains and public relations and 
government affairs departments are the first to get cut back in a recession. To a large 
extent, a firm’s dependence on associations and its capacity to act individually at EU 
level is determined by its size (Coen 1997, 1998). Small firms tend to rely on associations 
to represent their interests because they do not have the resources to sustain substantial 
public affairs capacities. Because of lack of individual investment power, they must unite 
to gain political clout.  
 Therefore, the reason why a particular Japanese firm is pursuing a more direct or 
collective type of lobbying strategy may sometimes be best understood by enquiring 
explicitly into not only the supranational and concerned sectoral factors but also 
corporate specific factors. In other words, some Japanese firms may simply possess more 
lobbying resources and experience than others. These firms are naturally more likely to 
be able to pursue a European style of lobbying. We use size and length of presence in the 
EU as proxies for resources and test whether corporate factors influence the decisions of 
Japanese firms to adopt certain types of lobbying patterns. We assert the following:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Resource rich Japanese firms are more likely to conduct 
direct lobbying than collective lobbying through business associations.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: Resource poor Japanese firms are more likely to conduct 
collective lobbying than direct lobbying.  
 
It is clear that large firms control substantial resources that allow them to act 
unilaterally and turn themselves into relevant policymakers in the EU. Besides, the 
economic and technical knowledge of large firms is often closer to the market than that of 
business associations. Thus, the Commission now works with directly with a number of 
firms to find solutions for the problems plaguing industrial sectors. Therefore, resourceful 
Japanese firms may find it easier to conduct an information strategy than those firms 
without sufficient resource. In addition, given these indicators of the importance of 
credibility in informational lobbying, those Japanese firms that lack the resources to 
conduct an information strategy may choose a financial incentive strategy, such as hiring 
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personnel with direct political experience in order to compensate for their lack of 
resources. Thus, we assert the following:  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Resource rich Japanese firms are more likely to use an 
information strategy than a financial incentive strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 6b: Resource poor Japanese firms are more likely to use a 
financial incentive strategy than an information strategy.  
 
 Figure 2 summarizes the interaction between Japanese firms’ lobbying 
formulation and the EU policymaking process.  
 
Figure 3.2 Factors affecting the formulation of Japanese lobbying strategy  
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3.3 Conclusion  
 
It is a challenge to develop theoretical ideas in the field of European interest 
politics, which is known for its diversity and complexity. In this chapter, an attempt was 
made to develop a model of lobbying strategy formulation in order to study the 
Europeanization of Japanese firms. Lobbying strategies involve a set of decisions for 
firms. The first decision of whether to lobby individually or collectively through business 
associations is theoretically pinned down by the logic of collective action (Olson 1965, 
Oliver 1993, Jordan 1998) while the second decision of whether to use an information or 
financial incentive strategy is drawn from exchange models (Blau 1964, Levine and 
White 1961). 
Our investigation of lobbying strategy formulation helps us understand the impact 
of increasing European integration upon non-European business actors in the EU. 
Recognizing that many large European and American firms have become independent 
political actors (Coen 1997, 1998; Richardson 2000; Jordan 2002), our analysis assesses 
whether the Western concept of elite pluralism could be applied to Japanese firms as non-
European actors in the policymaking process. To be more precise, large firms prefer 
direct lobbying to collective lobbying through European and national associations within 
the EU policymaking process, based on their information and technical expertise. It is 
claimed that many multinational firms are increasingly more ‘multi’ and less ‘national’ 
than in the past (Cowels 1998; Jordan 2002). However, this is not always true of Japanese 
firms. In Japan, business associations traditionally dominate the business lobbying scene 
and direct lobbying by individual firms is very rare. Firms extensively use financial 
incentives to influence policymakers instead of information. This is because formal 
government policies and informal administrative guidance, as well as social norms 
effectively embedded in the structure of business networks, have encouraged firms to 
consider and act in national interests  whenever and wherever possible (Zhao 1993; 
Yoshimatsu 2000; Ohtsu and Imanari 2002). In this sense, the underlying nationality of 
the firm may remain as the vitally important determinant of the nature of its lobbying 
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strategy formulation, and be much more persistent in the face of Europeanization than 
existing studies generally assume.  
 If Japanese firms have fully adjusted to the EU policymaking process, they 
should demonstrate the same preferences for the form of interest representation and the 
instrument as European firms addressed by the existing theories of lobbying. As an 
explanatory effort, with reference to resource dependency, insider and outsider model, 
and organizational resource, we also proposed a set of EU, sectoral and corporate factors 
that are likely to affect a firm’s choice for the form of interest representation and 
instrument. The interaction of these variables in the EU forms the central connecting 
thread of this study, and has generated a set of testable hypotheses for empirical testing in 
the subsequent chapters. In other words, the goals of our theoretical framework are 
twofold. One is to clarify to what extent Japanese firms have adopted to the EU 
policymaking process by focusing two aspects of their lobbying strategies: form of 
interest representation and instrument.  The other is to identify the opportunities and 
constraints that make up the institutional logic of Japanese firms to transform their 
lobbying strategies.  
This proposed framework needs to be confronted with the empirical reality. Thus, 
in the next chapter, on the basis of the discussion so far and hypotheses regarding the 
firms’ lobbying strategy formulation, we will outline the methodology of our case studies 
of Japanese automobile and electronics firms in the EU.  
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4. Methodology   
 
 Having identified current debates in the study of the EU policymaking process 
and set out the theoretical approach of our research, this chapter explains the 
methodology to test the hypotheses and systematically analyse the Europeanization of 
Japanese lobbying. The distinctive contribution of our research is the investigation of the 
Europeanization of Japanese firms by focusing on their lobbying strategy formulation and 
embeddedness in national lobbying practices. The detailed case studies of Japanese firms 
in the EU provide the empirical evidence for our investigation. Yet, before zooming in on 
these specific cases, we shall clarify our research design. The research design is the 
logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions 
and, ultimately, to its conclusions. It guides the researcher in the process of collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the 
researcher to draw inferences connecting casual relations among variables under 
investigation (de Vaus 1996, Yin 2003).  
In the first section of this chapter, we discuss the selection criteria of four case 
studies which will be explored in depth in the following three chapters; automobile trade 
policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s, electronics trade policies during the same 
period, the End of Life Vehicle Directive of 2000, and the Waste Electronic and 
Electrical Equipment (WEEE) and Restrictions of the use of certain Hazardous 
Substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) Directives of 2003. The 
particular selection of these industrial sectors, time periods, and policies for the case 
studies will be explained in relation to their relevance to the study of the Europeanization 
of Japanese lobbying. In each case study, the empirical focus consists of Japanese firms’ 
lobbying strategies regarding the form of interest representation and the instrument, as 
well as examination of the impact of EU, sectoral, and corporate factors upon their 
strategy formulation. 
The second and third sections explain our data collection, sample, and measures. 
The key methodological objective is to highlight the longitudinal transformation of 
Japanese lobbying strategies from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, and draw 
comparisons between automobile and electronics sectors. Therefore, as an analytical 
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method, we adopted a case study approach based on 30 detailed interviews with 
stakeholders in Brussels and Tokyo, supplemented by available publications and statistics 
as secondary sources of information. In addition to the attention given to these individual 
sources, several measures to clarify the links between the questions asked, the data 
collected, and the conclusions drawn are introduced in this section. Nominal comparison 
across cases is adopted for our level of measurement.  
 
 
4.1 Case Study Selection Criteria    
  
 The case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. Other 
methods include experiments, surveys, and the analysis of archival information. A case 
study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are clearly 
evident (Yin 2003: 12). It is also described as an intensive study of a single unit with an 
aim to generalize across a larger set of units (Gerring 2004: 341). A case study relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. In other words, the case study as a research strategy comprises an 
all-encompassing method covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and 
specific approaches to data analysis. It has a distinctive advantage when a “how” or 
“why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the 
researcher has little or no control (Yin 2003). Case study research includes both single- 
and multiple- case studies.  Multiple case studies have distinctive advantages in 
comparison to single case studies. The evidence from multiple cases is often considered 
more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust. If the 
cases offer contrast situations and subsequent findings support the hypothesized contrast, 
the results represent a strong start towards theoretical replication, vastly strengthening the 
external validity of the findings compared to those from single case studies alone.  
 Therefore, as an analytical method to test our hypotheses, a multiple case study 
approach based on detailed interviews and existing publications is preferred to either 
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econometric or survey research. A quantitative econometric approach has the advantage 
of a large sample size but it is unable to treat non-quantifiable determinants of business 
lobbying in the EU. A survey approach can theoretically treat a relatively large number of 
samples and incorporate non-quantifiable factors. However, such an approach generally 
confronts poor response rates and diplomatic responses, often leading to both a much 
smaller and unrepresentative sample. A case study approach based on interviews, 
questionnaires, and secondary materials is more likely to highlight the political, social 
and cultural dimension of Japanese lobbying. By comparing the lobbying processes over 
two different periods, pre- and post-TEU, and between two different industries, 
automobile and electronics firms, we can identify patterns that the other two approaches 
miss. Therefore, in each case study, we conducted a series of interviews with major 
stakeholders, including Japanese firms, Japanese business organizations, the Ministries, 
EU institutions and rival European/American firms and organizations. Japanese firms and 
business associations are the prime unit of our analysis. Information about their lobbying 
strategies constitutes the main focus of each case study, supplemented by information 
about other stakeholders.  
 The major problem of the case study approach is the relatively small sample size 
which, while making it more difficult to generalize (Lijphart 1971, Mahoney 2000), is 
unavoidable given the necessary depth of investigation. Moreover, the particular selection 
of cases may strongly influence findings, such that our results may not be consistent with 
the finding that would emerge if a more representative sample had been considered 
(Geddes 1990). In other words, the deliberately micro nature of this research, a handful of 
Japanese firms in two industrial sectors over two time periods, inevitably results in the 
exclusion of, or at least cursory attention devoted to other important issues, themes, and 
actors. For example, there are Japanese multinational firms in other sectors, such as 
banking and insurance, and chemical to name a few, who are also at the vortex of 
interaction between Europeanization and domestic structures. However, our prime 
intention to use a descriptive analysis has, out of necessity, excluded other firms and 
sectors from the research. Besides, the contexts of our case studies are likely to differ to 
some extent. If under these varied circumstances we still can arrive at common 
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conclusions from the cases, they will have immeasurably expanded the external 
generalizability of our findings.  
 The particular selection of the case studies has, nevertheless, to be justified in 
relation to their relevance to the study of the Europeanization of Japanese firms. There 
are several criteria behind selecting them in regard to sectors, timeframes and policy 
areas. The empirical analysis in this study consists of four case studies to provide the 
evidence to test the validity of our hypotheses. As summarized in table 4.1, Chapter 5 
looks at trade policies for automobile and electronics firms from the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s, Chapter 6 at automobile firms and the ELV Directive of 2000, and Chapter 7 
at electronics firms and the WEEE/RoHS Directives of 2003.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Case studies 
 
 Mid 1980s – 1993 1994 – 2003 
 
Automobile Sector Chapter 5: Trade policies 
(VERs, antidumping, local 
content rules, etc) 
Chapter 6: The ELV Directive 
Electronics Sector Chapter 5: Trade policies 
(VERs, antidumping, local 
content rules, etc) 
Chapter 7: The WEEE/RoHS 
Directives 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Automobile and electronics sectors 
  
 The firms selected for the case studies are in the automobile and electronics 
industries, which are the two most internationally oriented sectors of Japanese industry 
and were the object of significant protectionist measures in Europe in the 1980s. Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into the EU has increased since the mid 1980s and now 
counts for more than 20% of total Japanese overseas FDI. The EU is the second most 
favoured location of Japanese firms after the USA accumulating about 40% of their 
overseas investment (McCargo 2000). The automobile industry is dominated by 
relatively few large corporations. The biggest of these by annual production are Toyota, 
General Motors and Ford Motor. In 2005, 67 million automobiles (cars and light trucks) 
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were produced worldwide. In 2006, 16 million new automobiles were sold in the US, 15 
million in Western Europe, 4 million in China and one million in India.
4
 The electronics 
industry covers a wide range of products. In this study, we mainly refer to consumer 
electronics and equipment. Consumer electronics are most often used in entertainment, 
communications and office productivity. Some products classed as consumer electronics 
include personal computers, printers, telephones, audio equipment, televisions, 
calculators, office equipment, and playback and recording of video media such as DVD 
or VHS. Popular brands of consumer electronics include a wide range of European, 
American, and Japanese based companies including Philips, Ericsson, Nokia, IBM, 
Hewlett-Packard, Sony, Panasonic, NEC, Canon, and others. 
 
 
Table 4.2 The world’s top fifteen automobile companies (2006) 
  
Ranking Company  Country Assets Profits ($ billion) 
1 General Motors USA 193.51 2.80 
2 DaimlerChrysler Germany 176.68 3.06 
3 Toyota Motor Japan 172.61 10.89 
4 Ford Motor USA 172.23 3.48 
5 Volkswagen Germany 110.64 0.84 
6 Honda Motor Japan 80.48 4.52 
7 Nissan Motor Japan 79.80 4.76 
8 Peugeot France 70.64 1.68 
9 Fiat Italy 59.97 -1.97 
10 BMW Germany 55.14 2.76 
11 Renault France 50.64 4.41 
12 Robert Bosch Germany 49.75 1.95 
13 Hyundai Motor Korea 46.35 1.47 
14 Delphi USA 28.70 -0.03 
15 Volvo Sweden 28.64 1.27 
(Source: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/industries/Motor_Vehicles_Parts/1.html ) 
 
 
 Both automobile and electronics firms constitute one of the most important 
aspects of Japanese business community and have developed the most fully-fledged 
European operations of all Japanese manufacturing sectors. These firms include SONY, 
                                                 
4
 International Organization of  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA): http://www.oica.net/ 
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Panasonic, NEC, Fujitsu, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan, to name a few. These firms account 
for a large chunk of world output and are deeply integrated in the tissue of the 
international manufacturing economy. For example, there are nine Japanese automobile 
manufacturers that produce and sell vehicles and automotive components in Europe and 
they count for approximately 11% of the European automobile market.
5
 Similarly, 
Japanese electronics firms operate more than 180 manufacturing affiliates in the EU.
6
 In 
this sense, both Japanese electronics and automobile firms are well established and have 
become some of the main commercial actors in the European market in terms of sales, 
capital, R&D investment, employment and global reach. Table 4.2, 4.3 and figure 4.1 
highlight the strong presence of Japanese automobile and electronics firms in the global 
and European markets. Therefore, they are the prime examples which are subject to 
transnational convergence of lobbying practices. In terms of product diversification, the 
electronics sector deals with a wider range of products than the automobile sector. While 
the automobile sector essentially concerns itself with automobiles and their components, 
the electronics sector involves a number of products ranging from small household 
appliances to industrial machinery.  
 
Table 4.3 The world’s top fifteen electronics hardware and equipment companies (2005)  
 
                                        (Source: www.forbes.com) 
                                                 
5
 Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, JAMA  annual report 
6
 Japan External Trade Relations Organization, JETRO Report: Survey of the operations of Japanese 
affiliated manufacturing  
Ranking Company Country Assets Profits ($ billion) 
1 IBM USA 109.18 8.43 
2 Hewlett-Packard USA 75.14 3.50 
3 Nokia Finland 29.91 4.35 
4 Cisco Systems USA 33.83 5.39 
5 Sony Japan 85.14 0.85 
6 Dell USA 23.22 3.04 
7 Motorola USA 30.71 1.54 
8 LM Ericsson Sweden 24.26 2.80 
9 Matsushita (Panasonic) Japan 67.54 0.40 
10 Fujitsu Japan 36.17 0.48 
11 Sharp Japan 20.31 0.58 
12 NEC Japan 34.78 0.39 
13 Toshiba Japan 39.15 0.28 
14 Alcatel France 25.83 0.38 
15 Lucent Technologies USA 16.69 1.84 
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 While Japanese firms in both automobile and electronics sectors have come to 
embody significant market force in the global economy, their surrounding lobbying 
environments in the EC/EU show an interesting mix of similarities and differences. Trade 
policies between the late 1980s and early 1990s symbolized the troubled EC-Japan 
relations. Both Japanese automobile and electronics firms were subject to a range of trade 
policy measures such as the Voluntary Export Restrains (VERs), antidumping, and local 
content rules. Under such conditions, they had to generate political capital and lobby the 
EC to influence its trade policies to their own benefits for the first time. During this 
formative period of Japanese lobbying in the EC, Japanese firms in both sectors faced 
similar trade barriers. 
 Since the Treaty of European Union, many trade barriers have been removed. As 
a result, it has become clear that lobbying environments surrounding Japanese automobile 
and electronics firms show some clear differences. That is to say, due to the presence of 
predominant European firms, Japanese automobile firms still struggle to participate in the 
policymaking process on equal terms as other firms. For example, European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (ACEA), established in 1991, has become the most powerful 
pan-European automobile business association, representing the interests of thirteen 
automobile manufacturers with European plants, including two major American firms, 
Ford and General Motors. Through its specialist working groups and extensive network 
of individual experts from member companies, ACEA is able to provide a high level of 
technical expertise as an input to the EU policymakers. However, ACEA does not include 
any Japanese firms, and so they are forced to continue as a separate lobby. Therefore, 
Japanese automobile firms only have their national business association, Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), to represent their collective views at 
EU level. JAMA was established in 1967, and includes fourteen Japanese manufacturers, 
nine of which produce and sell their products in Europe (Daihatsu, Subaru, Honda, Isuzu, 
Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Suzuki, and Toyota), and one American firm (GM). Although 
JAMA and individual Japanese firms are actively involved in a number of policy fields, 
there is no doubt that ACEA has been the most powerful business lobby within the EU 
policymaking process.   
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Figure 4.1 European Automobile Market 2002 
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 In contrast, many Japanese electronics firms are members of several pan-
European industrial associations. For example, Canon, Fujitsu, Panasonic, NEC, Sanyo 
and SONY are all active members of the European Information, Communications and 
Consumer Electronics Technology Associations (EICTA). Moreover, their business 
interests, especially regarding environmental policy, have also been represented by the 
Japan Business Council in Europe (JBCE) at EU level. The JBCE, founded in 1998, is the 
first Japanese lobbying organization comprising more than 50 Japanese firms operating in 
the EU, although it does not include automobile manufacturers. Members of the JBCE 
employ over 150,000 people which account for approximately 40% of total employment 
by Japanese firms in the EU. The JBCE is active in a number of policy areas and 
maintains close links with other stakeholders.  
 Comparison between the electronics and automobile industries especially helps 
our investigation of hypothesis 3 and 4 concerning whether or not Japanese firms in 
different lobbying environments with varying product diversification show different 
degrees of embeddedness in traditional lobbying practices, and how they have developed 
a particular mix of lobbying patterns in given political settings.  
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4.1.2 Time period of case studies  
 
 Our research examines Japanese automobile and electronics firms in the EU from 
the late 1980s to 2003. As reviewed in the Chapter 2, the history of Japanese business 
lobbying can be divided into two stages: from the late 1980s to 1993 (pre-Treaty of 
European Union) and from 1994 onwards (post-TEU). The first period is largely 
characterized by EU-Japan trade disputes, while the second period concerns the 
expanding EU regulatory competencies and an increasing number of firms’ direct 
lobbying at EU level. In other words, trade policies dominated EC-Japan relations until 
the early 1990s and most negotiations to promote Japanese business interests were largely 
carried out at the state level negotiation between the EC and Japan. Under such 
conditions, firms and business organizations mainly lobbied member states and kept close 
contact with Japanese Ministries. By contrast, since the mid 1990s, the EU regulatory 
competencies have expanded to a variety of policy areas such as environment and food 
safety, inducing more direct lobbying at EU level. Thus, it is logical to set the TEU of 
1993 as a broad turning point for the development of Japanese lobbying. In other words, 
the pre-TEU period is mainly characterized by intergovernmental lobbying while the 
post-TEU period sees more multilevel direct lobbying. The difference in the institutional 
structure and regulatory power at the supranational level between these two periods is 
likely to influence the ways in which Japanese firms chose particular lobbying strategies.  
In terms of Europeanization, the first two case studies during the 1980s and early 
1990s might not involve much direct lobbying at the EC level from both European and 
Japanese firms as business lobbying was largely carried out through inter-governmental 
routes during this period. However, there was already a clear presence of Japanese 
automobile and electronics firms in the EC during this period, and their lobbying 
strategies regarding the form of interest representation and instrument need to be clarified 
in terms of their relations with the EC, member states, and Japanese government. Besides, 
in order to fully highlight the longitudinal development of Japanese lobbying in the EU, it 
is necessary to examine these cases during the formative stage of EC business-
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government relationship and establish the sound historical basis for the analysis of the 
following post-TEU case studies.  
Examination and comparison of these two periods allow the opportunity to 
provide the longitudinal analysis of Japanese lobbying and assess how different EC/EU 
institutional settings have affected the Japanese firms’ lobbying strategy. It should be 
noted that our research only seeks to examine the Japanese lobbying until 2003 and does 
not look at any recent issues concerning Japanese firms, although the development of 
their political activities appears to have continued. This is because a certain distance in 
time is required to aid the analytical process and provide a critical and comprehensive 
perspective on case studies. The period covered is both long and recent enough for 
contemporary relevance and yet it is sufficiently in the past to allow for marginally 
greater reflection and consideration, without falling into the trap of providing over-
speculative interpretations of current events. It is hoped that the argument developed will 
have currency for general debate on EU public policy and international business studies 
in the 2000s, and also provide an empirical understanding of the Japanese firms in the EU 
during the chosen periods of the 1980s, 1990s, and the early 2000s.  
 
4.1.3 Trade and environmental policies 
 
 In order to analyse Japanese lobbying in two different sectors and over two 
distinctive periods, we have decided to focus on the policymaking processes concerning 
automobile and electronics firms in trade policies during the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
End of Life Vehicle Directive of 2000, and the Waste Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment (WEEE) and Restrictions of the use of certain Hazardous Substances in 
electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) Directives of 2003. The comparison between 
the trade and environmental policies enables us to investigate our hypothesis 1 and 2 
regarding whether or not the nature of policy has affected the way Japanese firms have 
developed a particular mix of lobbying patterns in given political settings. 
Until the early 1990s, trade policies were the major concern for Japanese firms in 
Europe. That is, the EC had taken a range of trade policy measures since the early 1980s 
to protect European automobile and electronics industries, often specifically targeting 
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Japanese firms such as the Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), antidumping, and local 
content rules. These policies were directly linked to the national interests of member 
states and many countries showed a great reluctance to hand over redistributive power 
such as allocation of national quotas for Japanese products to the supranational level. In 
other words, these trade policies had a high level of political salience in the community 
and the Commission mainly required information on the preferences of relevant actors in 
concerned member states. Under such condition, it was difficult for Japanese firms to 
feed their views at the EC level. Thus, it is interesting to see how Japanese firms chose 
their form of interest representation and instrument for such non-technical and 
redistributive policy issues.  
 By contrast, the gradual transfer of regulatory functions from member states to 
EU institutions since the 1990s has contributed to the Europeanization of a number of 
policy areas, and waste management has become one of the priorities of EU 
environmental policy. In short, the ELV Directive aims to make vehicle dismantling and 
recycling more environmentally friendly, and sets clear qualified targets for reuse, 
recycling and recovery of vehicles and their components, encouraging producers to 
manufacture new vehicles with a view to their recyclability. The Directive’s main 
requirements are to ensure that 1) producers limit the use of certain hazardous substances 
in the maintenance of new vehicles and automotive components, 2) ELVs are subject to 
de-pollution prior to dismantling, recycling, or disposal, 3) treatment facilities operate to 
higher environment standards, 4) certain recovery and recycling targets are met by 
deadlines set by the Directive, and 5) by 2007 producers pay all or significant part of the 
costs of the treating ELVs. The underlying objectives of both the WEEE and the RoHS 
are quite similar to the ELV Directive, as the WEEE Directive regulates the management 
of waste from a wide range of electrical and electronic consumer appliances as well as 
professional equipment; washing machines, TVs, radios, shavers, PCs, printers, medical 
equipment, vending machines, toys and so on.  Producers are responsible for taking back 
and recycling such products and consumers are able to return their equipment at free of 
charge. The RoHS Directive requires the substitution of various heavy metals (lead, 
mercury, cadmium, and hexavalent chromium) and brominated flame retardants 
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(polybrominated biphenyls or polybrominated diphenyl ethers) in new electrical and 
electronic equipment that was put on the market from 1st July 2006.  
Environmental policy is one of the prime examples which require a high level of 
technical information and expertise to draft. The nature of EU environmental policies is 
regulatory and affects all firms which operate in the EU regardless of their nationality. 
Consequently, large firms have started to participate in the policymaking process more 
directly at EU level. Therefore, the detailed study of environmental cases enables us to 
examine Japanese lobbying in the EU within the context of a complex multilevel network. 
Besides, the study of environmental policy is especially interesting because it provides 
good examples of transnational ad hoc interest coalitions with Japanese firms and other 
stakeholders. It illustrates the processes in which Japanese firms have reorganized 
themselves to adjust to current elite pluralistic policymaking. To be more precise, there is 
no doubt that the ELV Directive has been one of the most influential policies for 
automobile manufacturers in the EU, and Japanese automobile firms had to organize 
themselves and construct their lobbying strategies from a relatively handicapped position 
within the European automobile market due to the presence of strong European rivals. In 
this sense, this case study will assess and clarify Japanese automobile firms’ lobbying 
strategies with regard to how they tried to blend into the ELV policymaking process and 
developed their European lobbying strategies. The outcome of the WEEE/RoHS process 
is significant in the sense that Japanese firms lobbied the EU policymakers on almost 
equal terms as other European and American firms and managed to realize several 
important policy goals in the Directives at the end. So far the WEEE/RoHS directives are 
one of the few policies in which Japanese firms managed to express some of their major 
concerns in their own right, such as exclusion of certain consumable goods and 
applications of lead. 
  
 Overall, these four cases will identify fixed, adaptable and creatable lobbying 
strategies of Japanese firms common to both sectors through two timeframes, and assess 
the impact of institutional determinants, at EU, sectoral, and corporate levels, upon firms’ 
varying degrees of embeddedness in traditional business practices and development of 
European lobbying strategies. Chapters 5 to 7 are the detailed case studies that provide 
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the empirical evidence for our investigation. Chapter 5 looks at automobile and 
electronics sectors and EC trade policies, Chapter 6 at automobile sector and the ELV 
Directive and Chapter 7 at electronics sector and the WEEE/RoHS Directives. In each 
case study, the prime objectives are to clarify and assess the interaction between the 
Europeanization of Japanese firms and their embeddedness in traditional lobbying 
practices by looking at the firms’ lobbying strategies regarding the form of interest 
representation and instrument as well as the impact of EU, sectoral, and corporate factors 
on their lobbying strategy formulation.  
 
 
4.2 Data and sampling 
 
 Evidence for case studies may come from a number of sources such as documents, 
archival records, interviews, and direct observation. No single source has a complete 
advantage over all the others. In fact, the various sources are highly complementary, and 
a good case study should use as many sources as possible. The incorporation of these 
sources into a case study increases its quality substantially. In other words, the use of 
multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows us to address a broader range of 
historical, political, and behavioural issues. The most important advantage presented by 
using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry. 
Thus, any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and 
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information (Yin 2003). For our 
investigation of the case studies, documentation and interviews are the main source of 
data. To be more precise, Chapter 5 is largely devoted to analytical comparison of 
secondary source material and various primary sources, such as government publications, 
press releases, web pages on the internet concerning the Japanese automobile and 
electronics industries and Japan-EU relations, and interviews. In addition, literature on 
various different topics was surveyed to establish a background for the empirical 
investigation. Literature on Japanese-European relations, the Japanese automobile and 
electronics industries, the structure, institutions, and decision-making process in the EU 
was helpful in producing this study. Chapters 6 and 7 also draw on these sources, but 
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mainly depend on primary sources gained from our own empirical field work, including 
web pages on the internet, company brochures, government publications, and interviews 
conducted with major actors. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Number of detailed interviews 
 
 
Japanese firms 10 
Japanese business associations (JAMA and the JBCE)  6 
European and American business associations 3 
European Commission  6 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  1 
Other governmental agencies  4 
Total  30 
 
 
 As indicated in table 4.4, the total of 30 detailed interviews was conducted in 
Brussels and Tokyo between 2005 and 2006 with sources from European, Japanese, and 
American business associations, individual Japanese automobile and electronics firms, 
the European Commission, Japanese Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), 
and other Japanese and EU governmental agencies, in English or Japanese.
7
 Each 
interview took approximately one hour with some exceptions which lasted for much 
longer. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. As 
discussed earlier, case study approach is defined as ‘intensive study of a single unit for 
the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units’ (Gerring 2004: 342). 
Therefore, sampling is another crucial element of a case study to achieve a high level of 
internal and external validity of the outcome.  However, the logic of selecting the 
interviewees in the case studies must be distinguished from the sampling logic commonly 
used in surveys. The standard sampling logic requires an operational enumeration of the 
entire universe or pool of potential respondents and then a statistical procedure for 
selecting a specific subset of respondents to be surveyed (de Vaus 1996, Yin 2003). This 
statistical sampling method is not suitable for the case study approach. This is because 
the case study approach is not the best method for modelling causal relations or assessing 
the prevalence of phenomena. Instead, it covers both the phenomenon of interest and its 
                                                 
7
 See the appendix for the details of the interviews and questionnaires 
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context and helps to define the cases. Therefore, it is better to identify the major 
stakeholders in the concerned cases, and try to take as many interviews as possible to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the issues.  
 In practice, the major difficulties with conducting the interviews were the 
identification of a relevant sample of actors and gaining access to the relevant people. 
There are nine Japanese automobile firms and a number of Japanese electronics firms in 
the EU. Ideally, it would have been best to interview all of nice to cover the whole 
population. However, it was not possible to include all of them in our analysis for a 
number of reasons. We identified the top ranked Japanese firms in terms of their sales, 
assets, and profits through existing statistics and ranking tables such as Forbes and 
Fortune500. We initially contacted most of the major firms, however some of them 
refused to participate in the research because they mainly outsourced their lobbying 
activities to the business associations (either JAMA or the JBCE) and did not have much 
to comment on the issues, or preferred not to talk about their lobbying strategies at all. 
Overall, we managed to include the three largest Japanese automobile firms (Toyota, 
Honda, and Nissan), and four Japanese electronics firms (Panasonic, Fujitsu, NEC, and 
Canon) which are constantly ranked high in a number of product fields such as consumer 
electronics and computer equipment. These Japanese firms all have an office in Brussels, 
and have a strong presence in the EU in terms of sales, productive capacity, capital and 
R&D investment, and employment levels. Since our research is interested in seeing how 
large Japanese multinational firms have transformed their lobbying strategies in the EU, 
the selected firms in both sectors are expected to be the prime example of such firms. We 
sometimes interviewed more than one person from the same firms or interviewed the 
same person twice. Besides, by incorporating not only Japanese firms and business 
associations but also the Commission officials, rival business associations, METI, and 
other governmental agencies, we aimed to provide a comprehensive insight of each case 
study, minimize the selection bias, and overcome the problem of small sampling size.  
 To be more precise, for the first two case studies, it was difficult to locate the 
people who were involved in trade issues during the late 1980s and early 1990s as many 
of them transferred to different departments in the same organizations, changed their jobs 
or retired. Moreover, the memories of these stakeholders involved in the negotiations are 
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unlikely to be clear in detail. Therefore, interviews with more general governmental 
agencies such as Japan External Trade Relations Office (JETRO) in Brussels and Tokyo, 
and the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Corporation in Tokyo provided interesting overall 
stories and historical background of the trade issues. In addition, a number of secondary 
sources helped our investigation.  
 For the last two case studies, we managed to interview the main stakeholders. For 
the ELV directive, as well as the three Japanese firms mentioned above, we also 
interviewed the director general, deputy director general, and technical affair specialist of 
JAMA in Brussels. The Director of regulatory affairs of ACEA in Brussels and Tokyo 
also provided useful insights into Japanese lobbying from the rival perspectives. For the 
WEEE/RoHS directives, as well as the four Japanese firms mentioned earlier, we 
interviewed the former and current secretary generals of the JBCE. American Electronics 
Association Europe (AeA) was also interviewed to provide comprehensive views on 
Japanese lobbying in the EU. Since both ELV and WEEE/RoHS directives are part of the 
same Environmental regulatory program, there was an overlap in personnel in the 
Commission who were directly involved in drafting these directives. Out of these 
personnel, we identified three officials of the DG Environment and one Japan desk 
officer of the DG Enterprise. In addition, the interview with METI official in Tokyo 
presented an interesting insight of Japanese business-government relationship and its 
impact upon firms in the EU. These interviewees essentially cover most major 
stakeholders who were involved in the case studies.  
 It should be noted that the choice of case studies and interviewees was also guided 
by the more practical consideration of information availability. As mentioned above, 
business lobbying is often conducted in secrecy and only limited information is available 
in the public domain. Thus, the selection of case studies was influenced by the degree of 
interview access anticipated from firms and other stakeholders. The respondents also 
suggested other people to interview, as well as other sources of evidence.   
 Overall, thorough interviews supplemented by secondary information enable us to 
provide a detailed empirical investigation for our hypotheses. It should not be forgotten 
that lobbying is a particularly sensitive issue. Industries and individual firms are naturally 
not inclined to reveal their technical details of interest representation, since successful 
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techniques could easily be copied by their competitors. For this reason, interviewees had 
to be assured of confidentiality and anonymity, and they had to be guaranteed that their 
personal comments would be absolutely non-attributable to themselves, their corporation, 
and their institution. Therefore, sources cannot be quoted by their names, although direct 
quotes are given in a codified manner, for example, ‘a source from the Commission: 
01/01/06: A’
8
.  
 
 There are several problems in conducting interviews as it is one thing to gain 
access to the desired person or to even have enough interviewees, but it is quite another 
to obtain accurate responses from them (Geddes 1990). Therefore, in order to minimize 
the bias from the interviewees, our interviews were based on a semi-structured 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is a highly structured data collection technique whereby 
each respondent is asked much the same set of questions. Because of this, questionnaires 
provide a very efficient way to contrast the variation among Japanese firms. In general, 
personal interviews provide the greatest flexibility in terms of question design to deal 
with complex research topics. In our research, the questionnaire has the following three 
aspects to examine Japanese lobbying in the EU; 1) measures of the dependent variable to 
clarify what is Japanese lobbying strategy, especially regarding the form of interest 
representation and instrument, 2) measures of the independent variables to make sure we 
have questions to tap each of these variables and clarify the nature of the links between 
dependent and independent variables, and 3) background measures to provide rather 
general information about respondents such as their overseas strategies, corporate culture, 
their location, general impressions for their rival firms,  and so on to help us see whether 
patterns occur within various subgroups. Our interviews were also of an open-ended 
nature, in which we could ask key respondents about the facts of a matter as well as their 
opinions about events. In some situations, we asked the respondents to propose his or her 
own insights into certain occurrences and used such propositions as the basis for further 
inquiry. As mentioned before, by incorporating a number of insights into Japanese 
lobbying from different actors and comparing them with each other, it is expected to 
                                                 
8
 The letter A refers to the first person interviewed on a particular date, B to the second person and so forth.  
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provide comprehensive perspectives of the issues, minimizing the response and sampling 
bias.  
 
 
4.3 Measures 
 
 In terms of the level of measurement, our variables in the analysis are essentially 
nominal in their nature and nominal comparison across cases can be used as a central 
strategy of hypotheses assessment since our research seeks to explore how Japanese firms 
conduct lobbying in the EU: whether individually or collectively, and whether to use 
information or financial incentive strategy. Small-N researches like ours often pursue 
causal analysis through nominal comparison across cases (Mahoney 2000). Nominal 
comparison entails the use of categories that are mutually exclusive (cases cannot be 
classified in terms of more than one category) and collectively exhaustive (one of the 
categories applies to each case). With respect to different levels of measurement, nominal 
categorization is sometimes considered unsophisticated because it does not involve the 
rank ordering of cases, much less quantifying the degree to which particular cases differ 
from one another. Yet, for conceptualizing certain kind of phenomena, nominal 
categories are highly appropriate. In other words, linking data to our hypotheses is also an 
important part of our empirical investigation. There are several criteria for interpreting 
the findings. Linking data to research questions can be done in any number of ways, but 
one promising approach for nominal comparison is the idea of pattern matching (Yin 
2003), whereby several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some 
theoretical proposition. In other words, we describe two potential patterns and then show 
that the data matched one better than the other. If the two potential patterns are 
considered rival propositions, the pattern matching technique is a way of relating the data 
to the hypotheses. This approach is suitable for our research as we are interested to see 
whether Japanese firms pursue more Japanese or EU type of lobbying strategies. That is, 
by comparing a Japanese firm’s lobbying strategy in the EU with that of European firms 
and Japanese national pattern, it is possible to measure the extent to which Japanese firms 
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have transformed their lobbying patterns and become an independent political actor 
within the EU policymaking process. 
 Nominal methods are not flawless tools for identifying necessary and sufficient 
causal conditions. For one thing, it is always possible that independent variables not 
considered in the analysis might be the significant factor if they were included. This is a 
standard problem of specifying an explanatory model that arises in many forms of causal 
assessment, and its consequence for nominal methods is that researchers can never know 
for certain whether they have correctly identified all necessary and/or sufficient variables 
or combinations of variables (Mahoney 2000). However, several arguments can be made 
in defence of the practice of nominal measurement. Many researchers focus on 
combinations of variables when using nominal methods. While a particular variable may 
itself be neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of an outcome, the variable may be part 
of a combination that is necessary or sufficient for an outcome. Thus, by incorporating 
several factors in an analysis, it is possible to minimize the potential risk of eliminating 
significant explanatory variables and work towards a more holistic model. In our research 
for Japanese lobbying in the EU, we seek to identify the institutional conditions which 
make up the logic of Japanese firms in pursuing more Japanese or EU type of lobbying 
strategies. We recognize that various streams of institutional factors merge to determine 
the decision of Japanese firms to choose particular lobbying strategies. Therefore, we 
disaggregate institutional conditions into three levels: EU, sectoral, and corporate factors. 
These factors are closely interrelated with each other and expected to influence the 
formulation of Japanese lobbying strategy at each level. 
In order to empirically explore the interaction between the dependent and 
independent variables in the case studies, it is necessary to clarify the measures for these 
variables.  For the dependent variable, we focus on the mechanism of lobbying strategy 
formulation wherein Japanese firms face two sequential and non-related decisions: 
organization of interest representation and instrument. With regard to the form of interest 
representation, we are interested to see whether Japanese firms conduct lobbying 
individually or collectively through national or European business associations. For the 
purpose of this research, we define the concept of collective lobbying as lobbying 
through national and European associations, and do not include ad-hoc coalitions of firms 
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in this definition. Ad-hoc coalitions are treated as part of individual lobbying strategies 
by firms. The reason to differentiate individual and collective lobbying in this research is 
to access the firms’ embeddedness in national collective lobbying channel. In this context, 
ad hoc coalitions imply that firms have developed strategic political capacities to lobby 
directly at EU level and temporarily work together with other countervailing firms 
without relying on their national associations. By applying this definition, we can 
measure the extent to which Japanese firms in the EU are able to lobby independently of 
national business associations. It is also important to note that Japanese firms in the EU 
utilizing multiple lobbying channels: both national associations and individual routes. 
Detailed in-person interviews with stakeholders enable us to identify the main form of 
interest representation for Japanese firms. 
As for the instrument, we are interested to see whether Japanese firms utilize 
information or financial incentives as their instrument to influence the policymakers. In 
order to operationalize the decision over these two instruments, we define information 
strategy as utilizing technical information as a means to influence policymakers. This 
typically includes activities such as submission of position papers and technical advice to 
the Commission and the EP. By contrast, a financial incentives strategy refers to 
activities such as financial contribution to political parties and other policymakers, hiring 
bureaucrats or other personnel with direct political experience (amakudari in the case of 
Japan), and having a representative of a firm in a political position. Similar to the 
decision regarding the form of interest representation, these two instruments are not 
mutually exclusive. However, our detailed interviews with stakeholders enable us to 
assess which instrument is more used by Japanese firms in the EU to influence the EU 
public policies.  
For the independent variables in the explanatory model, there are several 
indicators for the EU, sectoral and corporate factors which are likely to affect a firm’s 
lobbying strategy formulation. Firstly, in terms of EU factors, we argue that the nature of 
the policy, whether technical or non-technical and whether regulatory or redistributive, 
affect the level of demand for information among policymakers, resulting in the varying 
degree of access available to Japanese firms. Therefore, we treat environmental policies, 
ELV and WEEE/RoHS directives, as the example of technical and regulatory policies 
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while using trade policies as the example of less technical and redistributive policies. 
Secondly, for sectoral factors, we assume that the presence of dominant rival firms and 
product diversification in a sector are likely to affect a firm’s lobbying strategy 
formulation. As we briefly described before, there is a strong presence of European and 
American firms in the automobile sector with relatively low product diversification while 
the electronics sector is more fragmented with high product diversification. Therefore, 
these two sectors are used as the prime indicators for our sectoral factors. Thirdly, with 
regard to corporate factors, we hypothesize that a firm’s resource is one of the 
determinants and, therefore, use staff size of its public affairs department and length of 
presence in the EU as proxies for resources. By focusing on these points, we test whether 
corporate factors influence the decision of Japanese firms to develop a certain type of 
lobbying pattern. Measurement of these factors highlights the institutional conditions that 
shape the lobbying strategies of Japanese firms with differing efficacy.  
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
 In order to test our hypotheses and advance the existing explanatory framework of 
Japanese lobbying in the EU, we developed the research design centered on a structured 
and focused comparison of a set of case studies. The case study approach enables us to 
investigate the details of Japanese lobbying, but is also subject to several criticisms such 
as small sample sizes and difficulty of generalizing results. Therefore, we must be very 
careful in choosing particular cases and collecting data (Lijphart 1971, Gerring 2004, de 
Vaus 1996, Yin 2003, Geddes 1990, Mahoney, 2000). This chapter has explained a 
number of criteria for selecting four case studies and the measures for the dependent and 
independent variables which are the main focus of the subsequent chapters. The questions 
of how Japanese firms lobby in the EU and what constitute their institutional logic in 
developing a particular lobbying strategy are best analyzed by a comparative case study 
approach. We chose automobile trade policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
electronics trade policies during the same period, the End of Life Vehicle Directive of 
2000, and the Waste Electronic and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) and Restrictions of the 
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use of certain Hazardous Substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) 
Directives of 2003. Our research seeks to contribute to scholarship on transnational 
lobbying by tracking the development of Japanese lobbying in the EU, with special 
attention to the interaction between the EU policymaking process and traditional patterns 
of Japanese lobbying. In each case study we will particularly look at the form of interest 
representation and instrument of various firms in the lobbying process, and examine the 
impact of EU, sectoral, and corporate factors upon their particular choice of lobbying 
pattern. Empirical evidence for these case studies mainly came from the 30 interviews 
with stakeholders in Brussels and Tokyo, and secondary resources such as existing 
documents and archival records.  
 Overall, the following case studies provide a structured and focused comparison 
of Japanese automobile and electronics firms, in order to develop the existing explanatory 
framework of the Europeanization of business interests. A prime intention is to use 
detailed descriptive and comparative analysis to highlight the way in which Japanese 
firms conduct lobbying in the EU and assess the extent to which they are embedded in the 
national lobbying patterns. As discussed before, there is no doubt that Japanese firms 
have come to embody a strong market force in the EU, but their political capacities in 
choosing particular lobbying channels, negotiating with the policymakers, and seeking 
corporate alliances have been understudied. In other words, we aim to advance the 
understanding of the participation of non-Western actors within the EU policymaking 
process. 
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5. Automobile and electronics firms in the pre-TEU period: Trade 
policies  
 
In order to provide a longitudinal, as well as cross-sectoral, analysis of Japanese 
lobbying over two different phases, namely pre- and post-TEU periods, this chapter 
presents detailed case studies of automobile and electronics firms’ lobbying strategies 
against the EC trade measures from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. In both case studies, 
the prime objectives are to assess the impact of several institutional factors in forming 
Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies and lay a contextual background for the following 
case studies.  
Trade policies symbolized the troubled transnational relations between Japan and 
the European Community during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The EC had taken a 
range of trade policy measures since the early 1980s to protect European industries such 
as the Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), antidumping, and local content rules, often 
specifically targeting Japanese firms. Under such conditions, Japanese firms had to 
generate political capital and lobby the EC to influence its trade policies to their own 
benefit for the first time in the European policymaking process. Automobile and 
electronics firms constituted one of the most important aspects of Japanese business 
lobbying during this period, as both sectors had developed the most fully-fledged 
European operations of all Japanese manufacturing sectors.  
 In the automobile context, the trade disputes culminated in an agreement between 
the Japanese government and the EC in July 1991, effectively placing numerical limits on 
Japanese automobile exports to the EC as a whole and to specified member countries 
until 1999. This landmark accord stipulated that free trade in automobiles would be 
completed by 2000 and set a transitional period to allow European manufacturers to adapt. 
Nonetheless this agreement constituted Europe’s principal policy response to the 
Japanese automobile challenge as unification approached.  
 Similarly, Japanese electronics firms were subject to a series of EC trade policy 
measures during this period, although these disputes did not lead to the creation of single 
trade accord between Japan and the EC like the automobile case. The most important 
instrument of trade policy was undoubtedly antidumping. A wave of antidumping actions, 
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concentrated in the second half of the 1980s, targeted Japanese electronics firms and 
often led to the imposition of duties. In addition, the EC later amended its antidumping 
law to make it applicable to Japanese assembly plants in Europe. This was effectively 
administered as local content rule.  
In order to examine these early years of Japanese lobbying, this chapter proceeds 
as follows. Firstly, we address the background issues for both cases and explore the 
lobbying strategies of Japanese automobile and electronics firms with special attention to 
their form of interest representation and instrument. Although the roles of the Japanese 
government and bureaucrats are essential in understanding the negotiation processes with 
the EC during this period, the independent roles of Japanese firms and their strategic 
lobbying preferences need a closer attention. Secondly, we return to our initial 
hypotheses and examine the impact of EC, sectoral and corporate factors upon Japanese 
firms’ lobbying strategy formulation. These two cases provide good illustrations of the 
formative period of Japanese lobbying in Europe; how Japanese automobile and 
electronics firms reacted to the trade barriers and chose a certain lobbying strategy to 
maximize their business interests within the mainly inter-governmental policymaking 
process. In addition, examination of these case studies allows the opportunity to identify 
Japanese firms’ fixed, adaptable and creatable lobbying strategies common to both 
sectors as well as drawing an interesting comparison. 
 
 
5.1 Automobile firms: background and controversies 
 
Japanese automobile imports had been a sore point in EC-Japan relations since the 
end of the 1970s. An increasing Japanese presence in the European automobile market 
encouraged many European governments to implement policies designed to limit and 
control the flow of Japanese automobiles. Japanese firms had attained considerable shares 
in EC markets by 1980, such as Belgium (24.7%), the Netherlands (26.4%), Denmark 
(30.9%), Ireland (30.8%), and Greece (42.9%). In addition, by that year they had counted 
sizable shares of the British (11.9%), French (2.9%), and German (10.4%) markets 
(Mason 1997: 56). Besides, the specific circumstances of individual EC member states 
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shaped Europe’s response to Japanese automobile imports. On the one hand, highly 
protectionist countries such, as France and Italy, had and still have quite strong domestic 
manufacturers and imposed quantitative controls on Japanese products. On the other hand, 
those countries without indigenous automobile manufacturers, such as Denmark, Greece 
and Ireland, assumed a more liberal trade stance allowing the free flow of Japanese 
products. Under such situations, most trade between Japan and the EC was conducted 
bilaterally at the member state level as indicated in table 5.1, whereby Japan agreed to 
accept Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs) in its exports, or alternatively, export 
restraint was sectorally exercised by Japanese firms known as Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VERs).  
 
 
Table 5.1 The restriction of Japanese automobile imports in EC countries until 1991 
 
France 3% of market Government allocates quota to 
importers. 
Italy 3,300 units (p.a.) Importers apply for license, 
registering Japanese cars with the 
government 
Spain 1,200 units (p.a.) Same as above 
Portugal 10,000 units  (p.a.) Same as above 
UK 11% of market SMMT and JAMA’s agreement. 
JAMA allocates quota for Japanese 
makers 
Other EC states No official restrictions  
                                         (Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association: http://www.jama.or.jp/) 
 
 
When the Single European Act was ratified by member states in 1987, the 
programme to complete the single European market started at full speed. At the same 
time, the programme of unifying the twelve markets into a single European market 
motivated Japanese automobile firms to invest in production within the EC. The potential 
profits from the emerging single market lured them, and they also feared the creation of 
“Fortress Europe” that would discriminate against foreign products and prevent Japan 
from benefiting from market expansion (Abe 1999: 59). During the mid 1980s, Honda, 
Nissan, Toyota, and many other Japanese firms directly invested in major manufacturing 
operations in the EC and came to occupy about 10% of the EC automobile market as 
indicated in table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 The market share of the Japanese cars in the EC  
 
Units 1,036,000 1986 
% share 9.8 
Units 1,075,700 1987 
% share 9.5 
Units 1,088,562 1988 
% share 9.2 
Units 1,106,547 1989 
% share 10.8 
Units 1,219,584 1990 
% share 10.0 
Units 1,363,089 1991 
% share 10.9 
Units 1,322,557 1992 
% share 10.5 
Units 1,169,177 1993 
% share 11.0 
(Source: International Motor Business, 1986-96) 
 
 
The increasing level of local production by Japanese firms caused further trade 
disputes between Japan and the EC. The SEA introduced freedom of the movement of 
goods within the EC to be completed by 1992. Since many EC member states did not 
impose quotas on Japanese automobile imports, this obligation would enable Japanese 
firms to export vehicles erstwhile protected EC states via non-restricted Community 
markets. In addition, completion of a single market raised the possibility that Japanese 
transplant factories would produce vehicles in one EC state, the UK for example, and 
then freely ship then to other EC states such as France and Italy. Therefore, the 
approaching changes in EC/EU policies placed increasing pressure on the Commission to 
find new ways to support their member states as well as promote free trade within the 
community.  
The Commission proposed to the member states and the Japanese government 
that bilateral restraints on Japanese automobile imports, which were seen incompatible 
with the objectives of the single market programme, would be eliminated by the end of 
1992. Instead it proposed as an alternative a jointly administered VRA, which would run 
for a limited period before liberalizing the market. In this way, the EC would be able to 
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harmonize the automobile trade policies for Japan across member states, and further 
advance a single market.  
The principal policy outcome was the creation of the “elements of consensus” 
between the EC and Japan in July 1991. This landmark accord effectively placed 
numerical limits on Japanese automobile exports to the EC as a whole and to specified 
member countries until 1999. To be more precise, this accord saw the Japanese 
government and automobile firms agreeing to a transitional period within which the 
Japanese share of the EC/EU market would be allowed to increase from 12 percent in 
1991 to 16 percent by 1999. This transitional period was also designed to help the more 
protected European car markets to expose their domestic industries gradually to greater 
Japanese competition by continuing to implement national exports restraints until 1999. 
The Commission and Japan’s MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry)
9
 
agreed to review the market situation every six months (Kewley 2002: 192). After the 
transitional period, the VRA was abolished, and the European automobile market became 
completely liberalized. The policymaking process of the “elements of consensus” 
between Japan and the EC took more three years to complete from early 1988 to 1991.  
 
5.1.1 Form of interest representation  
 
 The Commission was clearly the most important actor with full responsibility for 
the 1991 accord. Bilateral negotiations on the European side were led by DG I (external 
relations), DG III (internal market and industry), and DG IV (competition policy). The 
national governments of member states, especially those with domestic automobile 
manufacturers such as the UK, Germany, France, and Italy, also significantly impacted 
the automobile trade policy with Japan. For the EC, especially the Commission, 
coordination among the member states was a key factor for successful negotiations with 
Japan. Throughout the EC trade policymaking process, European automobile firms’ 
forms of interest representation were mainly characterized by the corporatist model 
(Schmitter 1974, Greenwood 2003). 
                                                 
9
 Re-named as METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) in 2001 
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 Under such conditions, European automobile firms mainly lobbied through 
business associations at EC level. Prior to 1990, the automobile industry was represented 
in Brussels via two organizations: the Liaison Committee of the Automobile Industry of 
the Countries of the European Communities (CLCA) and the Committee of Common 
Market Automobile Constructors (CCMC). CLCA was the peak association for the EC’s 
seven national automobile trade groups, representing general interests common to all 
manufacturers. CCMC was in effect a club of European manufacturers, established 
following dissatisfaction with the lack of direct firm participation in CLCA, and had 
remained the industry’s most powerful group.  
Although each European firm brought to bear significant influence on its own 
national government, European automobile firms as a whole did not easily unite into a 
single interest group. Much to the Commission’s dismay, the draft accord was rejected by 
the heads of the European firms who argued that it was too favourable to Japan. Jacques 
Calvet, the then president of PSA Citroën, refused to even accept such proposition. 
Besides, those who produced luxury cars such as BMW had different interests from 
mass-producers such as Fiat, Renault and VW. The lack of internal consensus resulted in 
poor lobbying ability with the Commission. As a result, the Committee of Common 
Market Automobile Constructors (CCMC), which had until then served them as an 
industry federation, was replaced by the newly established industrial organization, the 
European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), in 1991. The transformation 
of the group into ACEA, in which they introduced majority decision rules instead of 
unanimous ones and ostracized the most intransigent PSA Citroën group, enabled the 
industry to gain more prowess of its own (Abe 1999: 78). To be more precise, adoption of 
a majority voting mechanism intended to improve the efficiency of decision making 
procedures and the commonality in policy positions.  In addition, ACEA also invited 
American automobile firms with European manufacturing operations to join, but not 
Japanese firms, even those with European plants (Kewley 2002: 190). ACEA transcends 
the national boundaries, and has more resources than either of its predecessors with a 
full-time staff of eighteen personnel.  
 Direct lobbying by individual European firms was still rare. European firms 
lobbied the Commission mainly through ACEA to reflect their views in the “elements of 
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consensus”. Collective action through ACEA is explained by selective incentive 
advocated by Olson (1965). Selective incentive is not simply a material benefit in the 
style of cheap insurance for members, but a selective policy benefit so that participation 
can shape the organizational agenda in a way that is favourable to the member firms. 
Participation allows an opportunity to influence group goals. For individual European 
firms, participation in collective lobbying was part of an exercise to minimize surprises, 
as member firms cope with a changeable and unstable policy agenda. In Olson’s language, 
the monitoring service of ACEA was a selective benefit which encouraged membership. 
In this sense, European automobile firms communicated with the Commission by 
forming pan-European business associations to promote their interests. Besides, the 
limited amount of individual lobbying is also explained by the fact that firms could rely 
on unfavourable European policy being blocked by their national governments at EC 
level.  
At the same time, recognizing the organizational problems of ACEA to create 
internal consensus, individual firms consequently began to make direct interest 
representations to the Commission as well. This is practical because with some issues 
there was no group discussion of individual cases. Such issues were simply kept off 
ACEA’s agenda. Thus, eight European automobile firms opened offices in Brussels with 
the main intention of developing personal links to policy development during this period. 
This is a sign that European automobile firms were gradually able to make strategic 
decisions as to whether they lobbied collectively or individually, depending on their 
differing interests. The gradual shift from collective lobbying to individual lobbying also 
confirms the development of a pluralist/elite pluralist EU policymaking process. Overall, 
they mainly relied on collective lobbying through ACEA, and individual lobbying at EU 
level was still very rare.  
 
Japanese practice 
 
 MITI mainly represented Japanese automobile interests at the negotiation table 
with the EC. MITI, which was responsible for creating an export cartel on the Japanese 
side, had agreed to explore with the Japan Automobile Manufactures Association (JAMA) 
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the issues of the “elements of consensus” in the European market by 1990. On the issue 
of exports to the EC, many decisions were at MITI’s discretion; MITI handled 
negotiations to estimate European market growth, decided the scale of total Japanese 
exports, and allocated export quotas to individual firms. From 1986 until the 1991 
agreement, MITI monitored Japanese exports to the EC. Japanese firms occupied roughly 
10% of the EC automobile market, as highlighted in table 5.3. MITI played a role to 
provide a framework for communication and consensus building between the Japanese 
government and the automobile industry. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) was also the formal representative body in international negotiations, and thus 
consulted in trade negotiations with the EC. The MFA was sensitive to Japan’s reputation 
and wished to cooperate in a liberal trade regime. Their participation was not only 
because of the formality of international negotiations, but also out of concern that the 
resulting agreement be compatible with the concurrent GATT Uruguay Round talks. 
Therefore, the early stage of the negotiations between Japan and the EC included both 
MITI and the MFA. In practice, however, the MFA had little influence on decision-
making in trade policies, as MITI carried out official negotiations for most aspects of the 
1991 agreement.   
 
 
Table 5.3 Japanese shares of European automobile market, by company (1989) 
 
Company Market Share (%) 
Nissan 2.9 
Toyota 2.5 
Mazda 1.8 
Mitsubishi 1.2 
Honda 1.0 
Suzuki 0.6 
Subaru 0.4 
Daihatsu 0.3 
Isuzu 0.1 
Total 10.8 
                                                      (Source: JAMA. Market Data Book 1990)  
 
 
Under such conditions, Japanese firms did not have much contact with the EC 
actors and had little incentive to change their traditional form of interest representation. 
Their relationship with MITI was characterized by the traditional institutional model 
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based on a strong initiative of bureaucracy in the policymaking process (Zhao 1993, 
Tsujinaka 1997, Kono 2003).  There were nine Japanese automobile firms and they acted 
as a single interest group through JAMA. They tended to rely on JAMA to express their 
opinions as a whole industrial sector, rather than commenting independently on foreign 
trade issues, as their European automobile counterparts did for the EC Trade policies. 
This made JAMA appear to be a highly united organization. More importantly, JAMA 
permitted MITI to take sole responsibility for conducting the negotiations on the Japanese 
side, thus assuring the Ministry’s primacy in not only influencing, but also articulating 
the demands of Japanese automobile firms (Kewley 2002). In addition, the exclusion 
from ACEA also led Japanese firms to fortify under JAMA. The absence of direct 
lobbying at  EC level was also confirmed by the interview with the Commission. The 
Japan desk officer at the Commission recalled that Japanese firms did not lobby the 
Commission at all, but MITI represented Japanese interests as a whole on behalf of the 
firms, although individual firms were always welcome to make any comment on EC trade 
policies.
10
  
Japanese automobile firms consulted with MITI individually on some EC trade 
issues. For example, Nissan’s outspoken President Yutaka Kume sometimes 
recommended tactics and issue emphases which were not in line with other firms. 
Besides, even though Japan had a domestic market of considerable size, it was over 
crowded to accommodate nine manufacturers in a market. Domestic competition 
expanded to export markets in the EC, where each firm began to make efforts to gather 
its own information rather than relying on MITI or JAMA (Abe 1999). Therefore, most 
Japanese automobile firms opened public affairs offices in Brussels by 1990 although 
they did not conduct any direct lobbying at the Commission. On the whole, Japanese 
automobile firms had established a very corporative relationship with MITI through 
JAMA on the major questions in the talks for the 1991 accord. Unlike European 
automobile firms which sought to represent their interests individually at the Commission 
as well as through ACEA, Japanese automobile firms relied heavily on JAMA and MITI 
for negotiations with the EC and direct lobbying at the Commission was almost non-
existent.   
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5.1.2 Instrument 
  
 Since the “elements of consensus” was negotiated at the state-level between the 
EC and Japan, European automobile firms and ACEA mainly lobbied the Commission 
and member states’ governments to express their views and create a united European 
front against Japan. Although it was crucial to present a European common position at 
the negotiations with Japan, European firms and ACEA openly and vigorously lobbied 
the Commission and their national governments during the consultation period. The 
Community’s automobile policy did not take shape immediately, and it was never easy 
for the Commission to co-ordinate various interests among European firms. The firms’ 
main lobbying instruments to influence the Commission were based on the exchange of 
information about their preferences for policy.  
 As exchange theory suggests (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961, Aplin and 
Hegarty 1980), those using an information strategy seek to affect public policy by 
providing policymakers with specific information about policy positions and may involve 
providing information on the costs and benefits of different issue outcomes. On the 
European side, there were some major controversies about the Commission’s initial 
proposal of 1989. Its initial plan included: i) abolishing national import restrictions on 
Japanese automobiles by the end of 1992, ii) setting a transitional period after the launch 
of single market in 1993 to allow European firms time to prepare for free competition 
with Japanese firms, and iii) establishing that no requirement of local content be made by 
member governments. Once talks with Japan started, the second point became the focus 
of the discussion, together with the treatment of Japanese automobiles produced in the 
EC.  In September 1989, European firms including VW, Fiat, and Renault, demanded 
five years. However, at a time when the Commission had almost achieved a consensus 
among European firms in December 1989, the French government insisted on seven 
years. Two months later, the Commission released a report indicating that national quotas 
might be kept for ten years. Throughout 1990 no single view prevailed on the transitional 
period length among European firms. As mentioned earlier, Jacques Calvet, the president 
of PSA Citroën at the time, in particular held to his strongly protectionist position, 
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demanding at least ten years. As a result, CCMC practically collapsed, and all but PSA 
Citroëne established ACEA in 1991. In March 1991, all ACEA members agreed to 
approximately six to seven years for the transitional period.
11
 In addition, whether or not 
Japanese transplants should be included in the restrictions during the transitional period 
made the negotiations even more difficult. For the European side, the treatment of 
transplants automobiles was crucial, since other issues such as the length of the 
transitional period would eventually and ultimately dissolve once the single market was 
completed. Thus ACEA demanded that the growth of Japanese transplant production be 
treated as the central issue of EC-Japan agreement.  
 Following completion and approval of the platform by ACEA in 1991, European 
automobile firms were assigned the task of convincing their respective home 
governments to support the common industry stance. In addition, ACEA sent a four-page 
memorandum to the Commission setting forth its position. Based on such agreement with 
ACEA and member states, the Commission had adopted a tougher position by the end of 
April 1991, which they then presented to the Japanese government and MITI. ACEA’s 
attempts to draft constructive policies corresponded closely with the process of looking 
for partners, which many exchange models had previously described (Levine and White 
1961, Aplin and Hegarty 1980).  
 
Japanese practice 
 
As for the lobbying instrument, since both Japanese firms and JAMA did not have 
much direct contact with the Commission, their lobbying instrument was domestically 
directed at MITI and not externally at the EC. Therefore, there was no incentive for 
Japanese automobile firms to change their traditional lobbying instruments to establish 
corporative relationships with the national policymakers. Their main lobbying 
instruments were not the exchange of information, but similar to the strategy of 
‘absorption’ described by Ring, Lenway, and Goverkar (1990), in that they attempted to 
absorb a part of the external political environment into the firm. In other words, 
automobile firms followed administrative guidance and other non-legally binding 
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instructions by MITI to maintain a cooperative networks with them. The amakudari, a 
custom by which former high-ranked bureaucrats get executive positions in private firms, 
was a common practice to facilitate the communications between MITI and JAMA. Such 
practice also took place between other Ministries or semi-governmental agencies and 
JAMA. For example, the head of JAMA’s transport division was traditionally a former 
official of Ministry of Transport. The relationship between MITI and JAMA was 
certainly closer than that between ACEA and the Commission. JAMA’s vice chairman 
was chosen from the directors of MITI’s automobile directorate. In general, meeting 
between JAMA and MITI took place prior to meetings of JAMA’s board of directors. 
Also, JAMA invited MITI officials along to the monthly meetings of its members.
12
 Such 
personalized incentive instruments were widely used by JAMA to influence MITI. 
Japanese automobile firms recognized the importance of maintaining a united 
common position at the negotiations with the EC and there was a general agreement on 
the central issues among Japanese actors. While the Commission constantly had to 
negotiate with European automobile firms to form a common position, Japanese 
automobile firms remained compliant so that MITI did not have to struggle to achieve 
domestic consensus. In responding to the EC, MITI sounded out automobile firms’ 
interests that were then reflected in MITI’s opinions at bilateral talks with the 
Commission. Japanese automobile firms were united under the common position of 
JAMA and rather passively accepted the policy guidance provided by MITI.
13
 The 
participation of Japanese automobile firms in MITI’s policymaking process was not 
usually exposed to the public, in that their more important contacts were often held at an 
informal level. Some disagreements and disputes were solved rather quietly thorough 
consultations between MITI and the industry to avoid open-confrontations. The 
widespread use of financial incentive and informal instruments among Japanese 
automobile firms clearly corresponded to the traditional model of Japanese business-
government relations (Zhao 1993, Kubota 1997, Woronoff 1986).  
In terms of the negotiations with the EC, the Japanese were faced with an 
agreement that was essentially not to their liking. For a start, although the increase in 
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market share was acceptable, it was dependent on market condition and size. The second 
problem was that any increase in market share had to be realistically derived from either 
local production, which was preferable for the Commission, or from direct imports from 
Japan, but not both. Therefore, the results of the accord produced bitter responses from 
the Japanese. For example, Nissan argued for a shorter transitional period stating that it 
understood the need for a transitional period, but it was its desire that this period be 
dismantled as soon as possible.
14
 Representatives of Toyota were also disappointed with 
the agreement, with one of the officials claiming that Japan was completely defeated 
(Kewley 2002:189).  
 
Overall, Japanese automobile firms did not transform their lobbying strategies 
from their national patterns during the pre-TEU period. There was no significant direct 
lobbying in the EU. They relied on their national business association to represent their 
interests and widely used personalized lobbying instruments to maintain a cooperative 
relationship with the Japanese policymakers. While their European rivals started to 
recognize the limit of national lobbying channels and started to directly represent their 
interests at EC level, either collectively through ACEA or individually, Japanese firms 
did not conduct any significant lobbying in the EC. Despite the widespread investment of 
Japanese automobile firms across Europe, there was no sign of convergence of lobbying 
strategies. Before moving on to examine the impact of several institutional factors upon 
the firms’ decisions regarding their form of interest representation and instrument, the 
next section will examine the lobbying strategies of Japanese electronics firms against the 
EC trade policies.  
 
 
5.2 Electronics firms: background and controversies 
 
 The electronics industry is similar to the automobile industry in that it is one of 
the most internationally oriented sectors of Japanese industry. Japanese electronics firms 
have strengthened international linkages through foreign direct investment since the 
                                                 
14
 Interview with JETRO, Tokyo, 3/2/05 
 114 
1980s. There are several distinctive features of the Japanese electronics industry. The first 
feature is a traditionally high dependence on consumer electronics products. The share of 
consumer electronics in total electronics production in the world decreased significantly 
from 49.0 percent in 1960 to 10.7 percent in 1995. However, the share in Japan at 16.2 
percent in 1992 was still high compared with 8.0 percent in Europe (Mason 1997: 87). 
The second feature is that Japanese electronics firms are vertically integrated, engaging in 
various sub-sector businesses. The third feature is that majority of electronics products 
have been manufactured by a limited number of firms such as Sony, Toshiba, Hitachi, 
Panasonic, Mitsubishi Electronics, and Sanyo. This is also the case in semiconductor 
production. NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi Electronic accounted for 
roughly 75 percent of the total semiconductor output in Japan in 1992.  
 
 
Table 5.4 The global electronics industry in 1990 (figures in billions of dollars) 
 
Country Production Imports Exports Trade Balance 
Japan 32.2 0.7 16.8 +16.1 
EC 10.7 9.3 1.2 -8.1 
USA 5.4 11.2 0.9 -10.3 
               (Source: The Commission: The European Electronics and Information Technology Industry 1991)  
 
 
 
In Europe, this industry had long been divided among numerous firms operating 
in fragmented national markets in which governments often played important roles. The 
declining international competitiveness in electronics products caused major structural 
changes in the European market. For example, a report commissioned by the EC and 
published in 1985 found that locally-owned firms, were, in general, far less productive 
than their Japanese counterparts. This lagging international competitiveness was evident 
in virtually all major electronics products groups. These trends, together with the 
spectacular rise of the Japanese electronics firms, had led to global Japanese leadership 
with only a modest European and American presence, as highlighted in table 5.4. This 
Japanese challenge to the European electronics industry encouraged widespread mergers, 
acquisitions and other forms of restructuring in Europe during the 1980s. For example, 
Philips took control of Grundig; Thomson acquired Telefunken, Nordmende, and 
Ferguson; and Nokia gained control of Oceanc and the German subsidiary of ITT. By the 
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end of 1980s, these three firms, Philips, Thomson, and Nokia had emerged as the EC’s 
pre-eminent locally based manufacturers.
15
  
Tariffs, voluntary export restraints and a range of antidumping measures had all 
worked to encourage Japanese electronics firms to invest in the EC. Such policies did not 
only accelerate investment that would have taken place in any case, but they also 
increased investment substantially above the level it would otherwise have reached 
(Belderbos 1995). A wave of antidumping actions, concentrated in the second half of the 
1980s, targeted Japanese electronics firms and often led to the imposition of duties. 
Under the EC’s antidumping law, based on the GATT antidumping code, EC firms could 
petition for and be granted protection against imports if there was evidence that the 
imports were sold below the normal value of the products and if the dumped imports 
were found to cause material injury to the firms. Normal value can be defined either as 
the price in the country of export or the fully allocated production cost. In addition, the 
EC later amended its antidumping law to make it applicable to Japanese assembly plants 
in Europe. This was effectively administered as local content rule. Under the local 
content rules, duties could be levied on products assembled in EC plants if the following 
conditions were met: i) the assembly plants were set up or had increased production after 
the antidumping action, and ii) more than 60 percent of components used in the EC 
assembly were imported from the home country. It was invoked seven times from 1987 
to 1990, with five cases concerning Japanese electronics products.
16
 EC policies 
significantly influenced not only the pattern of Japanese trade but also the development 
and character of Japanese electronics firms in Europe. EC trade measures against Japan 
induced Japanese electronics firms to engage in full manufacturing operations in the EC, 
and thereby partially replaced exports with local production by 1992. 
 
5.2.1 Form of interest representation  
 
 Since there were only a few European electronics firms and their international 
competitiveness was relatively limited, it was more of the EC’s initiative to exercise the 
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 Interview with the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation, Tokyo, 7/2/05 
16
 Interview with JETRO, Tokyo, 3/2/05 
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antidumping instrument and local contents rules to address its “Japanese problems”: the 
advance of Japanese firms in high technology markets of the EC, the relative weakness of 
EC firms, and the increasing bilateral trade deficit. A few European firms, such as Philips 
and Grundig, directly lobbied the Commission, as well as mobilized at national level for 
some product areas such as VCRs and CD players. However, there was no significant 
individual or collective lobbying by the firms at EC level. Unlike the automobile sector, 
European firms did not form a strong pan-European association to cultivate networks 
with the EC, instead relying on their traditional national lobbying channels. In this sense, 
European electronics firms mainly pursued the intergovernmental and corporatist 
relationships with the EC policymakers more so than automobile firms.  
The Commission was the authority administering the EC antidumping system. 
After receiving a complaint from EC firms, the Commission carried out an antidumping 
investigation if the complaint was judged to be well founded. If the investigation found 
dumping as well as injury, antidumping duties could be levied for a period of five years, 
or agreements could be made with the exporting firms involved, by which these firms 
promised to keep the process or quantities at a certain level. The negotiation of these 
trade measures set the stage for a unified commercial policy in the EC, with the 
Commission as the main actor instead of the respective governments. However, it should 
be noted that, although the Commission had broad decision-making powers and was 
responsible for the implementation of EC antidumping rules, the individual member 
states had to approve any definitive antidumping action through the Council of Ministers. 
Since only one antidumping case was rejected by the Council, it effectively rubber-
stamped the Commission’s proposals, allowing substantial autonomy to the Commission. 
However, during the investigation the Commission received member states’ comments 
on each case through the Council of Advisers and was obliged by law to hear the 
Adviser’s opinions. Thus, the Commission was likely to decide on cases by taking 
member states’ interests, as represented by the Council of Advisers, into account in order 
not to face defeat in the Council. In this sense, there was no significant lobbying by 
European electronics firms and business associations at EC level.  
 
Japanese practice 
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Since these trade barriers did not lead to the creation of single trade accord 
between Japan and the EC like in the automobile case, there was no significant lobbying 
activity by Japanese electronics firms against specific EC trade policies. Instead, they 
tended to rely on MITI to negotiate trade measures with the EC and accepted MITI’s 
guidance. Their relationship with MITI was characterized by the traditional institutional 
model based on a strong initiative of bureaucracy in the policymaking process (Zhao 
1993, Tsujinaka 1997, Kono 2003).  In other words, Japanese electronics firms had little 
incentive to change their form of interest representation, since their European operations 
were determined by MITI. It was logical for them to utilize national business associations 
to channel their European political interests instead of individual lobbying.  
 Generally speaking, the policy preferences of the electronics firms were normally 
expressed through industrial associations, represented by the Electronics Industries 
Association of Japan (EIAJ).
17
 This association, with a membership of roughly 600 
companies including some 50 foreign affiliated firms, covered consumer and industrial 
electronic products. The principal product areas covered by the EIAJ were consumer 
electronics, electronics components and devices, and industrial electronic equipment. 
Sony, NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Matsushita and Mitsubishi Electric played a pivotal role in 
decision-making in the EIAJ. All the past chairmen of EIAJ had been selected from these 
firms (Yoshimatsu 2000: 86). The EIAJ had a committee on European affairs. However, 
its activities were only limited to monitoring and analysing the European market, and 
providing information to its members. In addition, EIAJ’s broad policies were decided at 
its annual conference, which all members were entitled to attend. Important issues 
affecting the electronics industry were deliberated at the executive council and board of 
governors meeting. The executive board, comprised of governors (up to 60 people) and 
auditors, were elected at the annual conference.
18
 It was very rare for Japanese electronics 
firms to conduct individual lobbying as Japanese electronics firms preferred to act 
together whenever possible and emphasized the consensus among them.
19
  
                                                 
17
 Merged with Japan Electronic Industry Development Association (JEIDA) in 2000 and re-named as 
JEITA (Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association)  
18
 EIAJ homepage: http://www.jeita.or.jp/eiaj/english/about/profile/pro04.pdf 
19
 Interview with Fujitsu, Tokyo, 10/2/05 
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5.2.2 Instrument 
 
 As mentioned earlier, there was no significant lobbying by European electronics 
firms at the EC level. European firms mainly lobbied their host governments to impose 
these trade measures against Japanese firms. These networks between European firms 
and member governments confirmed the trends of corporatism, which had been prevalent 
during the pre-TEU period (Schimitter 1974, Schimitter and Streek 1999), and 
intergovernmentalism (Keohane and Hoffman 1990).  
At the same time, some European firms sought to cooperate with Japanese firms 
by collaborating in technological advancements, such as Philips and Sony in CD players, 
in order to secure their interests in the EC. Such transnational strategic alliances enabled 
some European firms to bypass the traditional national lobbying channels and laid the 
basis for them to become pan-European actors. In 1982, Philips and Grundig, the EC 
producers of videocassette recorders (VCRs) with Philips’ V-2000 standard, filed an 
antidumping petition against Japanese firms with the Commission. Rising Japanese 
import penetration prompted EC wide policy responses. As a result, the Commission 
negotiated with MITI the Community’s first ever voluntary restraint agreement (VRA). 
Under the terms of the agreement, the Japanese agreed to restrict VCR exports to the EC 
for three years, beginning in 1983. In addition, this VRA set minimum prices that were 
pegged at levels designed to close the gap between Japanese and Philips VCR production 
costs. Yet, European impediments to Japanese VCR imports did not stop there. For 
example, following expiration of the VRA accord in 1985 the Commission chose to raise 
the Community import tariff on VCRs from 8 to 14 percent. Moreover, certain member 
states such as France imposed informal national import quotas even after the termination 
of the 1983 accord. And signals from various member states encouraged the Japanese 
unilaterally to restrain VCR exports to the EC in subsequent years.
20
 Although European 
electronics firms in the VCR industry failed to maintain significant shares of local 
markets, through national and European policy channels, they tried to limit Japanese 
exports into the EC. Yet, overwhelming Japanese competitive strength largely forced 
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European electronics firms to abandon their attempt to popularize their own VCR format 
in 1985, and in subsequent years they started to adopt the Japanese patented VHS system 
instead. Thereafter, the European VCR market was largely dominated by Japanese 
electronics firms, as well as European firms operating under Japanese license (see table 
5.5).  
 
 
Table 5.5 The EC VCR market (millions of units)  
 
Year Total EC sales Total EC production Japanese share of total 
EC production 
Japanese 
imports 
1982 5.0 0.9 0.7 4.0 
1985 5.4 2.2 1.7 3.1 
1986 6.5 2.9 2.3 3.3 
1987 8.2 4.2 3.0 3.5 
1988 10.1 5.0 4.6 3.2 
1989 11.1 6.2 5.6 3.6 
(Source: JEITA)  
 
 
 Another important case is about the compact disc (CD) players. Phillips was 
determined that it would not repeat the mistakes over format standards it had made in the 
VCR contest. Accordingly, after fellow European producer Thomson declined to enter 
into joint efforts to develop a commercially viable CD player, Philips approached Sony 
about collaborating in further development of the product. Sony agreed to cooperate in 
such development and in the creation of a single standard for the new product. Pursuing a 
strategy to make their co-developed CD player standard throughout the industry, Philips 
and Sony licensed the technology to virtually every electronics firm that sought to obtain 
it. Although this action led to the universal adoption of the Philips-Sony standard, it also 
enabled all the major Japanese electronics firms to manufacture and compete in the CD 
player market. Consequently, anticipating a Japanese challenge in this new product 
segment, Philips and its member state backers successfully lobbied the Commission to 
institute a special 19 percent tariff on imported CD players from 1983. The rate of this 
tariff steadily declined, to 16.5 percent in 1987 and 9.5 percent in 1989. However, in 
1987 the Commission launched an extensive anti-dumping investigation, which led to the 
imposition of tentative import duties ranging up to 34 percent in the summer 1989 and to 
final duties ranging from 8 to 32 percent in 1990 (Mason 1997: 95).   
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Japanese practice 
 
 As already mentioned, there was no significant electronics lobby for the trade 
policies at EC level. Most negotiations were done between the Commission and MITI, 
and Japanese firms agreed to accept MITI’s policy guidance. In this sense, similar to 
European firms, Japanese electronics firms also relied on their national policy channels 
and were embedded in a corporatist business-government relationship (Sachwald 1995, 
Yoshimatsu 2000, Hartcher 1998, Johnson 1982). Regarding the relationship between 
MITI and the electronics sector, there were several ex-MITI officials in the EIAJ 
facilitating to maintain the close corporation between the two organizations. The 
secretary of the EIAJ was traditionally sent from MITI as well. In this sense, amakudari 
in the electronics sector was also common practice. Japanese electronics firms mainly 
attempted to influence the EC trade policies by directly aligning the incentives of the 
Japanese policymakers through financial inducements. Such Japanese lobbying 
instruments attempted to absorb part of the external political environment into the firm 
and business associations, mainly by hiring policymakers.  
At the same time, Japanese firms’ market competitiveness allowed them to 
cooperate with their European rivals and helped them to establish themselves as 
economic insiders in the EC. In other words, instead of attempting to lobby the European 
policymakers, Japanese firms directly invested in the EC and cooperated with their 
European rivals in order to avoid the unfavourable trade measures. As for VCRs, JVC, 
Sony, Panasonic, Hitachi, Sanyo, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba all established manufacturing 
plants in the EC by the mid 1980s. Two of these Japanese companies entered through 
joint ventures: JVC with Thorn EMI and AEG-Telefunken, and Panasonic with Bosch. 
By 1990, NEC, Funai, and Orion also set up local VCR plants in the EC. Similar to the 
VCR case, when the Commission formally decided to initiate its anti-dumping 
investigations in 1987, Japanese electronics firms began to directly invest in EC-based 
CD player manufacturing plants to circumvent the anti-dumping duties. Between 1987 
and 1990, no less than ten Japanese firms together established eleven such operations in 
the EC. For both products, the EC and member states placed major constraints on the 
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local investments of Japanese firms in the form of local content rules. These European 
trade policies encouraged Japanese electronics firms to localize their EC operations 
rapidly. By 1990, virtually all plants had reached 45 percent local content levels and 
some had achieved even higher levels of local sourcing. 
In addition to their localization strategy to circumvent the EC trade policies 
instead of direct lobbying, MITI and Japanese firms challenged the Community’s trade 
measures in the GATT. Instead of conducting information or financial incentive lobbying 
at EC level, Japanese electronics firms chose to use a more diplomatic lobbying 
instrument.  For example, in 1988, the Japanese government made a complaint to the 
GATT against the EC over its imposition of anti-dumping duties on Japanese products 
assembled in plants within the Community. It pointed out that the duties discriminated 
between manufacturers associated with foreign enterprises and domestic manufacturers, 
even when the latter used the same proportion of imported parts in their finished products. 
There was no local content requirement on European firms in the consumer electronics 
field, many of which were importing components from the same sources as Japanese 
firms operating in the EC (Ishikawa 1990: 85). This was the first time Japan had taken 
such action against the EC on a major issue at the GATT. Unlike the case of automobiles, 
where Japan accommodated the pressure from the EC and restricted exports, the Japanese 
electronics firms made a stand against what they saw as distortion of GATT rules. The 
GATT panel ruled in favour of Japan and the panel report was adopted by the GATT 
Council on 16 May 1990. This success encouraged Japanese firms to be more vigilant 
with respect to the way in which the EC applied GATT rules, and to press for tighter 
rules in the negotiations on anti-dumping in the Uruguay round (Woolcock and Yamane 
1993: 17). Similarly, another area in which Japanese electronics firms had become much 
more active was that of rules of origin. Japan alleged that the Commission had abused its 
discretionary powers in this area. As with anti-dumping actions, this stimulated Japan to 
seek to establish stronger GATT rules for the determination of the origin of the products. 
The lesson Japan drew from its experience in the 1980s was that it was in its interest to 
strengthen existing GATT disciplines. Having established international competitiveness 
in a range of electronics products, Japanese electronics firms shifted away from a policy 
of accommodating pressure for protection to one of defending its rights under GATT 
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rules. These examples show that Japanese electronics firms did not employ lobbying 
instruments directly aimed at the EC, instead they took matters to the GATT. The 
reliance on GATT to protect their interests in the EC was mainly because there was no 
exchange relation between the EC and Japanese firms. As various exchange models 
suggest, the interaction of private and public organizations can be conceptualized as a 
series of inter-organizational exchanges (Blau 1964, Hillman and Hitt 1999). An 
exchange relation is only likely to be sustainable when the exchange is reciprocal and 
both sides receive benefit from the exchange. In the electronics case, Japanese firms did 
not have much direct contact with the EC. Therefore, they continued to use financial 
incentive instruments to maintain a corporative relationship with MITI and let the 
government to put pressure on the EC through GATT, as well as localizing their 
European operations.  
Overall, Japanese electronics firms did not transform their lobbying strategies and 
stuck to their national lobbying pattern during the pre-TEU period. There was no direct 
lobbying in the EC. They relied on their business associations to represent their interests 
and widely used personalized lobbying instruments to feed their views into the EC 
through the Japanese national channels. Although there were not many European rivals 
and many Japanese electronics firms were localized in the EC, they did not seek to use 
their investment power and insider status to influence European trade policies.  
 
 
5.3 Factors influencing Japanese firms’ lobbying strategy formulation 
 
EC factors 
 
Firstly, the EC trade policies influenced the logic of Japanese lobbying in the EC. 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, previous studies have suggested that resource 
dependency matters because neither EU institutions nor interest groups can autonomously 
pursue and achieve their political goals (Pfeffer 1997, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In 
other words, the nature of policies is the important factor to influence the access pattern 
of business interests. If a policy deals with technical standards or the regulation of 
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sophisticated products such as pharmaceuticals, substantive expertise is important. On the 
other hand, for policies that have a high level of political salience in the member states, 
the Commission requires information on the preferences of relevant actors (Broscheid 
and Coen 2007). Furthermore, with regard to nature of policy, emphasis on the 
intergovernmental or multilevel approach is still a function of the type of policy under 
discussion, that is to say, the degree to which a policy is regulatory, distributive and 
redistributive (Coen 1998, Richardson 2001,Wallace and Wallace 2000: 199). Hence, on 
regulatory issues such as Environmental policy, the Commission can be seen to be taking 
a policy lead, but member states show a great reluctance to hand over redistributive 
powers such as taxation or trade policies to the supranational level. As a result, in a 
Japanese context, the more technical and complicated the policy is, the more likely 
Japanese firms are given access to the policymaking process since the level of resource 
dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese firms are likely to conduct more direct lobbying 
and less collective action through national associations. Alternatively, if the policy deals 
with few technical matters and concerns national interests, it is likely that Japanese firms 
are not given much access to the policymaking process, since the level of resource 
dependency is relatively low. Therefore, they are likely to conduct more collective 
lobbying through national associations than direct lobbying. 
Our findings show that indeed this is the case for the EC trade policies and 
Japanese firms in both the automobile and electronics sectors. With regard to the 
hypothesis 1, both Japanese automobile and electronics firms relied on their business 
associations, JAMA and JEITA, and did not conduct individual lobbying. Although the 
EC trade policies generated pressure for the removal of regulatory barriers and structural 
impediments within the Community, this internal dynamic for change did not exist to the 
same degree in Japan, where the emphasis remained on consensual agreement. In 
particular, as these trade negotiations between the EC and Japan took place bilaterally at 
the state level, Japanese industries and individual firms did not see many opportunities to 
directly represent their views in the EC and were reluctant to change their domestic 
pattern of lobbying. As JAMA and JEITA did not have European offices in Brussels, 
there was hardly any Japanese interest representation in the EC. Japanese automobile and 
electronics firms also began to invest in the EC in order to get around restrictions on 
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imports. However, such economic localization of Japanese firms did not facilitate them to 
participate in the EC policymaking process. In other words, there was not much resource 
dependency between the Commission and Japanese firms for the trade policies. Without 
much direct interaction with the Commission, Japanese firms had little incentive to 
change their traditional form of interest representation.  
Turning to hypothesis 2, which concerns the impact of the nature of policies on a 
firm’s decision for the lobbying instrument, Japanese firms in both sectors were not given 
much access to the policymaking process, since the Commission mainly required 
information on the preferences of European firms. Therefore, their lobbying instruments 
were directed at Japanese policymakers, especially MITI, which was responsible for the 
bilateral negotiations with the EC. Therefore, they did not change their traditional 
lobbying pattern and used a wide range of financial incentive instruments, most notably 
amakudari. The activities of Japanese firms in the EC were seriously restricted by the 
VERs and local content rules. In the face of protectionist EC trade measures, Japanese 
automobile firms chose to accommodate these protectionist forces, in order to avert more 
blatant protection and maintain trade peace between the EC and Japan. In contrast, 
Japanese electronics firms sought to mobilize GATT to influence EC trade policies. 
There was no proactive information lobbying in both sectors in the EC during this period.  
 The findings suggest that the nature of policies do play a role in the formation of 
lobbying strategies. The nature of trade policies that focused on the protection of 
European industries seemed to have a negative impact upon the Europeanization of 
Japanese lobbying. However, it should be stressed that these results need to be compared 
with the following case studies, which focus on more technical and regulatory policy 
issues. Comparison of these cases will highlight the impact of EU factors upon Japanese 
lobbying more clearly.  
 
Sectoral factors 
 
The nature of the EC policies is not the only factor influencing the lobbying 
strategy formulation of Japanese firms. Each industrial sector has its own institutional 
characteristics and they are also important determinants that influence the potential for 
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lobbying strategy formulation. To be more precise, Japanese firms in the electronics 
sector were more localized than those in the automobile sector because the level of 
internationalization was much higher. Because of the smaller scale of investment required, 
and growing concern about protectionist actions, Japanese electronics firms moved more 
rapidly into overseas production. As Japanese electronics subsidiaries became more 
established producers, they began to be seen as insiders in the EC, and were judged less 
on the basis on their ownership. Some Japanese R&D centres in the EC were granted EC 
R&D subsidies, which suggested that the prevailing view of Japanese firms as outsiders 
was changing. Sony Germany won approval to participate in three high technology 
projects sponsored by the EC, one of which was a joint effort with Ericsson and Siemens 
to develop next generation mobile telecommunications terminals (Belderbos 1995: 367). 
In contrast, the European automobile industry had a constant problem of overcapacity. As 
many as six major manufacturers each claimed more than 10 percent of the market share, 
although none of them boasted a decisive lead over the others. Therefore Japanese 
participation, whether by export or transplant, in such a close game naturally caused 
considerable concern and bitterness among European markers. 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the ability to gain support for issues may 
be affected by fragmentation in society (Coleman 1988). Generally speaking, in more 
pluralist structures, institutional arrangements result in a variety of interests coming into 
play in the policy arena (Hayes 1992), resulting in a fragmentation of political and 
economic power (Vogel 1996). In the political process of a pluralistic environment, 
interest groups and firms do not have to compromise with other groups. The 
policymakers may write or vote for policy that represents a compromise among their 
constituents, but the actual groups do not have to reach consensus across a variety of 
issues. A more pluralistic institutional environment creates the incentive for groups and 
firms to assert their own interests on specific issues in the political process (Murtha and 
Lenway 1994). The competition among interest groups in a more pluralist political 
environment is constantly changing, thereby presenting opportunities for firms to act 
selectively. Thus, the likelihood of firms participating individually in politics is greater in 
a more pluralist environment (Hillman and Keim 1995). Owing to the limited opportunity 
structure, firms in a less pluralist industrial sector will choose to participate in the 
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policymaking process collectively rather than individually. In other words, the less 
hostile the sector is towards Japanese firms, the easier it is for them to blend into the 
policymaking process.  
The findings from our case studies do not support hypothesis 3. There were strong 
European rival firms and the dominant European business association in the automobile 
sector, while Japanese firms occupied a large share of European electronics sector in the 
absence of rival firms. Yet Japanese firms in both sectors relied heavily on national 
business associations as the main lobbying channel. In this sense, the presence of 
dominant European rivals in a sector did not play a role in transforming the traditional 
form of Japanese business interest representation in the EC. Similarly, turning to the 
product diversification, which was hypothesized to play a role in choosing a particular 
lobbying instrument, the findings from our case studies do not support hypothesis 4 either. 
Despite the stark difference in terms of product diversification between the automobile 
and electronics sectors, Japanese firms in both sectors primarily focused on MITI and 
used a number of financial incentive instruments to maintain a cooperative relationship 
with it.  
Overall, market forces alone are unlikely to be sufficient to bring about 
convergence of lobbying strategies. Japanese firms in the automobile and electronics 
sectors were faced by rather different sectoral settings; however both relied on their 
national lobbying channels. It was expected that in the absence of strong European rivals, 
Japanese electronics firms were more able to become more proactive than automobile 
firms in the EC and depart from the national lobbying pattern. However, this was not the 
case for the trade policies.   
 
Corporate factors 
 
Finally, regarding the expectations about the relationship between a firm’s 
resources and its lobbying strategy, organizational theorists emphasize the importance of 
resources in interest mobilization (McCathy and Zald 1978, Cress and Snow 1988). 
Individual action loads all costs directly on the participating firms, whereas in collective 
action, the cost of political action is shared among members (Olson 1965). Thus, larger 
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firms with more slack resources prefer individual rather than collective action. They have 
the requisite resources for individual action, and such independent action may allow them 
to affect a government policy that best favours the firm. In addition, organizational 
resource also affects the firm’s decision about lobbying instrument. In order to develop 
credibility as a reliable information provider among policymakers, resource rich firms 
have an advantage over resource poor firms in using an information strategy (Sethi 1982). 
Therefore, the reason why a firm pursues a particular lobbying strategy is sometimes best 
understood by enquiring explicitly into their corporate resource availability.  
In a Japanese context, the data from the case studies partly supports hypotheses 5 
and 6; however this needs to be compared with the other cases in the following chapters. 
In other words, the findings confirm the expectations that resource poor Japanese firms 
are more likely to show strong embeddedness in national lobbying patterns. It should be 
stressed that this result was probably to do with the fact that the pre-TEU period was a 
formative period of Japanese lobbying and there was not much variation in Japanese 
firms in terms of their lobbying resources. To be more precise, throughout the 1980s, the 
Japanese tried to use actual, and the prospect of, inward investment to generate political 
influence to some extent. Most large Japanese automobile and electronics firms started 
directly investing in the EC from the 1980s. However, these EC based Japanese firms 
were not designed for active lobbying and unable to provide the required technical level 
of expertise or the manpower to monitor the EC policies. These local offices were 
essentially to manage the local manufacturing plants and monitor the sales in the market. 
Although many European firms stared to realize the increasing regulatory competences of 
the EC, especially after the SEA and move towards more pluralistic lobbying strategies, 
Japanese firms in the EC were slow to react to this trend and did not possess enough 
resources to conduct direct lobbying. In this sense, there was not much differentiation in 
size and length of presence in the EC among Japanese automobile and electronics firms 
during the pre-TEU period. Japanese firms were all resource poor in this respect.  
Under such conditions, collective action through the national business 
associations was a logical choice for Japanese firms. Instead of each firm monitoring the 
political process and attempting to influence this process alone, the business associations 
performed these functions in a collective manner, thereby creating economies of scale. 
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Collective action provided a more forceful voice than any one firm, assuming constrained 
firm-level resources. Regardless of the dues structure for business associations, member 
firms pooled their resources, resulting in lower per-firm costs of political action. With 
regard to their lobbying instrument, Japanese firms clearly lacked the resources to 
conduct information strategies in the EC and chose to focus on maintaining intertwined 
relationships with the national policymakers based on financial incentive strategies.  
 
   
5.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has laid a contextual analysis of early years of Japanese lobbying in 
the EC, which constitutes the basis for the longitudinal and cross-sectoral comparison 
with the following case studies in Chapter 6 and 7. There was no significant direct 
lobbying initiated by Japanese industries in the EC during this period. The main message 
is that Japanese firms in both sectors solely relied on their national political channels, 
mainly MITI, to feed their business interests at EC level. In this sense, their lobbying 
strategies in the EC were embedded in the traditional Japanese business-government 
relationship, and did not show any transformation from their domestic lobbying pattern 
despite the wide spread sizes of their FDI across Europe.  
In terms of interest representation, MITI mainly represented both automobile and 
electronics interests. Japanese firms tended to act as a single interest group through their 
business associations such as JAMA, and these associations usually permitted MITI to 
take sole responsibility for conducting the negotiations on the Japanese side, thus 
assuring the Ministry’s primacy in not only influencing but also articulating the demands 
of the Japanese firms. Therefore, there was no sign of network building between Japanese 
business lobbies and the EC policymakers. It should be noted that European automobile 
firms mainly relied on ACEA and European electronics firms used national lobbying 
channels during the period. Regarding the lobbying instruments, used by Japanese firms 
to influence MITI, the amakudari, a custom by which former high-ranked bureaucrats get 
executive positions in private firms or associations, was common in both the automobile 
and electronics sectors. Nevertheless, Japanese firms in both sectors maintained close 
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networks with MITI to form united fronts. Although there was no significant Japanese 
lobbying at EC level in the pre-TEU period, Japanese automobile and electronics firms 
reacted to the EC trade policies in different ways. Automobile firms chose to 
accommodate the EC’s pressure to reduce the trade surplus by agreeing to the 1991 
accord, while electronics firms began to localize their operations to circumvent the EC 
trade measures and challenged the EC’s trade policies in the GATT.  
To return to our initial hypotheses, we found mixed results. The data gathered 
from our case studies suggests that only EC factors seem to be relevant to the formulation 
of Japanese lobbying strategies. Trade policies were closely related to the interests of 
member states, often leading to state level negotiations. The nature of policies made it 
very difficult for Japanese firms to participate in the policymaking process. Therefore, 
Japanese firms had to use their national channels for lobbying and had little incentive to 
alter their traditional lobbying patterns. The sectoral factors seemed to play little role in a 
firm’s lobbying strategy formulation in the context of EC trade policies. Japanese firms in 
the automobile and electronics sectors were faced by rather different sectoral settings; 
however both relied on their national lobbying channels. It was expected that in the 
absence of strong European rivals, Japanese electronics firms would become more 
proactive than automobile firms in the EC and depart from the national lobbying pattern. 
However, this was not the case. Japanese electronics firms were more localized than 
automobile firms; however firms in both sectors did not lobby in the EC. The corporate 
factors were difficult to measure for these case studies, since the pre-TEU period was a 
formative stage of Japanese lobbying and there was not much variation in firms’ size and 
length of European experience. These results need to be compared with the more recent 
case studies in order to highlight the longitudinal transformation of Japanese lobbying 
strategies.  
This chapter provides a window into the following further case studies of 
Japanese lobbying in the post- TEU period, which highlight the transformation of 
Japanese lobbying. In this chapter, the manner in which Japanese automobile and 
electronics firms were embedded in their domestic lobbying pattern is laid out, as are the 
bases of economic competitiveness of these firms in the EC. Understanding these 
institutional settings, in which Japanese firms were initially rooted, as well as the 
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increasing Europeanization of the policymaking process, is key to the comprehension of 
the subject matter in the following chapters.  
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6. Automobile firms in the post-TEU period: The ELV directive 
 
 The End of Life Vehicles (ELV) directive (2000/53/EC) came into force on 21 
October 2000, and originally required to be implemented into national legislations by 21 
April 2002. It is a part of a sequence of environmental legislation that comes from the EU 
and adheres to the general guidelines of “waste minimization” and “polluter pays”. The 
Packing Waste regulations and the directive on the Waste Electrical and Electronic 
(WEEE) are other examples of this field of legislation.  
 In short, the ELV directive is concerned with cars, vans, and certain three wheeled 
vehicles. It aims to make vehicle dismantling and recycling more environmentally 
friendly, and sets clear quantified targets for reuse, recycling and recovery of vehicles 
and their components, encouraging producers to manufacture new automobile products 
with a view to their recyclability. The directive’s main objectives are to ensure that 1) 
producers limit the use of certain hazardous substances in the manufacture of new 
vehicles and automotive components, 2) the ELVs are subject to de-pollution prior to 
dismantling, recycling or disposal, 3) treatment facilities operate to higher environmental 
standards, 4) certain recovery and recycling targets are met by deadlines set by the 
directive, and 5) by 2007 producers pay all or a significant part of the costs of treating the 
ELVs.  
 There are nine Japanese automobile manufacturers in the EU (Toyota, Nissan, 
Honda, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Isuzu, Fuji Juko (Subaru), and Mazda) which 
produce vehicles and automotive components, counting for approximately 11% of 
European automobile market.
21
 It was clear that Japanese automobile firms as well as 
other European and American rivals would be by far the most affected by this directive. 
In the European automobile market, the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (ACEA) is the most powerful industrial lobby and played an important role 
in the ELV policymaking process, closely working with the Commission. ACEA consists 
of thirteen automobile manufactures with European plants, including two major 
American firms, Ford and General Motors. However, ACEA does not include any 
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Japanese firms. Hence, in order to lobby for the ELV directive, the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (JAMA) and individual Japanese firms were forced to operate 
as a separate lobby in the EU.  
 This chapter firstly explains the development of the ELV policymaking process 
with reference to several key issues of the directive. Then, it examines how European and 
Japanese automobile firms conducted their lobbying campaigns for the ELV directive in 
the following two aspects: the form of interest representation and the instrument.  In 
addition, the chapter analyzes the impact of EU, sectoral and corporate factors upon 
formation of Japanese lobbying, and compares the result with the pre-TEU Japanese 
lobbying presented in Chapter 5. Examination of these points will provide an interesting 
case study which highlights how and to what extent Japanese automobile firms 
transformed their traditional lobbying patterns to maximize their interests during the post-
TEU period. 
 
 
6.1 Development of the ELV policymaking process 
 
 Scrap cars have been recycled on an industrial scale for many decades and long 
before any national or European legislation was enacted. Driven by the recovery of 
valuable metals and the re-sale of used parts, vehicle recycling has been an economic 
activity in Europe for many years: the first big automobile shredder began its operation in 
1958 (Reinhardt 2005). The origin of the ELV directive can be traced back to the early 
1990s. Following the Council Resolution of 7 May 1990 on waste management policy, 
the Commission proposed various measures to combat certain categories of waste. 
Several waste streams had therefore already been the subject of the EU regulation such as 
waste oil, waste batteries and accumulators, waste packaging, and sewage sludge. The 
ELV project group was set up within the DG Environment in 1991 and its work over the 
period of 1991-94 resulted in a set of key documents being drafted and adopted, in 
particular the information document, the analysis document and the strategy proposal 
document. It was the latter document that was submitted to the Commission as the 
official paper to guide it in its task of drafting a legislative proposal on the ELV issues. 
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Besides, the fifth Community action programme in the field of environment and 
sustainable development stressed the need to modify both methods of production and 
consumer behaviour. Thus, the European Parliament called on the Commission based on 
the resolution of 14 November 1996 to legislate waste streams, in particular the end of 
life vehicles. The Commission took the view that a specific directive was necessary given 
the importance of the type of waste. This position was shared by the OECD Working 
Party on waste streams whose 1995 report considered the treatment of the end of life 
vehicles as a priority towards the overall objective of reducing waste.
22
 Nonetheless, 
while the Commission was responsible for proposing responses to problems, the Council, 
the EP, the Court of Justice, and several organized policy communities/industries also 
played an important role in agenda-setting.  
At the same time, increasing pressure from national governments led the 
automobile industry to sign off voluntary agreements to achieve higher recycling and 
recovery rates and accept responsibility for the treatment of ELVs. Twelve European 
countries developed voluntary agreements by the mid 1990s. Prompted by such national 
legislation, the ELV directive was developed in order to create a more harmonized EU 
approach to waste management and encourage sustainable development of the EU 
environmental policies.   
There are several major controversies about the ELV proposal among the 
automobile firms in the EU as listed below. Many of these concerns were shared by all 
major business actors while other issues were raised individually. Overall, the proposal of 
the ELV directive was seen by the industry as bureaucratic, inflexible, partly 
contradictory to other environmental regulations and too costly without generating the 
necessary environmental wins.  
 
Producer responsibility:  
The first and most important issue which the automobile industry wanted to 
address was to do with producer responsibility. That is to say, they claimed that it was not 
reasonable to force the producers to bear the full cost of treatment of ELVs. They 
particularly raised objections regarding a cost-free take back of end-of-life vehicles 
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incorporated into the proposal that would retrospectively apply to vehicles designed and 
produced before the directive was put into force. They argued that this would impose on 
the automobile industry high financial obligations that were bound to affect the economic 
situation of the sector and its competitive position.
23
  
 
Recovery rate of the ELVs:  
The targets for total recovery were split into a target for reuse (materials reused 
for the original purposes), recycling (materials reused for other purposes) and energy 
recovery (materials incinerated to generate energy).  However, there was an over-
emphasis on reuse and recycling. The main result of this would be that the development 
of new concepts of lightweight construction use, for example composite materials, could 
be extremely hindered as heavyweight automobiles contain more materials subject to 
recovery; therefore, making it easy for manufacturers to reach the recovery target set by 
the directive. However, this lightweight construction was needed to reduce fuel 
consumption and thus vehicle emissions. Furthermore, the increasing use of materials 
made from renewable natural resources would be hampered. These types of materials 
could be suitable for energy recovery, but not for recycling. For these reasons, the 
automobile industry criticized that it was not clear how the recovery target had to be 
calculated and a clear definition was needed. Not defining these rates from the outset 
would create confusion and made it difficult for manufacturers to work towards a clear 
goal.  
 
Prohibited materials:  
According to the proposal for the ELV directive, automobile parts and 
components containing lead, mercury, cadmium and hexavalent compounds of chromium 
had to be removed in the process of subsequent recycling from all vehicles sold as from 
2003. The automobile industry claimed that the application of lead in steel and 
aluminium alloys, for example, allowed them to be machined more easily and thus had a 
useful role in energy conservation and lightweight construction.
24
 Exemptions from the 
                                                 
23
 Press release on the ELV directive submitted by ACEA: 13/7/99 
24
 Press release on the ELV directive submitted by ACEA: 7/7/98 
 135 
list of prohibited materials were listed in the Annex II of the directive. The automobile 
industry criticized that these exemptions were still limited and based on technical facts 
only, not taking into account ecological or economical matters.  
 
Spare parts: 
 The automobile industry argued that spare and replacement parts containing 
those banned materials should be excluded from the scope of the ELV directive. 
Otherwise, spare parts with a changed design may no longer be compatible with the 
product in which they were originally used. In other words, consumers would not be able 
to purchase the right spare part if it contained one of the banned materials outlined in the 
directive. As a result, the whole vehicle might have to be disposed of. Automobile firms 
claimed that this would create unnecessary waste, and called for the exemption of spare 
parts for maintenance of finished products that were put on the market before the 
substitution deadline.  
 
 Finally, the End of Life Vehicles (ELV) directive was adopted by the EP and the 
Council on 18 September 2000 in order to prevent waste from end of life vehicles and 
promote the collection, re-use and recycling of their components to protect the 
environment. The ELV policymaking process, like any other EU policies, took several 
years to develop the proposal into the directive, and involved multi-levelled interactions 
and lobbying among a number of stakeholders. Therefore, the period from 1998 to 2000 
is the prime concern of this chapter when examining the development of Japanese 
automobile firms’ lobbying strategies towards the ELV directive.  
 The directive defines an end of life vehicle as any type of vehicle which is waste 
within the meaning of directive 75/442/EC. It forces manufacturers to pay take-back and 
recovery costs for vehicles on the market from 1 July 2002. At the moment, 75% of end 
of life vehicles are recycled. The aim of the directive is to increase the rate of reuse and 
recovery to 85% by average weight per vehicle and year by 2006, and to 95% by 2015. In 
addition, use of lead, mercury, cadmium and hexavalent chromium became prohibited in 
materials and components in vehicles put on the market after 1 July 2003. This directive 
is based on Article 175 of the EU treaty. Therefore, member states are entitled to adopt 
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stricter measures for environmental protection as long as these measures comply with 
Community law such as the principle of free movement of goods laid down in Articles 
28-30 of the Treaty.  
The final date for implementation in the member states was 21 April 2002. France, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Finland all 
missed this deadline although the Commission formally requested these countries to 
adopt national laws concerning end of life vehicles on 21 October 2001. On 8 April 2003, 
the Commission referred all of these countries except Spain and Portugal to the European 
Court of Justice.  Consequently, all new member states had to transpose the directive by 
the date of their accession on 1 May 2004. As of 2005, eleven of the old and nine of the 
new member states had officially communicated their national transposition measures to 
the Commission. 
 
 
6.2 Lobbying strategies of European and Japanese automobile firms 
 
 This section examines European and Japanese lobbying strategies for the ELV 
directive with reference to their form of interest representation and lobbying instrument. 
This allows the opportunity to compare European and Japanese lobbying strategies and 
clarify the embeddedness of national characteristics vis-à-vis Europeanization of 
Japanese automobile firms. 
 
6.2.1 Form of interest representation  
 
 Under current EU policymaking process, firms have become the integral players, 
participating directly as independent political actors or collectively through cross-border, 
strategic, and sometimes ad-hoc, business alliances with other countervailing interests. In 
the context of Olson’s logic of collective action (1965), the increased number of direct 
lobbying by firms is also explained by the fact that traditional business associations are 
unable to cover all aspects of increasing EU policies and fail to provide their members 
with significant selective incentives. Large firms have developed political capacities to 
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initiate either individual or collective lobbying according to the issues, and learned to 
utilize various forms of interest representation to suit their needs (Coen 1997, 2001, 
Mahoney 2007). In this sense, large firms are no longer bounded by collective lobbying 
through national business associations which was prevalent in pre-TEU period. Firms 
enjoy political autonomy and, if they decide to conduct lobbying collectively, this 
decision is rather strategic and not seen as the only option available to them. For large 
firms in the EU, both individual and collective lobbying can be mutually reinforcing 
strategic activities.  
 Most European automobile firms now have an EU affairs office in Brussels, 
staffed by lobbyists knowledgeable in the workings of the EU institutions. In some 
aspects of the ELV policymaking process, lobbying campaigns were initiated directly 
with the Commission, the EP and other European policymakers by individual firms. For 
example, Volkswagen and other German manufacturers actively proposed radical 
changes regarding the liability and recycling of heavy metals.
25
 Besides, individual 
European firms were also able to choose their level of lobbying and utilized both national 
and European channels. For example, when the Commission was unreceptive and sought 
not to accept any major amendments regarding producer responsibility, Volkswagen and 
other German manufacturers altered their lobbying focus and mobilized national support 
at the regional level. The result of such domestic pressure upon German government was 
that the German Environmental Minister cancelled the proposed Council of Ministers 
Environmental meeting in early 1999 and slowed the policy formulation down, giving the 
automobile firms some extra time for lobbying (Coen 2003). The German manufacturers 
also lobbied national governments via their subsidiaries in Spain (Seat) and the UK 
(Rover) to support the German government’s revisions at the Council of Ministers. 
In addition to individual lobbying, most automobile firms also channel their 
lobbying efforts through pan-European business associations. As described in the 
previous chapter, the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) is the 
most powerful automobile business lobby, representing the interests of thirteen EU-based 
automobile manufacturers including two major American firms, Ford and General 
Motors. National associations of manufacturers in the EU member state are also associate 
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members of ACEA. ACEA was established in 1991 as a response to the gradual shift to 
Brussels of governmental responsibility for many of the complex economic, social, 
technical, and legal issues resulting from closer European integration. Its tasks include 
monitoring and analysing issues of common interest to its members, informing them on 
developments in these areas, elaborating and implementing the industry’s common 
positions, and supporting the EU institutions in dealing with matters of significance to the 
sector. Through its special working groups and an extensive network of individual 
experts from member companies at all level of industry, ACEA has a high degree of 
technical expertise and applied experiences. For individual European automobile firms, 
the membership of ACEA was beneficial for the ELV lobbying as collective lobbying 
provided a more forceful voice than just a single firm as well as being more economical. 
At the same time, ACEA sometimes found it hard to make fast responses to issues 
because of the difficulties in reaching a consensus among member firms. Therefore, 
European automobile firms used both individual and collective lobbying, depending on 
the issues of the ELV directive. They have become independent political actors and have 
developed a strategic political identity to choose the form of interest representation at EU 
level.  
 
Japanese practice 
 
Traditionally, Japanese firms rely on national business associations for their 
interest representation, and there is a general lack of individual lobbying in business-
government relationship (Zhao 1993, Tsujinaka 1997, Kono 2003). With a presence of 
strong bureaucracy, business and politics are so closely intertwined that firms simply 
follow the administrative guidance given by the Ministries. In the EU, many Japanese 
automobile firms such as Toyota, Nissan, and Honda are all well aware of the increasing 
EU regulatory competencies and keen to participate in the policymaking process. Unlike 
the trade policies, environmental policy making process does not involve bilateral 
negotiations between the EU and Japan. Thus, Japanese automobile firms in the EU could 
participate in the policymaking process without relying on MITI or other national routes. 
ACEA does not include any Japanese automobile firms, which also produce in Europe. 
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Therefore, they are forced to continue as a separate lobby from ACEA. In other words, 
they have no European political constituency to champion their business interests and are 
not members of the most powerful business association in the EU. In this sense, Japanese 
firms have to seek alternative routes to represent their interests.  
Japanese automobile firms in the EU all have some kind of public affairs 
divisions or, at least, have some employees mainly working on the lobbying related 
issues since the early 1990s. Under such condition, a few Japanese automobile firms, 
particularly Toyota and Honda are trying to develop their own ways of interest 
representation in the EU in order to break through the ACEA-dominated automobile 
sector and enhance their political presence within the policymaking process. To be more 
precise, Toyota has been focusing on the Europeanization of its corporate image and has 
invested a lot of resources on its lobbying division in order to strengthen its political 
influence in the EU. In 2004, the company sold almost 916,000 units in the EU, counting 
for 5.1% of the regional market share. Its European head office, Toyota Motor Europe, 
was created in Brussels in 2002, to ensure better coordination between marketing, R&D, 
manufacturing, and lobbying activities in the EU.  The interview with Toyota revealed 
that it did not want to be seen as Japanese in Europe, and would aim to become an 
independent political actor without relying on Japanese channels since this seemed the 
only way to become a policy insider in the EU.
26
 Other Japanese business actors in the 
EU also commented that Toyota seemed to be the only Japanese firm in Europe which 
possibly possessed enough political resource to initiate direct lobbying on their own. 
Toyota has applied for the ACEA membership several times in the past, however it has 
not yet been accepted. Honda is also another interesting case. It maintains a lobbying 
division, staffed by mainly European and actively monitors the EU policymaking process. 
Honda claims that, if necessarily, it could probably conduct direct lobbying without 
relying on JAMA.
27
 
In addition to those two firms, other Japanese firms are now in partnership with 
European and American firms in many aspects of their business. Therefore, they can feed 
their views through their European partners at EU level. Nissan is a prime example of 
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using a European partner for its interest representation. Nissan has been in partnership 
with Renault since the late 1990s. Renault possesses about 44% of Nissan’s stock while 
Nissan holds about 15% of Renault’s. Nissan’s lobbying division shares the facilities 
with Renault’s office in Brussels, and they work very closely with each other. Therefore, 
as well as working with JAMA, Nissan can comfortably rely on Renault which is, of 
course, a member of ACEA meaning that it is well-placed to gain insider information and 
feed its views through the EU policymakers. Similar cases include the close cooperation 
between Mazda and Ford.  
As for the ELV issues, Japanese automobile firms were all concerned with the 
potential impact of the directive upon their business operations from the early stage of its 
policymaking process. However, despite a growing awareness for the need of proactive 
lobbying in the EU, the number of direct lobbying to the Commission and the EP initiated 
by individual Japanese firms was still relatively limited. Interviews with the official at the 
DG Environment revealed that Japanese automobile interest were collectively 
represented under JAMA and individual firms did not lobby the EU directly, compared 
with other European and American firms.
28
 A JAMA official commented that apart from 
a few members, especially Toyota, the rest of the Japanese firms did not have much 
direct dealings with the EU policymakers and preferred to lobby collectively.
29
 This was 
partly because there was a general consensus regarding their shared ELV interests among 
Japanese firms, and so most of the time there was no need to conduct separate individual 
lobbying. Collective lobbying through JAMA obviously made Japanese automobile 
interests more noticed. The reluctance of most Japanese automobile firms to conduct 
individual lobbying does not always mean that Japanese automobile interests are 
underrepresented in the ELV policymaking process. The Japan Automobile Manufactures 
Association (JAMA) acts to represent the Japanese automobile industry at EU level. 
JAMA was established in 1967 and its European office in Brussels opened in 1990. It 
includes fourteen Japanese manufacturers, nine of which produce and sell their products 
in Europe. Members of JAMA count for about 11% of European automobile market and 
employ more than 190,000 people across Europe. JAMA and ACEA set up four working 
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groups, focusing on ELVs, CO2 emissions, road safety, and e-safety technology. These 
working groups meet on a regular basis in Brussels, and they also organize a formal 
conference once a year where the head of these two associations discuss the broad 
direction of their cooperation and shared interests 
For the ELV issues, JAMA was the major Japanese business stakeholder actively 
communicating with European policymakers although JAMA admitted that working in 
line with ACEA was essential when conducting lobbying in the EU.
30
 All Japanese 
automobile firms in the EU heavily relied on JAMA. However, JAMA European office 
suffered from paralysis as well. In other words, the outline of its European lobbying 
strategies needed to be decided by JAMA Tokyo office, and it was the Tokyo office that 
always had a final decision making power. Its tortuous internal decision making 
procedures made any fast response impossible. JAMA officials commented that they 
recognized this problem and tried to speed up its decision making process, however it 
was sometimes difficult to take any immediate action against the constantly changing 
ELV directive proposals.
31
 In this sense, the role of JAMA European office was limited 
to monitoring and analyzing the EU issues. JAMA European office was closely linked to 
its headquarter in Tokyo and, therefore, tied to the Japanese business-government 
relationship. Yet, it is pointed out that the Japanese government and Ministries were no 
longer directly involved in Japanese automobile lobbying in the EU, however they would 
always support JAMA and maintain close links with it behind the scene.
32
 
In terms of interest representation at EU level, Japanese automobile firms showed 
several different preferences. In a political setting where ACEA dominates the industry, 
some firms, especially Toyota, decided to focus on localization of their interest 
representation either on their own while other Japanese firms had to rely on JAMA or 
their European partners. Despite their high profiles in the market, the latter group of firms 
had little incentive to develop their own lobbying campaigns despite their high profiles in 
the EU. As a result, in terms of the preferences of the Japanese automobile firms for the 
form interest representation at EU level, there appeared to be a bi-polar situation where 
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some firms mainly focus on lobbying either individually or through non-Japanese 
channels while others chose collective lobbying through JAMA.  
 
6.2.2 Instrument 
 
In the EU, firms need to be proactive and directly participate in the policymaking 
process in order to avoid unfavourable policy outcomes. It is true that the EU political 
system is more consensual than adversarial. Like the Japanese system, it is often more 
important to reach agreement than for one side to win, and there are usually too many 
sides for any single one to emerge as the sole victor (Titley 2005). However, during the 
consultation period, firms have to actively lobby the EU policymakers in order to feed 
their views and shape the policies in their favour.  This is a clear difference of the EU 
business-government relationship from the Japanese one. From the point of exchange 
theory (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961, Alpin and Hegarty 1980), this is the 
information strategy which seeks to affect public policy by providing policymakers with 
specific information about policy positions and may involve providing information on the 
costs and benefits of different policy outcomes. The desire by large firms to participate 
directly in the EU policymaking process is reciprocated by the Commission’s demand for 
quick and reliable information (Bouwen 2002, McLaighlin and Jordan 1993, Mazey and 
Richardson 1993). The Commission relies to a large extent on private actors to supply it 
with information and to help it draft legislation.  
In the ELV context, ACEA and European firms actively lobbied against the 
directive. One of the Commission officials commented that ACEA was very aggressive 
in their position papers and at the negotiation table.
33
 European firms mobilized both 
ACEA and directly lobbied the Commission, the EP, and some member states’ 
governments. Especially German automobile firms demanded radical changes in the 
directive regarding liability and recycling of heavy metals. ACEA appeared on side with 
the Commission during early directive drafts from 1994 to 1997. Several officials at the 
DG Environment suggested that ACEA was the most powerful business stakeholder and 
its views regarding the ELV issues were always taken seriously as a European industrial 
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consensus view into the Commission’s policymaking proposal.
34
 When the Commission 
brokered its initial proposals in 1997 and placed a great emphasis on the liability of 
manufacturers for the recycling and disposal of vehicles, the industry awoke and started 
aggressively lobbying against the directive as the full cost to the industry became clear in 
1998. In this period, European automobile firms mobilized both ACEA and directly 
lobbied the Commission. There are several major controversies about the ELV proposal 
among the automobile firms in the EU. Many of these concerns were shared by all major 
business actors while other issues were raised individually. Overall, the proposal of the 
ELV directive was seen by the industry as bureaucratic, inflexible, partly contradictory to 
other environmental regulations and too costly without generating the necessary 
environmental wins. At the end of the lobbying process, the EP and the Commission 
working with ACEA agreed on some 39 amendments, and the Council accepted a joint 
text in 2000. 
 
Japanese practice 
 
In order to participate in the policymaking process and feed their views through 
the EU policymakers, Japanese automobile firms had to cultivate and establish several 
networks with other stakeholders. In Japan, the relationship between business and politics 
is maintained by highly personalized networks based on means such as political donation, 
fine dining, and amakudari, provided by the business community to politicians and 
bureaucrats (Kubota 1997, Woronoff 1986, Yoshimatsu 2000). However, the strategies to 
participate in the policymaking process that Japanese automobile firms adopted for the 
ELV issues were rather different from their traditional patterns.  
For the ELV issues, Japanese automobile firms were forced to be a separate lobby 
outside of the most important forums and had to cultivate networks with the EU 
policymakers from rather handicapped positions compared with their European and 
American rivals. Because of this power relationship in the sector, it was also crucial for 
Japanese firms to maintain a close and good working relationship with ACEA in order to 
stay informed about the development of ELV policymaking process. It is also interesting 
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to note that Japanese firms and JAMA mainly targeted the Commission (DG 
Environment) for the ELV issues and did not utilize the EP as an alternative policy 
channel at all. JAMA commented that they did not try to lobby the EP as Japanese firms 
obviously had no political constituency in the member states and could not afford to 
lobby both the Commission and the EP with their limited resource.
35
 Thus, in terms of 
networking with the stakeholders for the ELV issues, Japanese firms and JAMA mostly 
concentrated on the Commission and ACEA.  
Japanese automobile firms did not try to personalize their networks with the EU 
policymakers by making political donations or any financial means from the early stage 
of their settlement in the EU. It is also reported that although some Japanese automobile 
firms such as Nissan had employed several ex-EU officials as their lobbyists in the past 
in order to facilitate their access to the EU policymakers, this European type of 
amakudari was not significantly effective (Joos and Waldenberger 2005: 119). This is 
because the EU institutional setting and personnel have been constantly changing and it is 
very difficult to build lasting informal networks with particular EU officials. Generally 
speaking, Japanese automobile firms and JAMA spend a lot of resource on creating a 
favourable political condition for them in the EU. In other words, since a good working 
relationship with ACEA is crucial for JAMA, JAMA is very careful not to upset ACEA 
or any other stakeholders. It annually hosts a big reception in Brussels, inviting the 
representatives from the automotive industry, the EU institutions, the media and many 
other business actors. JAMA commented that this reception provides a great opportunity 
for industry, decision-makers, and stakeholders to come together to informally exchange 
views, while sampling traditional Japanese cuisine. Moreover, at the initial stage of 
policymaking process, JAMA often sets up informal occasions with the Commission 
officials such as dinner meetings to discuss matters in a more relaxed atmosphere. JAMA 
takes advantage of these informal occasions to exchange information with the 
Commission, identify the potential problems and to seek compromises.
36
 These 
receptions and informal dinners also allowed Japanese firms to create useful networks for 
ELV lobbying.   
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JAMA and Japanese firms have recognized that technical information is an asset 
when trying to influence EU policymakers. The Commission officials also perceive 
Japanese automobile brands as a sign of high standard and quality.
37
 However, since 
ACEA dominates the EU lobbying scene, they cannot fully utilize their technical 
expertise at EU level. In other words, because ACEA has a number of advantages over 
Japanese firms in a lobbying context, it is very difficult for Japanese firms to gain insider 
status in the EU policymaking process. JAMA has admitted that ACEA always plays the 
major role when representing European automobile interests whereas JAMA does not 
have much influence over the whole decision-making process.
38
 Whenever there is an 
opportunity, JAMA tries to comment on the discussions between the Commission and 
ACEA.  
For the ELV issues, JAMA submitted a number of position papers and expressed 
their main concerns listed in the previous section during the consultation period. It also 
maintained a close link with ACEA, frequently exchanging and sharing their information 
on the ELV issues. Given the size of Japanese automobile FDI in Europe, the presence of 
JAMA and Japanese firms could not be ignored. JAMA was invited to many important 
workshops and meetings by the Commission along with ACEA. Besides, JAMA was 
good at maintaining a relationship with the Commission via regular e-newsletters. In 
these newsletters, JAMA introduced the latest Japanese automobile news and 
technologies to the Commission, implying that they could comply to certain aspects of 
the directive which ACEA could not do such as the heavy metal ban without causing a 
problem with other stakeholders. Overall, one of the Commission officials commented 
that JAMA was well-established and certainly inside of the ELV policymaking process, 
but not yet achieved to gain the core insider status as ACEA.
39
 In other words, JAMA and 
Japanese firms managed to establish some networks with the Commission by utilizing 
their expertise and novelty, however these networks were not as strong as the ones 
between ACEA and the Commission. One JAMA official argued that if they had to 
summarize Japanese automobile lobbying against the ELV directive in one word, it 
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would have to be “consensus”. 
40
 Every decision regarding its ELV lobbying strategy was 
made by consensus. JAMA and Japanese firms always made a lot of effort to have a 
united front as the Japanese automobile industry. Avoiding confrontation among member 
firms is always a really important work ethic in JAMA European office.
41
  
Although cooperation with ACEA was an essential element of Japanese 
automobile lobbying instrument, ACEA had a rather different perception of Japanese 
automobile firms. One of the ACEA officials commented that Japanese firms seemed to 
lack the principle of “give and take” in terms of information sharing. That is, they just 
wanted to access to ACEA’s insider informatio, but hardly provided any useful 
information regarding Japanese technologies or their general lobbying strategies in 
return.
42
 This confirmed that Japanese firms were still unable to establish themselves as a 
core insider within the policy process, and also highlighted that it is still unlikely for 
Japanese firms to be included in ACEA in the near future. In addition, for the ELV issues, 
the Japanese lobbying strategy, which is based on the consensus-based internal decision 
making, was not well perceived by ACEA and the Commission. ACEA commented that 
it took JAMA and Japanese firms too long to reach any agreement, and that it was 
frustrating for ACEA when these two associations had to consult with each other 
regarding ELV issues.  The Commission argued that it would like to receive as many 
business opinions as possible when drafting the directive. However, Japanese automobile 
interests were often internally scanned by JAMA and their headquarters in Japan, and the 
Commission could not benefit from the diversity of Japanese automobile interests.
43
 
 As a result of JAMA’s limited information access to the Commission, some 
Japanese firms also started to cultivate networks with the EU policymakers on their own. 
The prime example is again Toyota. It has employed several ex ACEA and Ford 
lobbyists and tried to conduct its own informational lobbying. For the ELV issues, 
Toyota largely relied on JAMA. However, in general it has established close networks 
with Commission officials at every level and holds regular meetings with them (Joos and 
Waldenberger 2005: 116). The interview with Toyota suggested that its networking with 
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other stakeholders has just started and Toyota would like to directly participate more in 
the Commission and the EP in the near future.
44
   
On the whole, Japanese automobile firms tried to cultivate networks with other 
stakeholders for the ELV directive in a similar manner as ACEA. However, because of 
their rather disadvantageous position in the sector, their networks with the EU 
policymakers were not as sound as the ones of ACEA. Besides, the Commission 
recognized the presence of Japanese automobile firms in the EU, but did not have much 
need to grant them a wide range of access since it could comfortably rely on ACEA for 
technical information. In order to improve the situation, Japanese firms spent a lot of 
resources on creating a favorable environment for them by hosting receptions and 
organizing informal dinners with the Commission officials. In this sense, some elements 
of personalized and informal lobbying instrument could be found in these activities. 
However, such personalized networks were not the most significant feature of Japanese 
automobile lobbying for the ELV directive. They tried to learn information lobbying 
although they were not as successful as other European firms. Overall, it appears that 
Japanese automobile industry as a whole tried, but could not utilize information lobbying 
strategy to the full.  
 
 
6.3 Factors influencing Japanese automobile firms’ lobbying strategy formulation  
 
EU factors  
 
Firstly, the nature of the ELV directive influenced the pattern of Japanese 
lobbying in the EU. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, previous studies have 
suggested that resource dependency matters because neither EU institutions nor interest 
groups can autonomously pursue and achieve their political goals (Levine and White 
1961, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In other words, the nature of policies is an important 
factor influencing the access pattern of business interests. If a policy deals with technical 
standards or the regulation of sophisticated products such as pharmaceuticals, substantive 
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expertise is important. On the other hand, for policies that have a high level of political 
salience in the member states, the Commission requires information on the preferences of 
relevant actors (Broscheid and Coen 2007). Furthermore, with regard to the nature of 
policy, emphasis on the intergovernmental or multilevel approach is still a function of the 
type of policy under discussion, that is to say, the degree to which a policy is regulatory, 
distributive, and redistributive (Coen 1998, Richardson 2001,Wallace and Wallace 2000: 
199). Hence, on regulatory issues such as Environmental policy, the Commission can be 
seen to be taking a policy lead, but member states show a great reluctance to hand over 
redistributive powers such as taxation or trade policies to the supranational level. 
As a result, in a Japanese context, the more technical and complicated the policy 
is, the more likely Japanese firms are given access to the policymaking process since the 
level of resource dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese firms are likely to conduct 
more direct lobbying and less collective action through national associations. 
Alternatively, if the policy deals with few technical matters and concerns national 
interests, it is likely that Japanese firms are not given much access to the policymaking 
process since the level of resource dependency is relatively low. Therefore, they are 
likely to conduct more collective lobbying through national or European associations 
than direct lobbying. 
Our findings show that this is partly the case. With regard to the hypothesis 1, the 
highly technical nature of ELV directive facilitated more Japanese lobbying at EU level, 
but did not affect the form of Japanese interest representation much. Although the ELV 
directive required much technical expertise to be drafted, this did not encourage Japanese 
firms to conduct individual lobbying. Instead, most Japanese automobile firms still 
preferred to represent their interests through JAMA. However, the technical nature of the 
ELV directive also freed Japanese firms from the national constraints. That is, unlike the 
trade policies in the late 1980s which was mainly dealt by MITI, the ELV directive 
policymaking process did not prompt much interference from Japanese government. 
Therefore, some firms, especially Toyota, decided to use less and less Japanese lobbying 
channels. Some scholars (Bouwen 2002) argue that the choice over the form of interest 
representation centers on the kind of information that different types of organizations can 
provide to the policymakers. That is, firms are best at delivering expert knowledge about 
 149 
technology while EU associations control information about encompassing European 
interest of member firms. However, Japanese automobile firms did not follow this logic 
of interest representation. When they could not join ACEA, they chose to rely on JAMA 
instead of conducting individual lobbying. In this sense, the Japanese pattern of collective 
lobbying through business association remained strong.  
Turning to hypothesis 2 which concerns the impact of the nature of policies on a 
firm’s decision for the lobbying instrument, our findings show that Japanese automobile 
firms tried to use more information strategy than financial incentive strategy for the ELV 
directive. Japanese firms and JAMA recognized that technical information was the most 
influential lobbying means for the ELV directive. Yet, Japanese firms were not given 
much access to the policymaking process since the Commission mainly required 
information on the preferences of European firms. Japanese firms tried to utilize their 
expertise and information as a tool to influence the Commission, however, both JAMA 
and ACEA commented that there was no major difference in their main concerns 
regarding the ELV directive. Thus, the Commission did not have much need to grant a lot 
of access to Japanese firms as it could comfortably rely on the information and expertise 
provided by European firms. This actually made it difficult for Japanese firms to make 
their presence known within the policymaking process. They just followed ACEA and 
could not stand up for themselves in terms of lobbying. Besides, several EU officials 
further expressed the view that they clearly preferred ACEA as its most reliable 
information provider since it represented pan-European industry view, and Japanese 
automobile firms were still secondary information source.
45
 This indicates that overall 
Japanese automobile firms were still generally perceived as outsiders, failing to establish 
sound political credibility at EU level. JAMA commented that they tried to initiate direct 
lobbying to the Commission, but often ended up following what ACEA wanted to lobby 
and had done.
46
 For example, during the negotiation of the exemption of spare parts, the 
Commission held a consultation meeting with ACEA. However, JAMA was not informed 
about this and found out the outcome of this meeting at much later stage. The interview 
with one of the Commission officials revealed that the opinions of Japanese firms were 
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taken on board, but had less appeal to the Commission than the one of ACEA as Japanese 
firms did not represent European views at the end of the day. Under such situation, 
JAMA had to work in line with ACEA for most issues, and was very conscious not to 
upset its relationship with ACEA.    
The findings from the ELV case study suggest that the nature of policies play a 
role in the formation of lobbying strategies, especially their lobbying instrument. In the 
face of increasing EU regulatory competencies, Japanese automobile firms did not use 
financial incentive lobbying, and tried to use information lobbying. Yet, their form of 
interest representation shows a mixed result. The EU factors weakened the ties between 
Japanese firms and Japanese government, however most firms still preferred to conduct 
collective lobbying through JAMA. To compare with the results in Chapter 5, it is clear 
that the nature of policies play a role in the formulation of Japanese lobbying. Although 
the number of individual lobbying was very limited for both pre- and post- TEU periods, 
the ELV directive provided more opportunities for Japanese firms to participate in the 
policymaking process and generated more pressure for them to act proactively than the 
trade policies in the early 1990s. While JAMA did not lobby at all in the EC for the trade 
policies, its European office played an important role for the ELV directive, actively 
participating in the policymaking process. In addition, the technical nature of the ELV 
directive facilitated Japanese automobile firms to use information strategy. For the trade 
policies, Japanese firms did not have much direct contact with the Commission. 
Therefore, they had little incentive to change their traditional lobbying pattern and used a 
wide range of financial incentive instruments to maintain a cooperative relationship with 
Japanese policymakers, especially MITI. In contrast, since the ELV policy making 
process required much input from a wide range of business actors, Japanese firms also 
tried to utilize their expertise to influence the Commission.  
 
Sectoral factors 
 
The nature of the EC policies is not the only factor influencing Japanese firms’ 
lobbying formulation. Each industrial sector has its own institutional characteristics and 
they are also important determinants that influence the potential for lobbying strategy 
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formulation. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the ability to gain support for issues 
may be affected by the fragmentation in society (Coleman 1988). Generally speaking, in 
more pluralist structures, the institutional arrangements result in a variety of interests 
coming into play in the policy arena (Hayes 1992), resulting in a fragmentation of 
political and economic power (Vogel 1996). In the political process of pluralistic 
environment, interest groups and firms do not have to compromise with other groups. 
The policymakers may write or vote for policy that represents a compromise among his 
or her constituents, but the actual groups do not have to reach consensus across a variety 
of issues. More pluralistic institutional environment creates the incentive for groups and 
firms to assert their own interests on specific issues in the political process (Murtha and 
Lenway 1994). The competition among interest groups in more pluralist political 
environment is constantly changing, thereby presenting opportunities for firms to act 
selectively. Thus, the likelihood of firms participating individually in politics is greater in 
more pluralist environment (Hillman and Keim 1995). Thus, owing to the limited 
opportunity structure, firms in less pluralist industrial sectors will choose to participate in 
policymaking process collectively rather than individually. In other words, the less 
hostile the sector is towards Japanese firms, the easier for them to blend into the 
policymaking process. European automobile industry has a constant problem of 
overcapacity. As many as six major manufacturers claim more than 10 percent of the 
market share although none of them boasts a decisive lead over the others. Therefore, 
Japanese participation in such a close game among European markers naturally causes 
considerable concern and bitterness.  
The findings from the ELV case study support hypothesis 3. Due to the strong 
presence of European rivals and ACEA, most Japanese firms chose to lobby collectively 
through JAMA in order to enhance their political power against ACEA. Besides, it 
almost seems that Japanese firms were reconciled to their semi-outsider position in the 
European market. One JAMA official commented that the European automobile lobbying 
scene for the ELV directive was dominated by ACEA and Japanese automobile firms had 
just followed ACEA, knowing that they could not make much difference.
47
 This lack of 
desire to compete with ACEA and develop their political credibility within the EU 
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policymaking process may explain the rather passive lobbying approach of Japanese 
automobile firms.  
Turning to the product diversification that was hypothesized to play a role in 
choosing a particular lobbying instrument, the findings from our case studies provide 
mixed results for hypothesis 4. That is, it is true that Japanese firms and JAMA spent 
huge resources to create a politically favourable condition by hosting large receptions or 
other informal events. However, this approach was used to complement their information 
strategy. A financial incentive strategy was not common practice among Japanese 
automobile firms in the EU. Although the automobile sector has less product 
diversification, Japanese firms still tried to conduct information lobbying. It is widely 
perceived by the EU policymakers that the approaches of JAMA and Japanese 
automobile firms were very polite and non-confrontational compared with their European 
and American rivals. One of the Commission officials suggested that Japanese 
automobile lobbies were very polite and negotiated with the Commission by explaining 
their concerns based on sound technical information without being assertive.
48
 This non-
confrontational approach to the ELV directive was attributed to the sensitive position of 
Japanese automobile firms in the European market. In other words, JAMA and Japanese 
firms could not initiate any aggressive lobbying in order not to frustrate ACEA in any 
way. In this sense, they deliberately chose to conduct their lobbying campaigns in a 
subtle manner although such lobbying campaigns may not have made a significant impact 
on the ELV directive. In addition, one remarkable characteristic of Japanese firms in the 
EU is their eagerness to comply with most regulations and standards set by the EU. 
Instead of trying to change the EU regulatory framework to suit their interests, Japanese 
firms often manage to develop their technology and solve problems internally in order to 
comply with the EU policies. This tendency clearly reflects the lack of proactive lobbying 
in the traditional Japanese business-government relationship. For the ELV issues, 
Japanese automobile firms also showed the embeddedness in the traditional emphasis on 
harmony. Several Japanese automobile lobbyists admitted that Japanese firms had the 
tendency to obey the EU policymakers as much as they could to avoid open-
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confrontation and bad public image.  The results need to be compared with the case of 
electronics sector which shows more product diversification in the next chapter.   
Overall, Japanese automobile firms showed strong embeddedness in the 
traditional emphasis on consensus-based and non-confrontational approaches to the 
policymakers. Strictly speaking, this was not a choice they made, and was rather the only 
option available to them since Japanese automobile firms had to closely cooperate with 
ACEA as well as lobbying the EU policymakers as a separate lobby. Their sensitive 
power relationships with the EU and ACEA made any bold and aggressive lobbying 
impossible. It appears that many Japanese firms were reconciled to their disadvantaged 
position in the market, and almost gave up challenging the existing lobbying environment 
to strengthen their political influence. To compare with the results in Chapter 5, the sector 
specific factors keep influencing the form of Japanese automobile interest representation 
over the two different time periods regardless of the EU and corporate factors. Since 
European firms and ACEA were the most influential business lobbies in the EU 
policymaking process, Japanese automobile firms tended to rely on JAMA to provide a 
more forceful collective voice at EU level. However, sectoral factors have little impact 
upon automobile firms’ lobbying instruments in both time periods. In other words, 
despite their disadvantaged position in the policymaking process, Japanese automobile 
firms continued to use information strategy which is prevalent among European firms. A 
financial incentive strategy was not a common practice among Japanese automobile firms 
in both case studies.  
 
Corporate factors 
 
 Organizational resources should also play a role in a firm’s lobbying strategy 
formulation. Resource mobilization theorists emphasized the importance of resources in 
interest group mobilization and advocacy efforts (McCarthy and Zald 1978, Cress and 
Snow 1998). In order to mobilize for a policy debate, resource poor groups need to spend 
resources conservatively. This inevitably leads them to lobby collectively through some 
kind of coalitions or business associations so that they could pool resources and stretch 
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scare resources. Wealthy groups on the other hand, could lobby on their own and be 
equipped with sufficient technical expertise and information (Sethi 1982).  
Regarding the expectations of the relationship between a firm’s resources and its 
form of interest representation, the findings support hypothesis 5. That is, there is clear 
variation in Japanese automobile lobbying. Although most Japanese firms opened their 
offices in Brussels in the early 1990s, Toyota has expanded its office and established a 
European head office which is equipped with an in-house lobbying team consisting of 
roughly twenty staff. They include former lobbyists of ACEA and Ford. The other 
Japanese automobile firms only have a small number of staff, usually one or two 
personnel, in their EU affairs department.
49
 As highlighted before, resourceful firms, 
most notably Toyota, appeared to be keen on individual lobbying while other Japanese 
automobile firms had to rely on JAMA. Based on their investment size and corporate 
resource, Toyota could possess enough political credibility to act individually and 
influence the EU public policy. For example, in 1997, Mr. Okuda, the often controversial 
and outspoken head of the Toyota group at the time, cased a political row in the UK by 
stating that the firm’s future European investment strategy might change if the UK 
government refused to adopt euro currency (Kewley 2002). An interview with a JAMA 
official confirmed that most Japanese automobile firms in the EU did not possess enough 
resource to conduct individual lobbying and had to rely on JAMA for the most aspect of 
lobbying activities in the EU.
50
  
Turning to hypothesis 6 which concerns the impact of the firm’s resources on its 
decision on the lobbying instrument, our findings from the ELV case study did not 
particularly support hypothesis 6. It appeared that regardless of the resources available to 
the firms, Japanese automobile firms did not conduct much financial incentive lobbying. 
Instead, they all tried to utilize their technical expertise as a means to influence the ELV 
directive policymaking process. Besides, although the willingness to comply with the 
authority still remained strongly within Japanese firms in the EU, their technological 
superiority over their European and American rivals may also explain why Japanese 
automobile firms were relatively non-confrontational in lobbying the ELV directive at the 
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negotiation table. In other words, Japan has generally stricter environmental standards 
than the EU in many aspects, therefore, Japanese firms could somehow manage to meet 
the EU requirements by utilizing their expertise developed in Japan. 
 To compare with the results in Chapter 5, the ELV case study saw more variation 
in corporate resources among Japanese automobile firms in the EU. The pre-TEU period 
was a formative period of Japanese lobbying and there was not a significant presence of 
Japanese firms in the EU. The ELV case study highlighted that resource poor Japanese 
firms were more likely to show strong embeddedness in collective action through 
national business association. However, such corporate factors seemed to have little 
impact upon Japanese firms’ lobbying instrument. Regardless of the degree of corporate 
resource, Japanese automobile firms tried to adopt the European style of information 
lobbying strategy. This trend was strengthened in the post- TEU period.  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
The ELV policymaking process provides a good case study to highlight how 
Japanese automobile firms tried to restructure their strategies in the post-TEU period and 
to what extent they managed to blend into the European automobile market in terms of 
lobbying. Japanese automobile firms have been producing in Europe since the 1970s and 
their sales now count for about 11% of European market. However, in a lobbying context, 
ACEA has been the dominant business interest group, and JAMA and Japanese firms are 
still forced to continue as separate lobbies. In this sense, the ELV policymaking process 
was more institutionalized with fewer stakeholders than other similar EU waste 
management policies such as the case of the WEEE/RoHS directives and electronics 
industry. Hence, this case is very interesting as one of the prime examples in which 
Japanese firms tried to maximize their business interests from a relatively disadvantaged 
position compared with their European rivals, resulting in varying lobbying strategies.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 and summarized in figure 6.1, under the current elite 
pluralist political environment in the EU, large firms select individual lobbying (I), using 
information (IN) as their instrument to influence policymakers (IIN). By contrast, under 
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the bureaucratic and mass inclusionary pluralist political environment in Japan, firms 
select collective lobbying (C), using financial incentives (FI) as their instrument to 
influence policymakers (CFI). In the ELV policymaking process, European firms used 
both individual and collective forms of interest representation, depending on the issues, 
and practiced information lobbying. By contrast, Japanese automobile firms heavily used 
a collective form of interest representation and information instrument. The form of 
interest representation appears to be more resistant against the convergence of lobbying 
strategies than the instrument among Japanese firms.  
 
 
Figure 6. 1 Model of lobbying strategy formulation (Japanese automobile firms in 
the ELV policymaking process)  
 
 
 
 
 
 The main features of the Japanese automobile firms’ lobbying strategies for the 
ELV directive was characterized by their sensitive approach in order not to upset 
stakeholders while maintaining a good relationship with ACEA as well as lobbying the 
EU to carve out Japanese business interests. To be more precise, Japanese automobile 
interests for the ELV directive were largely represented by JAMA. Yet, JAMA European 
office was unable to make any fast response since its decision-making function remains 
in its Tokyo office. However, it still managed to establish itself as an important business 
actor within the policymaking process and its presence was well recognized by the EU 
Decision 1 
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Decision 2 
Instrument 
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policymakers. Most Japanese automobile firms channeled their lobbying campaigns 
through JAMA. However, given its slow decision-making process and limited degree of 
influence, some Japanese firms, especially Toyota, also began to initiate direct lobbying 
by themselves. There appeared to be a bi-polar situation where some firms mainly focus 
on lobbying either individually or through non-Japanese channels while others chose a 
collective lobbying through JAMA. These individual lobbying campaigns are likely to 
increase in the future, however they have just started, and for most Japanese firms, 
JAMA still remains the most important political channel. In terms of lobbying instrument, 
JAMA used information strategy and managed to establish itself as a major policy insider 
within the ELV policymaking process. Japanese automobile firms did not use financial 
incentive strategy to access EU policymakers.  
 To return to our initial hypotheses, we have found mixed results. Our data 
suggests that EU factors did encourage Japanese firms to be more proactive and conduct 
lobbying in the EU. However, their form of interest representation remained collective 
through JAMA. Sectoral factors influenced the formation of Japanese lobbying as well. 
The presence of strong European rivals left Japanese firms little space to participate in the 
policymaking process. Thus, many Japanese firms decided to pool their resources in 
JAMA and collectively enhanced their voice at EU level. In addition, examination of 
corporate factors confirmed that only firms with significant corporate resources in the EU 
could conduct individual lobbying and depart from traditional Japanese lobbying pattern. 
In terms of the convergence of EU and Japanese lobbying patterns, the form of interest 
representation seemed to be more persistent than the instrument among Japanese 
automobile firms. In this chapter, we focused on the case of automobile firms with 
respect to their lobbying strategy formulation. But the lobbying formulation model needs 
to be tested in other cases as well. The next chapter will provide a case study of 
electronics firms in order to draw an interesting comparison between these different 
sectors.  
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7. Electronics firms in the post-TEU period: The WEEE and 
RoHS directives   
 
 The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and Restriction of the 
use of certain Hazardous Substances (RoHS) in electrical and electronic equipment 
directives (2002/96/EC and 2002/95/EC) were developed in parallel and came into force 
in February 2003, needing to be transposed into national legislations by 13 August 2004. 
The WEEE directive aims to prevent the generation of electrical and electronic waste and 
to promote reuse, recycling, and other forms of recovery in order to reduce the quantity 
of such waste to be eliminated whilst also improving the environmental performance of 
economic operators involved in its treatment. The RoHS directive is designed to 
approximate the laws of the EU member states on restricting the use of hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment in order to contribute to the recovery 
and elimination of equipment waste and the protection of human health.
51
 
 In short, they regulate the management of waste from a wide and disparate range 
of electrical and electronic consumer appliances as well as professional equipment such 
as washing machines, TVs, radios, shavers, PCs, printers, medical equipment, vending 
machines, and toys. Producers are now responsible for taking back and recycling 
electrical and electronic equipment and consumers are able to return their equipment free 
of charge. In addition, the RoHS directive requires the substitution of various heavy 
metals (lead, mercury, cadmium, and hexavalent chromium) and brominated flame 
retardants (polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) or polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDE)) 
in new electrical and electronic equipment put on the market from the 1st July 2006. 
 There is no doubt that Japanese electronics firms in the EU, as well as other 
European and American manufacturers, are by far the most affected by these directives. 
They all actively lobbied the EU policymakers and tried to participate in the WEEE and 
RoHS policymaking process in many ways. Besides, the electronics industry is one of the 
most internationally oriented sectors of Japanese industry. Many Japanese electronics 
firms have become more aware of the potential impacts of EU environmental policies 
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upon their business interests and have opened European affairs offices in Brussels since 
the creation of a single market. The case of the WEEE/RoHS directives is one of the few 
policies in which Japanese firms actively took part in the lobbying process and managed 
to carve out their major concerns in the directives at the end. At present, lobbying 
patterns of Japanese electronics firms in the EU are undergoing transformation and it is 
very difficult to make any statement upon the permanence of their strategies. Despite this, 
this chapter still provides a good illustration of the interaction between Europeanization 
and persistence of national characteristics in Japanese electronics firms’ lobbying 
strategies in the EU.  
 This chapter firstly explains why these directives became a focal lobbying interest 
of Japanese firms and looks at the main policy issues in the lobbying process. Then it 
examines in detail how Japanese electronics firms developed the strategies and conducted 
their lobbying campaigns for the WEEE and RoHS directives, with special attention to 
the form of interest representation and the instrument. In addition, this chapter explores 
the impact of sectoral, EU and global factors upon the formation of Japanese electronics 
firms’ lobbying strategies in the EU. Examination of these points clarifies and accesses 
the current pattern of Japanese lobbying, and draws an interesting comparison with the 
results in the Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
 
7.1 Development of the WEEE/RoHS policymaking process 
 
The origin of the WEEE/RoHS directives can be traced back to the early 1990s. 
In 1991, the EU began looking at the environmental impact of products by launching a 
scheme aimed at reducing waste by using market forces to encourage manufacturers to 
environmental friendly products.
52
 The Commission established the Priority Waste 
Stream Working Group which consisted of major European stakeholders from member 
states, national business associations, and consumer and environmental groups. It 
analyzed the lifetime impact of electronics products on the environment; in other words, 
the complete life-cycle of electrical and electronic products was examined, from the 
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extraction of raw materials to production, distribution and disposal. The Priority Waste 
Stream Working Group’s work over the period of 1991 to 1994 resulted in a set of key 
documents being drafted and adopted, in particular the information document, the 
analysis document and the strategy proposal document, in order to minimize resource 
consumption, avoid the use of hazardous substances, prolong product life, make reuse 
and recycling easier, and more tightly allocate responsibility and liability.
53
 It was the 
latter document that was submitted to the Commission as the official paper in 1995 to 
guide it in its task of drafting a legislative proposal on the WEEE/RoHS issues.  
At the same time, in some member states, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden, national legislation had already been introduced on the 
WEEE, which obliged the manufacturers to take back the end of life products and to fund 
the collection and recycling facilities. Prompted by such national legislations, directives 
on WEEE and RoHS were developed in order to create a more harmonized EU approach 
to waste management and encourage sustainable development of the EU environmental 
policies. In June 2000, the Commission sent the European Parliament a proposal for the 
WEEE and RoHS directives. The proposal was examined under the co-decision 
procedure and, therefore, submitted to the European Parliament for its opinions at the 
first reading. After several consultations and amendments of the drafts, in which major 
business lobbies including Japanese business association and electronics firms tried the 
most to carve out their preferences and interests, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted the proposal in December 2002. Therefore, the period from the late 
1990s to 2002 is the prime concern of this chapter to examine the development of 
Japanese electronics firms’ lobbying strategies towards the WEEE and RoHS directives.  
During the early stage of policymaking process in 1998 and 1999, all business 
lobbies’ main positions on the WEEE and RoHS directives were to keep the scope of the 
directives as narrow as possible, and hopefully withdraw such regulations as a whole.
54
 
For example, the Japan Business Council in Europe (JBCE) argued in its position paper 
submitted in 1999 that the directive should only cover large household appliances and 
exclude small equipment. In view of the fact that environmental burden of small 
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household appliances was minimal and that the recycling experience of such products 
was limited, the JBCE claimed that the recycling cost would become excessive in 
comparison with the benefit, and the initial scope of the directive should be limited to 
large equipment. Similarly, it argued that a ban on substances should not be provided in 
the directive, and should be dealt with in other directives after the implementation of 
comprehensive risk assessment.
55
 Both European and American firms also expressed 
similar negative views on the WEEE and RoHS proposals at the initial stage.  
However, as a result of growing global environmental concerns and increasing 
trends towards more eco-friendly public policies, by the end of the 1990s, electronics 
firms came to realize that it was impossible to withdraw the passage of the WEEE and 
RoHS directives. Instead, they had to start lobbying the EU policymakers by actively 
participating in the policy process as business stakeholders and tried to shape the 
regulatory framework of these directives in their favour.  
There were several major controversies about the WEEE and RoHS directive 
proposals among the electronics firms in the EU. Some of these concerns were shared by 
all major business actors while other issues were raised individually or sometimes 
collectively by Japanese and American business actors. In terms of common concerns in 
the WEEE and RoHS directives, there were four main issues which all business actors 
actively lobbied for.  
 
Producer responsibility: 
The first issue which the electronics industry wanted to address was to do with 
producer responsibility. That is to say, they supported the principle of all producers being 
legally liable for financing the end of life treatment and disposal costs of their own 
products. Besides, the electronics industry claimed that they must remain free to set up 
whatever types of recycling systems they so choose. As for historical wastes which were 
put on the market before the directives, they argued that the provision to require 
producers to collect and recycle historical waste was unreasonable as it would impose 
retroactive responsibility on producers, and in doing so undermine legal certainty. 
Manufacturers were nevertheless committed to design for recycling but could obviously 
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not have taken strict requirements into account for products designed more than ten years 
ago. Thus, they advocated that if no other solution could be found, the obligation to 
finance historical waste from products with a long life such as refrigerators should not 
apply to the scope of the directive for the first ten years after the implementation.
56
  
   
Consumables: 
The second issue was about the treatment of consumables such as paper, diskettes, 
CDs, magnetic tape or ink or toner cartridges, and coffee filters. Electronics firms 
strongly claimed that these consumables should be excluded from the scope of the WEEE 
directives because existing waste collection and treatment systems were better suited to 
deal with this waste stream. This was because consumables were in many cases 
manufactured by other producers than the producers of the electric or electronic appliance, 
and thus electronics manufacturers had no impact on how consumables were designed, 
and could not, if necessary, reduce the negative impact on the environment.
57
  
  
Spare parts: 
The third issue concerned the spare parts of electric and electronic appliances. 
The electronics industry argued that spare and replacement parts containing those banned 
substances should be excluded from the scope of the WEEE and RoHS directives. 
Otherwise, spare parts with a changed design may no longer be compatible with the 
product in which they were originally used. In other words, consumers would not be able 
to purchase the right spare part if it contained one of the banned substances outlined in 
the RoHS directive. As a result, the whole appliance would have to be disposed of.
58
 
Electronics firms claimed that this would create unnecessary waste, and called for the 
exemption of spare parts for maintenance of finished products that were put on market 
before the substitution deadline.  
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Separate collection: 
The fourth concern was about separate collection of WEEE. The WEEE and 
RoHS directive proposals suggested that some WEEE, such as printed circuit boards, and 
plastic containing brominated flame retardants, should be removed from separately 
collected WEEE. The electronics industry claimed that selective treatment was 
problematic in several aspects and might be counterproductive. In other words, every 
trace of any of six targeted substances had to be removed from the collected waste before 
it could be processed further for recycling or recovery. They argued that it would require 
manual removal operations which would be extremely labour and time intensive, and 
unlikely to be fully completed. Besides, the electronics industry claimed that 
responsibility for collection of WEEE from private households should start from 
designated collection points because: i) a producer should be responsible only for costs 
under its control; ii) the cost of collection directly from private households was not 
influenced by a producer; iii) most local authorities handled household collection via a 
local waste tax and had the appropriate infrastructures to deal with collection.
59
  
 
Apart from these points, there were some other issues which were mainly lobbied 
under the initiative of Japanese firms, although some European and American firms also 
worked closely in some aspects as well.  
 
OEM products: 
OEM (original equipment manufacturing) products mean finished or semi-
finished products put in the market under the brand of a company which does not 
manufacture the products by itself. Japanese firms claimed that the recycling 
responsibility of OEM products should belong to the brand owner, since the deliverer of 
these products had no knowledge about the marketing strategy of the product itself such 
as sales volume and sales price.
60
  
 
Application of lead: 
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Another sensitive issue for Japanese firms was about applications and exemption 
of lead in the RoHS directive. To be more precise, they argued that lead in the glass of 
cathode ray tubes, electronic components, fluorescent tubes, high melting temperature 
type solders, solders for servers, storage and storage array systems, solders for network 
infrastructure equipment, and electronic ceramic parts should be exempted from the 
scope of the RoHS directive. Many Japanese firms claimed that these exemptions were 
crucial for the information technology and electronics industry across the world. Despite 
various initiatives towards lead-free solutions, there was no lead-free technology 
available that would ensure the same reliability that leaded technology did. These 
products required more than 99.0% reliability due to the enormous human and financial 
consequences of equipment failures. 
61
 
 
Finally, the WEEE directive was agreed on 13 February 2003, along with the 
related directive on RoHS. The WEEE directive is based on Article 175 of the Treaty. 
Member states can adopt stricter measures for environmental protection, as long as these 
measures comply with Community law such as the principle of free movement of goods 
laid down in Articles 28-30 of the Treaty. Annex IA of the WEEE directive contains a list 
of categories of products covered, and Annex IB contains a list of products falling into 
these categories. Since this list is non-exhaustive, member states could in principle 
include other products in national legislation implementing the WEEE directive. The 
WEEE directive aims to minimize the impact of electrical and electronic equipment on 
the environment during their life times and when they become waste. It applies to a huge 
spectrum of products: large and small household appliances, IT and telecommunications 
equipment, consumer equipment, lighting equipment, electrical and electronic tools (with 
the exception of large-scale stationary industrial tools), toys, leisure and sports equipment, 
medical devices (with the exception of implanted and infected products), monitoring and 
control instruments, and automatic dispensers. The directive encourages and sets criteria 
for the collection, treatment, recycling and recovery of waste electrical and electronic 
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equipment. It makes producers responsible for financing most of these activities. Private 
householders are to be able to return WEEE without any charge.  
 The RoHS directive is based on Article 95 of the Treaty. The purpose of this 
directive is to approximate the laws of the member states on restrictions of the use of 
hazardous substances in electrical and electronics equipment, and to contribute to the 
environmentally sound recovery and disposal of WEEE. It bans the placing on the EU 
market of new electrical and electronic equipment containing more than agreed levels of 
lead, cadmium, mercury, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) and 
polybrominated diphenyl ether (PBDE) flame retardants from 1 July 2006. It covers the 
same scope as the WEEE directive, except for medical devices and monitoring and 
control instruments. It also applies to electronic bulbs and luminaries in households. 
However, there are also a number of exempted applications for these substances as stated 
in Annex of the RoHS directive, such as lead in glass of cathode ray tubes and mercury in 
straight fluorescent lamps. Under the directive, manufacturers need to ensure that their 
products and components comply with the agreed standards. If they do not, they need to 
redesign their products in order to stay on the Single Market.
62
  
 
 
7.2 Lobbying strategies of European and Japanese electronics firms 
 
 This section examines European and Japanese lobbying strategies for the 
WEEE/RoHS directives with reference to their form of interest representation and 
lobbying instrument. This allows the opportunity to compare European and Japanese 
lobbying strategies and clarify the embeddedness of national characteristics vis-à-vis 
Europeanization of Japanese electronics firms. 
 
7.2.1 Form of interest representation  
 
As for business stakeholders in regards to the WEEE and RoHS issues, it should 
be noted that European, American and Japanese electronics firms count for the great 
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majority of today’s European electronics market as a whole. Therefore, these firms were 
by far the most affected by these directives and tried to lobby the EU policymakers in 
many ways to win favourable amendments to proposed directives. There is no doubt that 
large electronics firms have become independent political actors in the EU policymaking 
process. In the context of Olson’s logic of collective action (1965), the increased number 
of direct lobbying by firms is also explained by the fact that traditional business 
associations are unable to cover all aspects of increasing EU policies and fail to provide 
their members significant selective incentives. Large firms have developed political 
capacities to initiate either individual or collective lobbying according to the issues, and 
learned to utilize various forms of interest representation to suit their needs (Coen 1997, 
2001, Mahoney 2007). Most European and American electronics firms now have an EU 
affairs office in Brussels, staffed by Europeans knowledgeable in the workings of the 
institutions of the EU. Therefore, in some aspects of the WEEE and RoHS policymaking 
process, lobbying campaigns were initiated directly with the commission or the EP, either 
by the firms in their own right or through ad-hoc business alliances. Pijnenburg (1998) 
notes that ad hoc issue coalitions are characterized by low levels of formalization and 
high levels of autonomy for the coalition’s members. This ad-hoc alliance has become an 
alternative form of interest representation for large firms that seek to collectively lobby 
for a single legislative or regulative debate for a short to medium term, but prefer to 
remain independent of business associations.  
In addition to the firms’ individual lobbying and ad-hoc coalitions, there are 
several key business associations who closely interacted with each other and actively 
lobbied the EU policymakers in order to represent their concerns about the WEEE and 
RoHS directives. The main business associations concerned in this chapter are the Japan 
Business Council in Europe (JBCE), Japanese electronics firms, the European 
Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics Technology Associations 
(EICTA), and the American Electronics Association (AeA). EICTA was formed in 1999 
as the European Information and Communications Technology Industry Association by 
the consolidation of the two former European federations of the information and 
telecommunications industries. In 2001, it merged its activities with EACEM, the 
European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers. The new joint association 
 167 
changed its name to European Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics 
Technology Industry Association. Today, EICTA combines 32 national digital 
technology associations from 24 European countries with over 50 direct company 
members. EICTA altogether represents more than 10,000 enterprises in Europe with 
more than two million employees and revenues of over €1,000 billion. In addition, it 
should be noted that many Japanese firms and American firms which belong to the JBCE 
and AeA are also active members of EICTA. 
AeA, founded in 1943 in the USA, is the largest high-tech trade association in the 
United States, with about 2,500 companies representing all segments of the industry and 
1.8 million employees. Its European office, AeA Europe, is a not-for-profit association of 
high tech companies of American parentage doing business worth more than € 100 
billion in Europe such as IBM, Intel, HP, Lexmark, and Motorola. Established in Brussels 
in 1990, AeA Europe focuses on managing issues surrounding environmental and 
regulatory standards and the impact of EU policies on transatlantic trade, investments, 
jobs, research, education and community affairs throughout Europe. Members employ 
over 500,000 people in Europe and are active throughout the high technology spectrum, 
from software, semiconductors and computers to Internet technology, advanced 
electronics and telecommunications systems and services.
63
 In particular, AeA worked 
hard to bring together an Association coalition between European, Japanese and 
American producers of electronics to lobby jointly on the WEEE/RoHS issues. 
At EU level, it is true that there are several cross-sectoral business associations 
such as UNICE and Orgalime, which also have commented on the WEEE and RoHS 
issues. However, since these associations are not tied to the interests of one specific 
industrial sector or national constituency, they are only able to represent the common 
good and perform public interest functions. When these cross-sectoral associations do 
take positions, they are often a lowest common denominator point of view, which has 
little political impact. As a result, in a practical lobbying context, these associations were 
not so influential and have not directly participated in the WEEE/RoHS policymaking 
process compared to electronics business associations such as EICTA, AeA and the 
JBCE.  
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Overall, large electronics firms, as well as the JBCE, EICTA and AeA, created an 
interactive and strategic policy network with the EU policymakers, trying to maximize 
their political interests in the WEEE and RoHS directives.  
 
Japanese practice 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Japanese firms traditionally rely on national business 
associations for their interest representation, and there is a general lack of individual 
lobbying in business-government relationships (Zhao 1993, Tsujinaka 1997, Kono 2003). 
With a presence of strong bureaucracy, business and politics are so closely intertwined 
that firms simply follow the administrative guidance given by the Ministries. As for the 
WEEE and RoHS issues, Japanese electronics firms such as NEC, Sony, Panasonic, 
Canon, and Fujitsu, were all concerned with the potential impact of the directives upon 
their business operations from the very early stage of policymaking process. Japanese 
firms recognized that the WEEE and RoHS directives would have an impact upon not 
only their European market strategies but also upon their global ones. EU environmental 
policies no longer limit themselves to the EU: increasingly they are setting the global 
standard. Therefore, Japanese firms cannot be global players if they fail to provide 
products and services that meet the EU regulatory requirements. In this sense, the WEEE 
and RoHS directives have become the best example of how the rest of the world is 
following EU standards. 
However, despite a growing awareness for the need in proactive lobbying in the 
EU, the amount of direct lobbying to the Commission and the EP initiated by individual 
Japanese firms was limited for the WEEE and RoHS proposals. Several interviews with 
the officials at the DG Environment revealed that Japanese firms tended to lobby 
collectively through business associations and if individual Japanese firms contacted the 
Commission on their own, their objectives were often just to hear the Commission’s 
position and not to actively negotiate with it regarding the WEEE and RoHS issues.
64
 
Besides, several Commission officials further expressed the view that individual Japanese 
firms did not lobby the EU directly, compared with other European and American 
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firms.
65
 The only exception was Sony. Regarding the separate collection of WEEE 
proposed in the draft directive, there were several different opinions in the industry which 
opposed the original proposal, and an ad-hoc transnational coalition of electronics firms 
was created to focus on this specific issue. JBCE as a whole supported the Commission’s 
original proposal regarding this matter, however, its member Sony joined this ad-hoc 
coalition in order to seek an alternative lobbying channel to promote its own views on the 
separate collection of WEEE.
66
 This highlights that Sony began to make a strategic use of 
different form of interest representation. However, this was the only case in the 
WEEE/RoHS policymaking process that Japanese electronics firms chose to act 
independently of business associations.  
When Japanese electronics firms could not conduct their own lobbying campaigns, 
there were mainly two different lobbying channels through which they could gain access 
to the EU policymakers: EICTA, and the JBCE. It is important to note that EICTA, the 
biggest European electronics association, includes many Japanese electronics firms as 
well as American electronics firms. In this sense, EICTA was also a major lobbying 
channel for those Japanese member firms concerned with the WEEE and RoHS proposals. 
In this way, Japanese firms could easily blend into European electronics industry and 
lobby for their interests through a European business channel. Interviews with some 
Japanese firms suggest that membership of EICTA was an advantage in a sense that they 
could forward their interests as European. One Eurocrat at the DG Environment 
expressed that EICTA was the most influential business interest group and its views 
regarding the WEEE and RoHS issues were always taken seriously as a European 
consensus view into the Commission’s policymaking process.
67
 Therefore, through 
EICTA, Japanese firms could gain a European insider status without making Japanese 
identities and interests obvious in the EU.  
However, EICTA is such a large business organization and often suffers from 
paralysis. Its tortuous internal decision-making procedures sometimes make fast 
responses difficult. Its decisions, when they are arrived at, do not always concern 
Japanese business interests and are sometimes a lowest common denominator point of 
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view which has little relevance to Japanese firms. In addition, although many Japanese 
firms are included in EICTA, it is essentially driven by European business interests and 
Japanese firms are sometimes treated as outsiders within the organization.
68
 Therefore, 
although some Japanese firms initially preferred to lobby through EICTA, many Japanese 
electronics firms became more aware of the constraints within its organization and began 
to mainly rely on the JBCE for more effective lobbying.  
 
The inability of Japanese firms to conduct individual lobbying and the limited 
benefits of EICTA caused Japanese firms in the EU to establish smaller and more 
Japanese interests focused business organizations. The JBCE played the most significant 
role in representing Japanese business interests regarding the WEEE and RoHS directives 
at EU level. The JBCE is unique in two aspects compared with pre-existing Japanese 
business associations.  
Firstly, the JBCE was originally established in 1998 by some leading electronics 
firms to especially deal with the WEEE and RoHS problems, and it was the first Japanese 
organization focusing on lobbying in the EU. It is stated that the JBCE’s key objective is 
to contribute to EU public policy issues in a positive way, drawing upon the experience 
gained in Japan by utilizing the expertise developed in specific fields such as 
environmental protection and technological innovation. It monitors a number of 
proposals and policies discussed at the Commission and analyses their potential effects, 
benefits, financial losses, and damages upon Japanese business interests. One of the main 
reasons why Japanese firms decided to organize themselves under the JBCE is to save 
some of the financial costs of lobbying. Conducting the lobbying campaigns individually 
could be costly and time consuming, since each Japanese electronics firm would have had 
to spend a lot of money and manpower to monitor EU activities, and there were often 
many overlaps in their concerns.
69
 In addition, at EU level, well-resourced and larger 
groups are more likely to be in a position to feed their views through to the Commission, 
the EP and other EU policymakers from the initiating stage to the taking of the final 
decision compared to small groups or individual firms. Thus, for many Japanese 
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electronics firms, establishing a Japanese business lobbying group was seen as a logical 
step to realize more efficient and effective lobbying in the EU. Although many Japanese 
firms also belong to EICTA, it was not always easy to make themselves heard in a large 
European organization.
70
 Thus, Japanese electronics firms decided to organize 
themselves under the JBCE to represent their interests more directly and efficiently at EU 
level. 
The second significant feature of the JBCE is its organizational structure and 
decision making mechanism. As for the WEEE and RoHS issues, the environmental 
committee of the JBCE, chaired by NEC, played the leading role in communicating with 
the EU policymakers. At that time, most Japanese firms and business organizations in the 
EU, such as JAMA Europe, did not have a decision-making function in Brussels and 
needed to be directed by their head offices in Tokyo for most important matters. This 
often took a long time to make a decision, and made it difficult for their European offices 
to take immediate actions at EU level. In contrast, the JBCE has its decision-making 
function in Brussels and therefore its member firms could outsource their lobbying to the 
JBCE for quicker actions regarding the WEEE and RoHS issues.
71
 That is, where 
Japanese firms in the EU were still closely tied to Japanese actors in Tokyo, the JBCE 
could entirely devote itself to lobby for Japanese electronics interests. As Japanese 
business interests were largely represented by the JBCE, it was inevitable that its member 
firms had to constantly make some consensus-based decisions to maintain the united 
front of the JBCE. Yet, the JBCE realized that tortuous consensus building procedures 
could make any fast response impossible, and therefore, it only focused on a limited 
number of common concerns which all member firms shared. An interview with the 
JBCE suggested that in order to function effectively and efficiently in the EU, the 
traditional Japanese consensus-based slow decision making process should be avoided as 
much as possible, although this was very hard to realize since many member firms were 
of course managed by Japanese lobbyists. The JBCE and its active members, NEC in 
particular, were aware of the disadvantages of the slow decision making procedure, and 
tried to overcome traditional Japanese mentality among its members by giving the JBCE 
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strong initiatives.  In order to avoid a long consensus-building process amongst member 
firms, the JBCE focused on the limited number of key issues which most of its member 
firms had concerns with. By concentrating its resources upon selected issues, the JBCE 
tried to increase the chance of making a difference in these areas.
72
 
Besides, since the beginning of the WEEE and RoHS lobbying process, the JBCE 
has been conscious to emphasize its European identity. For example, the JBCE claimed it 
welcomes the support provided by EU member states to Japanese investments and wishes 
to enhance the relationships with the EU policymakers. One JBCE official commented 
that “our activity in the EU to date has convinced us that we have the right idea: the 
notion that we are European and it is our right, as well as our duty, to contribute to the 
European policymaking.”
73
 In this sense the JBCE tried to localize its political identity 
and was able to initiate more proactive lobbying than any other pre-existing Japanese 
organization.  
However, although the JBCE seems to be the prime example of Europeanization 
of Japanese lobbying strategies, the JBCE itself is closely linked to the Japanese 
Ministries. Personnel links, particularly with METI, remain in the JBCE. All Secretary 
Generals of the JBCE to this date have been a METI official sent from Tokyo. Besides, in 
Brussels, these JBCE officials are supported by JETRO Brussels Office (Japan External 
Trade Organization) which is a government-related organization that works to promote 
mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world, in order to get their 
work permit visas issued. In this way, the JBCE plays a role to bridge the gap between 
the Japanese business community in Tokyo and Japanese firms in the EU. It is pointed 
out that the Japanese government and Ministries were no longer directly involved in 
Japanese lobbying in the EU, however they would always support the JBCE and maintain 
close links with it behind the scenes. Some Japanese lobbyists expressed that although it 
is important to comply with the European way of lobbying, the close links with the 
Japanese government, its Ministries, and the business community in Japan would remain 
intact under the European masks of Japanese firms in the EU.
74
 Furthermore, it should be 
noted that there was a significant difference in the degree of awareness of the importance 
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of lobbying among member firms in the JBCE. Interviews with the JBCE suggest that 
especially for the WEEE and RoHS issues, the JBCE’s lobbying campaigns were led by a 
few active members, especially NEC, while other firms observed and just followed these 
proactive members.
75
  
 
Overall, in terms of interest representation at EU level, Japanese electronics firms 
preferred lobbying through the JBCE to individual lobbying or through EICTA. Some 
officials at the DG Environment commented that Japanese electronics firms’ interests 
were mainly represented by the JBCE and the JBCE’s presence was well recognized 
within the Commission. Japanese firms were aware of the importance of proactive 
lobbying; however their individual activities were still sometimes constrained by the 
shortage of resources. Therefore, most Japanese firms preferred to rely on the collective 
lobbying to compensate for their lack of resources and feed their views through to the EU 
policymakers. There was hardly any support from zaikai and industrial organizations in 
Japan to support individual firms’ lobbying for the WEEE and RoHS issues. In this sense, 
establishing the JBCE was necessary for Japanese firms in the EU to strengthen their 
presence in the policymaking process. The significance difference in their lobbying 
strategies from traditional Japanese lobbying patterns was that Japanese electronics firms 
were proactive and strategically chose to lobby collectively in order to represent their 
interests at EU level independently of Japanese government, Ministries, zaikai, and 
gyokai. Ironically, since the JBCE became very influential, individual Japanese 
electronics firms had little incentive to develop their own lobbying campaigns and, 
despite their high profiles in the EU, still essentially remained Japanese, thus failing to 
gain pan-European corporate identity.  
 
7.2.2 Instrument 
 
The interaction between business actors and the Commission is based on the 
exchange of information. In the WEEE/RoHS context, European and American firms, 
EICTA, and AeA all actively lobbied the Commission by utilizing their technical 
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expertise. From the point of exchange theory (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961, Alpin 
and Hegarty 1980), this is the information strategy which seeks to affect public policy by 
providing policymakers with specific information about policy positions and may involve 
providing information on the costs and benefits of different policy outcomes. The desire 
by large firms to participate directly in the EU policymaking process is reciprocated by 
the Commission’s demand for quick and reliable information (Bouwen 2002, McLaighlin 
and Jordan 1993, Mazey and Richardson 1993). The Commission relies to a large extent 
on private actors to supply it with information and to help it draft legislation.  
 As described before, there were several major controversies about the 
WEEE/RoHS proposals among the electronics firms in the EU. Many of these issues 
were shared by all major business actors while other issues were raised individually. 
During the consultation period, firms and business associations all submitted position 
papers and utilized their technical knowledge in order to shape the directives for their 
favour. Producer responsibility, treatment of spare parts and consumables, and separate 
collection of products were their major concerns. For both European and American 
business lobbies, financial incentive lobbying strategy was not a common practice at all. 
One American lobbyist pointed out that lobbying in the USA is much more straight 
forward and less complicated  than the EU as it is fairly easy to identify how and where 
political power and money flow in the US policymaking process.
76
 In EU lobbying, 
campaign contributions are not a weapon in the lobbyist’s lobbying instruments. Custom 
and law limit the scope for corporate donations and, in any case, the campaign costs of 
individual politicians are very low compared with their US counterparts. AeA 
commented that when lobbying in the EU, technical knowledge and a good case are more 
important than anything else in order to influence the EU policymakers.
77
  
  
Japanese practice 
 
In terms of lobbying instruments, it seems that the JBCE and Japanese firms 
found the Commission quite welcoming and open to their comments and interests. 
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Compared with European and American firms, the Japanese were relatively new to the 
European market, however, they claimed that as far as they could see, there was no major 
difference between Japanese firms and other large firms in terms of gaining access to the 
Commission.
78
 In Japan, the relationship between business and politics is maintained by 
highly personalized networks based on means such as political donation, fine dining, and 
amakudari, provided by the business community to the politicians and bureaucrats 
(Kubota 1997, Woronoff 1986, Yoshimatsu 2000). However, Japanese electronics firms 
did not try to personalize their networks with the EU policymakers by making political 
donations or using any financial means from the early stage of their settlement in the EU. 
It is also reported that although several Japanese electronics firms, such as Fujitsu and 
Sony, had employed several ex-Commission officials as their lobbyist in the past in order 
to facilitate their access to the EU policymakers, this amakudari was not significantly 
effective either within the EU policymaking process (Joos and Waldenberger 2005). 
Instead, they recognized that technical information is an asset to influence the EU 
policymakers. In other words, the JBCE commented that as long as they provided 
scientifically sound information, the access to the Commission and the EP were always 
open to any business actors regardless of their nationalities.
79
 Thus, in order to build a 
trusting relationship with the EU policymakers and effectively conduct their lobbying, 
Japanese firms as well as other firms invested a lot of their resources to obtain technical 
and scientific data to convince the EU policymakers to amend their policy proposals. In 
order to cultivate the working relationships with the EU policymakers based on technical 
expertise, the JBCE submitted more than 20 position papers concerning the WEEE and 
RoHS proposals from 1999 to 2002. In these papers, the JBCE expressed their views and 
made several policy recommendations regarding their main concerns listed in the 
previous section. The JBCE mainly targeted both the Commission and the EP through 
their lobbying. In addition, lobbying campaigns were initiated directly with the EP. In 
particular, British MEP, Glyn Ford, actively courted Japanese interests and supported 
many amendments proposed by the JBCE at the EP.  
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For example, the application of lead was one of the major concerns for Japanese 
business. Lead was often contained in a number of electronics appliances, and its ban 
would directly affect the fundamental designs of many electronics products and force the 
firms to re-design them. Therefore, the exemption of certain applications of lead from the 
RoHS directive was highly desired by many electronics firms.  The JBCE argued that 
lead in the glass of cathode ray tubes, electronic components, fluorescent tubes, high 
melting temperature type solders, solders for servers, storage and storage array systems, 
solders for network infrastructure equipment, and electronic ceramic parts should be 
exempted from the scope of the RoHS directive. The JBCE claimed that these 
exemptions were crucial for the information technology and electronics industry across 
the world. Despite various initiatives towards lead-free solutions, there was no lead-free 
technology available that would ensure the same reliability that leaded technology gave 
in these products which required more than 99.0% reliability due to the enormous human 
and financial consequences of equipment failures. As a result, a number of applications 
of lead, such as lead in glass of cathode ray tubes, electronic components and fluorescent 
tubes, lead in solders for servers, storage and storage array systems, and lead in electronic 
ceramic parts, were all exempted from the RoHS directive.  
For some aspects of these directives, the JBCE conducted several joint lobbying 
campaigns with EICTA and AeA. The issue concerning the treatment of consumables 
was the prime example of this joint lobbying. In 2002, these three organizations 
submitted two joint position papers to the EP. They strongly claimed that consumables 
such as paper, diskettes, CDs, magnetic tape or ink or toner cartridges, and coffee filters 
should be excluded from the scope of the WEEE directives because existing waste 
collection and treatment systems were better suited to deal with this waste stream. This 
was because consumables were in many cases manufactured by producers other than the 
actual producer of the electric or electronic appliance, and thus electronics manufacturers 
had no control on how consumables were designed, and could not, if necessary, reduce 
negative impacts on environment. 
AeA commented that Japanese electronics firms learned the European way of 
information lobbying very quickly and played an important role in leading the European 
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electronics industry in some policy issues.
80
 The JBCE and AeA worked very closely on 
the WEEE and RoHS issues. Although the JBCE was a relatively new lobbying 
organization in Brussels, it quickly managed to establish several networks with other 
stakeholders by utilizing technical expertise developed in Japan. 
The success of such ad-hoc lobbying suggests that the JBCE was able to develop 
strategic alliances with rival firms to facilitate access to the EU policymakers. In other 
words, by using their technical expertise to cultivate the networks with the EU 
policymakers, the JBCE was accepted as a political insider within the WEEE and RoHS 
policymaking process on the same terms as other business stakeholders.  
 
Therefore, it appears that Japanese electronics industry, at least superficially, 
managed to establish some sound networks with the EU policymakers and blend into the 
WEEE and RoHS policymaking process as one of the major business stakeholders.  
It is widely perceived that the approaches of the JBCE and Japanese electronics 
firms to the EU policymakers were very polite and non-confrontational compared with 
European and American business lobbies. One Japanese firm commented that lobbying in 
the EU is often a personal issue. If the lobbyists click with the policymakers, the whole 
negotiation process goes rather smoothly. Thus, the Japanese polite and un-
confrontational negotiation styles often led to a positive response from the EU 
policymakers when lobbying for the WEEE and RoHS issues.
81
 One Commission official 
pointed out that when negotiating for the WEEE and RoHS issues, Japanese firms were 
always very calm and presented their concerns with sound technical information in a 
much less emotional manner than European and American firms.
82
 They cultivated 
networks with the EU policymakers to participate in the policy community in pretty 
much the same way as European and American business actors, however, at the 
negotiation table, Japanese business lobbies tended to be much less aggressive than their 
rival actors in terms of their manner and demands.  
 One remarkable characteristic of Japanese firms in the EU is their eagerness to 
comply with most regulations and standards set by the EU. In other words, instead of 
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trying to change the regulatory framework of the EU to suit their business interests, 
Japanese firms often manage to develop their technology and solve problems internally in 
order to comply with the EU policies. Regarding the WEEE and RoHS issues, AeA 
commented that it was crucial to lobby to minimize the scope of the initial directives as 
once these directives were implemented, the requirements would only become higher and 
higher, and would set the new standard for the coming directives. In this sense, AeA 
pointed out that at the initial stage, many Japanese electronics firms were rather passive 
and did not understand the importance of proactive lobbying to change the EU regulatory 
framework for their long-term business operations.
83
 
Some Japanese firms admitted that since such proactive lobbying is normally 
absent in the Japanese business culture, they often just comply with the political authority 
without arguing. Japanese firms are very conscious about their corporate image and, thus, 
always try to comply with any rules and regulations to avoid giving any negative image 
to society and the policymakers. It was claimed that this trend can be also found within 
European and American firms; however there is a clear difference in the degree of 
willingness for compliance. This clearly indicates the strong embeddedness in traditional 
Japanese business culture within Japanese firms in the EU. They tend to avoid 
confrontation and comply with authority as much as they can.  
 
Overall, the way Japanese firms cultivated networks with other stakeholders for 
the WEEE and RoHS directives was similar to European and American firms in the EU. 
There was no significant evidence for personalized networks with other stakeholders 
which are prevalent in Japan. Instead, they used their technical information to bargain 
with the EU policymakers and gained an insider status. The examination of Japanese 
firms’ strategies to cultivate networks with other stakeholders highlights how they 
changed their traditional lobbying patterns and changed themselves to fit the EU 
policymaking process. At the same time, it is also true that due to traditional business 
culture, many Japanese firms still did not fully understand the importance of proactive 
information lobbying in order to shape the EU regulatory framework to suit their business 
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needs. Therefore, they were often perceived as being rather eager to comply with the EU 
regulations and directives without lobbying.  
 
 
7.3 Factors influencing Japanese electronics firms’ lobbying strategy formulation 
 
EU factors 
 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, previous studies have suggested that 
resource dependency matters because neither EU institutions nor interest groups can 
autonomously pursue and achieve their political goals (Levine and White 1961, Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). In other words, the nature of policies is the important factor to 
influence the access pattern of business interests. If a policy deals with technical 
standards or the regulation of sophisticated products such as pharmaceuticals, substantive 
expertise is important. On the other hand, for policies that have a high level of political 
salience in the member states, the Commission requires information on the preferences of 
relevant actors (Broscheid and Coen 2007). In a Japanese context, the more technical and 
complicated the policy is, the more likely Japanese firms are given access to the 
policymaking process since the level of resource dependency is high. Therefore, Japanese 
firms are likely to conduct more direct lobbying and less collective action through 
national associations. Similarly, if the resource dependency for information is high, 
Japanese firms are likely to conduct more information lobbying than financial incentive 
lobbying.  
 Turning to hypothesis 1 which concerns the relationship between the nature of 
policies and the firms’ form of interest representation, our findings do not show the 
supporting evidence for it. Indeed, the WEEE/RoHS directives became a major concern 
for Japanese firms, and triggered the need for proactive lobbying at EU level. Yet, instead 
of conducting individual lobbying, Japanese electronics firms decided to set up a new 
lobbying organization, the JBCE. The establishment of the JBCE was partly due to the 
high demand for Japanese information from the EU institutions so that Japanese 
electronics firms could exploit policy channels more fully. In other words, the EU factors 
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led Japanese electronics firms to collectively represent their interests at EU level instead 
of individual lobbying. There are logical reasons to do so; the Commission prefers to deal 
with a consensus industry view, and not every electronics firm can afford to maintain its 
own in-house public affairs operation in Brussels.  
With regard to hypothesis 2, the highly technical nature of the WEEE/RoHS 
directives prompted Japanese firms to use more information lobbying strategies than 
financial incentive strategies. Japanese business lobbyists also expressed that the power 
relationships between the EU institutions are not fixed and it is very difficult to tell who 
is in charge of certain policy issues.
84
  Therefore, Japanese electronics firms did not try to 
personalize their networks with the EU policymakers by making political donations or 
any financial means from the early stage of their settlement in the EU. The JBCE and 
Japanese firms recognized the technical information was the most influential lobbying 
instrument to influence the Commission. Drafting the WEEE/RoHS directives required a 
wide range of technical information. Therefore, the EU policymakers were keen to gain 
an insight into Japanese firms’ information. Some MEPs even went so far as to actively 
court the Japanese and encourage them to see the EP as a viable channel for realizing 
policy objectives (Kewley 2002). 
 
 The findings suggest that the nature of policies plays a role in the formation of 
lobbying strategies. Especially, in response to the potential impact of the WEEE/RoHS 
directives upon their business operation, Japanese firms had to be more proactive in the 
policymaking process. Instead of lobbying individually or collectively through EICTA, 
they decided to set up the JBCE. In this sense, the EU factors encouraged Japanese firms 
to unite and feed their views through national channels instead of prompting them to be 
independent political actors. Yet, it should be noted that the JBCE is different from 
existing Japanese business associations in a number of aspects. By establishing of the 
JBCE, Japanese firms collectively managed to gain a European insider status which 
would have been impossible if pursued individually. With regard to the lobbying 
instrument, the EU factors have a clear impact upon Japanese firms’ decision. They did 
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not use financial incentive strategy at all and mainly relied on information strategy 
instead.  
 To compare with the results in Chapter 5, the nature of policies did affect the form 
of interest representation among Japanese electronics firms. The WEEE/RoHS 
policymaking process provided Japanese firms with opportunities to participate more 
directly than the EC trade policies. There was no major Japanese electronics business 
association in Europe during the pre-TEU period. Establishment of the JBCE was seen as 
a major step forward for Japanese electronics firms to actively lobby in the EU. The 
WEEE/RoHS directives encouraged Japanese firms to be proactive in the EU and directly 
conduct lobbying at EU level. However, such pressure for direct lobbying did not induce 
much individual lobbying among Japanese electronics firms. In addition, the technical 
nature of the WEEE/RoHS directives allowed Japanese electronics firms to use 
information strategy. For the trade policies, Japanese firms did not have much direct 
contact with the Commission. Therefore, they had little incentive to change their 
traditional lobbying pattern and used a wide range of financial incentive instruments to 
maintain a cooperative relationship with Japanese policymakers, especially MITI. In 
contrast, since the WEEE/RoHS policymaking process required much input from a wide 
range of business actors, Japanese firms also tried to utilize their expertise to influence 
the Commission.  
 
Sectoral Factors 
 
It is crucial to note that for Japanese firms, the European electronics sector is a 
rather global and open one compared with other sectors, such as the automobile sector 
where there is a dominant presence of European rival firms. In other words, there are 
only a few large European electronics firms, such as Nokia and Philips, and Japanese and 
American firms have occupied a large share of the European electronics market. 
Therefore, when drafting the WEEE and RoHS directives, the Commission could not 
ignore the presence of Japanese firms and appreciated their detailed technical information. 
This global sectoral setting allowed Japanese firms to blend into the EU policymaking 
process on equal terms with European and American firms. In addition to the global 
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nature of the European electronics market, it is often claimed that Japanese electronics 
products, such as those of Sony and Panasonic, often enjoy a higher brand image than 
European and American products. Their reputation as a high quality brand among 
European consumers helped to create a favourable political environment for Japanese 
firms although they were relatively new to the EU lobbying scene.  
Our findings do not particularly support hypothesis 3. Despite the fact that 
Japanese electronics firms occupied a large share of European market, they still did not 
conduct much individual lobbying, and preferred to rely on the JBCE. Although many 
Japanese firms also belong to EICTA, it was not always easy to make themselves heard 
in a large European organization.
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 Thus, Japanese electronics firms decided to organize 
themselves under the JBCE to represent their interests more directly and efficiently at EU 
level. Japanese electronics firms, through the JBCE, established sound political 
credibility and managed to lobby the EU policymakers on equal terms with other rivals. 
The JBCE claimed that with its insider status, it was able to become more proactive and 
managed to carve out their interests within the directives. Ironically, since they 
collectively gained political credibility in the EU, most individual Japanese electronics 
firms chose to stick to some of their national lobbying patterns such as a strong 
preference for business association led lobbying campaigns. Yet, considering the fact that 
Japanese firms are traditionally reluctant to conduct direct lobbying, the JBCE was seen 
as the major step forward to become a political actor in the EU. 
The other hypothesized relationship- that a sector with more product 
diversification will lead Japanese firms to use an information strategy instead of financial 
strategy- is partly supported by the data but the effect needs to be compared with the 
automobile case to see if the product diversification really makes a difference. As 
explained before, unlike automobiles, electronic products are highly diverse, from small 
household appliances to large equipment. Therefore, the WEEE/RoHS directives cover a 
wider range of technical issues than the ELV directive although they both aim to 
minimize the waste of products. In an ELV context, ACEA and JAMA were both 
concerned with similar issues. Therefore, it was difficult for Japanese automobile firms to 
outweigh ACEA and promote their interests. In contrast, due to the diversity of electronic 
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products, the JBCE concentrated on a limited number of core issues so that it could spend 
more resources on each topic, and hence it was more likely to realize its policy objectives 
for each of the directives. In other words, Japanese electronics firms were able to find 
some niches where they enjoyed an informational monopoly over other rival firms such 
as the application of lead. This enabled them to establish sound networks with other 
stakeholders and adopt more proactive lobbying strategies.  
To compare with the results in Chapter 5, the sector specific factors did not 
induce individual lobbying among Japanese electronics firms in both pre- and post- TEU 
periods. In a Japanese context, firms preferred to conduct collective lobbying even in an 
absence of strong European rivals. Instead of conducting individual lobbying, Japanese 
firms chose to establish the JBCE and collectively aimed to gain a political insider status. 
With regard to the instrument, Japanese electronics firms continued to use an information 
strategy which is also prevalent among European firms. Financial incentive strategy was 
not a common practice among Japanese electronics firms in both case studies.  
 
Corporate factors 
 
Our findings support hypothesis 5. There is a clear link between corporate 
resource and the form of interest representation. In other words, the significant absence of 
direct lobbying by individual Japanese firms was mainly due to their lack of political, 
financial and human resources. Many Japanese electronics firms still did not have enough 
resources in Brussels to conduct lobbying by themselves. In other words, there was still a 
critical lack in understanding of how important direct lobbying in the EU was within their 
headquarters in Tokyo. Most Japanese electronics firms have an EU affairs department in 
Brussels, which usually consists of one or two Japanese staff. Many of them have little 
previous experience in public relations. Generally speaking, the economic importance of 
the European market for many Japanese electronics firms often comes after the US and 
Asian markets, and this results in the situation where there are not enough human and 
financial resources left to support their EU offices. In addition, due to the traditional 
lobbying styles, where major parts of business lobbying are tightly integrated into 
national political structure making it very difficult to distinguish the line between public 
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and private interests, many Japanese electronics firms’ headquarters in Tokyo still do not 
fully understand the concept of direct lobbying at EU level, and still rely upon the METI 
for its guidance and information regarding EU policies. As a result, European offices do 
not receive enough support from their headquarters in Tokyo, and thus have to rely on 
other business organizations in the EU for more efficient lobbying.
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 Moreover, 
collective lobbying saves excessive financial costs of lobbying for individual firms. It is 
widely accepted that conducting any lobbying campaigns individually at EU level can be 
costly and time consuming since there are often many overlaps in the lobbying interests 
of the electronics firms in the EU. Besides, at EU level, a well-resourced and larger 
interest group is inevitably likely to be in a position to feed its views through to the EU 
policymakers from the initiating stage to the taking of the final decision. Since many 
Japanese firms in the EU did not have large enough political and financial resources to 
represent their interests at EU level on their own, collective lobbying was seen as a 
logical step to realize more efficient and effective lobbying in the EU. The only exception 
seems to be Sony. Sony appeared to adopt a similar strategy to Toyota, by investing a lot 
of resources in its lobbying division to conduct more independent lobbying campaigns 
without relying on the JBCE or EICTA. Its lobbying team consists of roughly 10 
lobbyists who are mainly European knowledgeable of the EU policymaking process.  
Sony’s active participation in the ad-hoc transnational coalition of firms highlighted its 
desire to become a pan-European political actor without a Japanese label, and proved its 
strategic capacity to mix and match policy channels to feed its views through the EU.  
However, unlike Toyota, Sony did not have to become extremely Europeanized because 
of successful JBCE lobbying.  
 Turning to hypothesis 6 which concerns the impact of corporate resource upon the 
lobbying instrument, our data does not provide any evidence for it. Regardless of the 
level of resource availability, Japanese electronics firms did not try to use financial 
incentive strategy. Yet, although Japanese firms and the JBCE tried to conduct 
information lobbying, their approach was sometimes seen to be rather passive by other 
rival firms and the Commission. The willingness to comply with the authority still 
remained strongly within Japanese firms in the EU, their technological advantages may 
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also explain why Japanese firms were relatively less aggressive to lobby the WEEE and 
RoHS directives at the negotiation table with the EU policymakers. For example, in the 
area of separate collection and recycling of the WEEE, Japan had already introduced a 
national law before the EU, therefore Japanese firms possessed enough technical 
information to deal with some aspects of the WEEE and RoHS directives. Such 
technological advantages may also explain the rather quiet negotiation manner of 
Japanese firms.  
 To compare with the results in Chapter 5, the WEEE/RoHS case study saw more 
variation in corporate resource among Japanese electronics firms in the EU. The pre-TEU 
period was a formative period of Japanese lobbying and there was not significant 
presence of Japanese firms in the EU. In the WEEE/RoHS case study, it became clear 
that Sony tried to develop a strategic political capacity to join an ad-hoc coalition as well 
as collective lobbying through the JBCE. Yet, the number of such transnational ad-hoc 
lobbying and individual lobbying among Japanese firms was still limited. Regardless of 
the level of corporate resource, Japanese electronics firms still seemed to prefer collective 
lobbying in the EU. In addition, such corporate factors seemed to have little impact upon 
Japanese firms’ lobbying instrumenst. Regardless of the degree of corporate resource, 
Japanese electronics firms tried to adopt the European style of information lobbying 
strategy. This trend was strengthened in the post- TEU period. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
 The WEEE and RoHS policymaking process provides a good illustration of how 
Japanese electronics firms restructured their strategies in the post-TEU period and 
lobbied the EU policymakers by constructing strategic alliances with other stakeholders. 
It is true that the number of Japanese lobbying policy successes for the WEEE and RoHS 
directives was few. However, this case is still remarkable as one of the first major policy 
areas in which Japanese firms conducted proactive lobbying and managed to carve out 
their policy objectives within the directives at the end.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3 and summarized in figure 7.1, under the current elite 
pluralist political environment in the EU, large firms select individual lobbying (I), using 
information (IN) as their instrument to influence policymakers (IIN). By contrast, under 
the bureaucratic and mass inclusionary pluralist political environment in Japan, firms 
select collective lobbying (C), using financial incentives (FI) as their instrument to 
influence policymakers (CFI). Japanese electronics firms within the WEEE/RoHS 
policymaking process mainly used collective form of interest representation and 
information instrument.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Model of lobbying strategy formulation (Japanese electronics firms in the 
WEEE/RoHS policymaking process)  
 
 
 
 
 
The main features of the Japanese electronics firms’ lobbying strategies for the 
WEEE and RoHS directives were characterized by their conscious efforts to become 
more Europeanized, in terms of their political identities, in order to blend into the 
policymaking process as an insider while some elements of the traditional Japanese 
lobbying pattern still remained intact. To be more precise, although Japanese electronics 
firms in the EU were well aware of the need for proactive lobbying under current EU 
political environment, they often suffered from a shortage of resources to conduct their 
own lobbying campaigns, and had to channel their lobbying campaigns through business 
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organizations. EICTA was one of their lobbying channels and it was effective when 
Japanese firms wanted to raise their issues as European electronics industry views. 
However, within EICTA, Japanese firms were still outsiders and it was not always easy 
to make their concerns top of EICTA’s agenda. Therefore, Japanese firms established the 
JBCE and it represented Japanese electronics interests at EU level to great extent. The 
JBCE was different from pre-existing Japanese business organizations. It was established 
especially for EU lobbying under the initiatives of several active Japanese electronics 
firms, and has its own decision making function in Brussels, allowing much faster 
responses to EU policies. In this sense, the JBCE compensated the lack of resources of 
individual firms and conducted proactive lobbying as an independent political actor 
within the WEEE and RoHS policymaking process. The JBCE established several strong 
networks with other stakeholders by utilizing the technical expertise provided by its 
member firms, and managed to develop European political credibility. However, within 
the policy community, Japanese firms’ negotiation style was much less aggressive than 
other business lobbies. This is due not only to traditional Japanese business culture 
emphasizing the compliance with authority, but also to their strategic choice of trying to 
make a favourable impression on the EU policymakers.  
To return to our initial hypotheses, we found some mixed results. Our data 
suggests that EU factors did encourage Japanese firms to be more proactive and conduct 
lobbying in the EU. However, their form of interest representation still mainly remained 
collective. Instead of conducting individual lobbying in the EU, Japanese firms 
established the JBCE which focused on European public image while representing 
Japanese electronics interests as a whole. Sectoral factors influenced the formation of 
Japanese lobbying as well. In an absence of strong European rivals, Japanese firms could 
lobby the Commission on almost equal terms as other firms by utilizing their technical 
expertise. In addition, examination of corporate factors confirmed that only firms with 
significant corporate resource in the EU could conduct individual lobbying and depart 
from traditional Japanese lobbying pattern. Otherwise, they preferred to conduct lobbying 
through the JBCE. In terms of convergence of EU and Japanese lobbying patterns, the 
form of interest representation seemed to be more resistant than the instrument among 
Japanese electronics firms.  
 188 
8. Conclusion: Europeanization and persistence of national 
lobbying practice  
 
The number of Japanese firms in Brussels has increased since the creation of the 
European Single Market. At the same time, large European firms have become 
independent political actors and harmonized their lobbying patterns, creating a distinctive 
business-government relationship in the EU. Yet, it still remains to be examined whether 
Japanese firms are able to utilize their political options and conform to the new EU 
lobbying style, which features firms’ direct participation within the policymaking process. 
This study, based on four detailed case studies in the automobile and electronics sectors, 
explores the Europeanization of Japanese firms' lobbying strategies, and assesses how 
they have adapted to the constantly evolving EU public policymaking system. With 
reference to the actor-based models of interest groups and Europeanization literature, it 
provides an empirical investigation of interaction between traditional Japanese lobbying 
practices and the EU institutional environment in forming firms' preferences for 
particular lobbying strategies. In short, the key objective is to highlight the variation in 
the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying with special attention to the firms’ form of 
interest representation and lobbying instrument. We also aim to identify the opportunities 
and constraints that make up the institutional logic of Japanese lobbying strategies in 
pursuing a more Japanese or EU type of lobbying practice.  
Overall, we have demonstarted that Japanese firms have restructured their 
political behaviours to suit the EU policymaking process. However, the degree of such 
Europeanization of lobbying strategies has significantly varied across sectors and firms 
due to ranging influence from several institutional factors.  The underlying nationality of 
the firm remains the vitally important determinant in the nature of its lobbying strategy 
formulation, and is much more persistent in the face of Europeanization than existing 
studies generally assume. 
In this concluding chapter, we firstly review the distinguishing features of our 
study in relation to the existing literature in the field of EU business-government relations. 
Then we also summarize our findings and discuss their normative implications. 
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Examination of these points will allow the opportunity to identify and suggest avenues 
for future theoretical and empirical research.  
 
 
8.1 Distinguishing Features of our study 
 
As we have noted, many other scholars have studied the nature of business 
lobbying in the EU (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Greenwood 1998, 2003; Grant 2004, 
Cowles 2001, Coen 1997, 1998, 2003; Richardson 2000; Eising 2004). Through their 
analyses, we have gained significant knowledge and understanding about the ways in 
which large firms interact with the policymakers. It is now widely perceived that many 
European and American firms appear to have established a sophisticated political 
capacity that allows them to develop new multi-level and ad hoc political alliances to 
maximize their interests. The development of business interests is significant in that it 
challenges traditional forms of industrial collective action in Europe. The growing 
regulatory competencies of the EU have allowed large firms to bypass long established 
national lobbying channels in influencing European legislations and programmes. 
Therefore, the firms which succeed are those that have the flexibility to adapt to the 
issues and to utilize a wide variety of political channels at multiple levels. Large firms 
have established a strong EU presence, and a distinct EU business-government 
relationship that has set the standard for business lobbying across sectors in Brussels. But 
in what ways has our study advanced beyond what these previous studies already have 
accomplished? 
Most importantly, in contrast to previous research, our study aims to highlight the 
persistence of national characteristics in firms’ lobbying behaviour in the face of 
Europeanization. In this context, there are several works which examined the 
transformation of interest intermediation by comparing national traditions and studying 
how they were translated to EU level or how the EU led to convergence between national 
modes of interest representation (Coen 1998, Beyers 2002). The investigation of 
corporatist, pluralist and elite pluralist business-government relationships has led to the 
comparative study of different national and sectoral patterns of interest representation 
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(Greenwood 1997, Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998, Streeck and Schmitter 1991). 
Varying national business lobbying traditions in which firms are embedded may explain 
the different degree of Europeanization and the speed of change among firms in the EU. 
It is claimed that “in countries such as the US and UK, where there had been a long 
tradition of competing for government attention, adapting to the lobbying opportunities in 
the EU came as second nature.”(Coen 1998: 97) For example, Jordan (2002) analysed the 
Europeanization of British environmental policies and argued that Europeanization was 
an outcome of Britain’s evolving response to European integration and an important part 
of the broader process of bringing that about. In addition, there are some cultural and 
historical traditions that hindered the mobility of firms. In countries such as France, 
Germany and Italy, where business had an institutional lobbying arrangement with the 
state, it took longer to recognize that national channels were diminishing in importance. 
German big business, for example, became involved in European business groups rather 
belatedly given its strong national industry associations (Cowles 1998).  
Generally, one of the broadest conclusions of these studies is that the EU politics 
does affect the ways in which national groups relate to their governments and organize 
themselves at the EU level although some national political traditions may continue to 
matter to some extent. Many existing studies treat large firms as a relatively 
homogeneous group, increasingly becoming European regardless of their nationality, and 
claim that, within the single European market, firms have harmonized their lobbying 
activity and become pan-European political actors. The consequence of increasing direct 
lobbying strategies among firms has been the creeping institutionalization of forum style 
politics and the creation of issue networks that have harmonized firms’ lobbying patterns 
at the EU level.  
However, we argue that despite the convergence of strategies and business 
interests in Brussels, we can still expect some national business-government 
characteristics to persist in the foreseeable future. Moreover, very few studies have 
attempted to explore the degree to which non-EU large firms adapt to existing kinds of 
EU lobbying practices, except several studies on trans-Atlantic comparison (Coen 1999, 
2004; Cowels 1996). Japanese firms have come to embody significant market forces in a 
number of sectors in the EU. There are about 900 Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the 
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EU including 271 in the UK, 144 in France, and 133 in Germany.
87
 Although many 
Japanese firms have been recognized as some of the largest in industries such as 
electronics and automobiles, not much Japanese lobbying has been observed and few 
studies examine whether, and if so how, Japanese firms have re-structured their political 
organization and developed credibility to adjust to the EU policymaking process. Instead, 
many existing studies of Japanese lobbying abroad take their cases from US politics 
(Yamada 1982, Shinoda 1989, Choate 1990, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995) and, in an 
EU context, many studies were done on subjects such as Japanese FDI and business 
management and EU-Japan trade disputes (Abe 1999, Belderbos 1995, 1997, Gilson 2000, 
2001, Hughes 2001, Mason 1997). These studies do not primarily focus on Japanese 
firms’ lobbying preferences for political channels and they do not examine the changing 
nature of Japanese business lobbies. Therefore, the limited relevance of previous studies 
to the constantly evolving EU policymaking process has necessitated a theoretical 
reassessment of Japanese lobbying. 
In a lobbying context, Japanese firms are different from European and American 
rivals in many aspects. Needless to say, they have no member state to champion their 
concerns in the Council of Ministers, and are not used to direct lobbying, due to the 
traditional Japanese business-government relationship. Japanese business interests are 
traditionally and institutionally intertwined with the policymakers, leading to a lack of 
direct lobbying among firms (Zhao 1993, Ohtsu and Imanari 2002). In short, Japanese 
lobbying is characterized by a heavy reliance on national and sectoral organizations, 
financial and personalized instruments to access the policymakers, and a passive and 
unconstructive negotiation manner in order to both maintain harmony and feed their 
views at the same time. In Japan, firms are not independent political actors within the 
policymaking process, and prefer indirect lobbying through business associations. For 
Japanese firms, adjusting their lobbying strategies to the EU policymaking process is 
transnational in its nature as opposed to supranational for European firms. Needless to 
say, growing EU institutions do not affect the way in which Japanese firms relate to their 
national government. Thus, Japanese firms in the EU are likely to develop their lobbying 
strategies on the basis of their national lobbying pattern.  
                                                 
87
 JETRO Offices in Europe 
 192 
Therefore, it still remains to be examined to what extent Japanese firms have 
adjusted to the EU and whether there are any patterns in the process of the 
Europeanization of Japanese lobbying, in which firms have had to develop a relatively 
new concept of direct lobbying. In recognising both the Europeanization of lobbying 
practices among large firms and the embeddedness of Japanese firms in their national 
business culture, we aim to develop a theoretical model to explore these questions further. 
In this sense, our most important departure from existing literature is the explicit focus on 
Japanese firms in the context of Europeanization and business lobbying. By doing so, we 
have refined our understanding of how the concept of elite pluralism, in which large 
firms become independent political actors in the EU policymaking process, applies to the 
non-European firms in the EU.  
 
 
8.2 Our theory and empirical findings  
 
We will summarize our argument and empirical findings. In order to provide a 
sound theoretical basis to investigate the Europeanization of Japanese firms, it is 
important to stress that we focus on this issue primarily at the horizontal level of EU 
policy formulation as opposed to the top-down or bottom-up perspectives. Japanese 
firms’ lobbying strategy formulation in the EU policymaking process is our main focus. 
If Japanese firms have fully adjusted to the EU policymaking process, they should 
demonstrate the same preferences for the form of interest representation and instrument 
as European firms, as addressed by the existing theories of lobbying. We aim to explore 
whether the Western concept of elite pluralism could be applied to Japanese firms as non-
European actors in the policymaking process. In other words, Japanese firms in the EU 
face two sequential decisions: whether to lobby individually or collectively (Olson 1965, 
Pijnenburg 1998, Oliver 1993) and whether to use information or financial incentives as 
their instrument (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961, Hillman and Hitt 1999, Aplin and 
Hegarty 1980). We explore the mechanism of Europeanization of Japanese lobbying by 
focusing on these two choices that firms make in order to participate in the policymaking 
process. They are the dependent variables of our analysis. To be more precise, large firms 
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prefer direct lobbying to collective lobbying through national associations within the EU 
policymaking process, based on their information and technical expertise. It is claimed 
that many multinational firms are increasingly more ‘multi’ and less ‘national’ than in the 
past (Cowels 1998; Jordan 2002). However, this is not always true of Japanese firms. In 
Japan, business associations traditionally dominate the business lobbying scene and direct 
lobbying by individual firms is very rare (Argy and Stein 1996, Hartcher 1998, Imura and 
Schreurs 2005, McCargo 2000). Firms extensively use financial incentives to influence 
policymakers instead of information. This is because formal government policies and 
informal administrative guidance, as well as social norms effectively embedded in the 
structure of business networks, have encouraged firms to consider and act in national 
interests whenever and wherever possible (Zhao 1993; Yoshimatsu 2000; Ohtsu and 
Imanari 2002). 
As an explanatory effort, the aim of this study is also to identify the opportunities 
and constraints that make up the institutional logic of Japanese lobbying strategies in the 
EU in pursuing a more Japanese or EU type of lobbying strategy.  In recognizing that 
transformation of Japanese lobbying is not a uniform process and there is variation across 
sectors and firms, we develop a theoretical framework to study the interaction between 
the EU policymaking process and Japanese firms and explain the institutional conditions 
that shape Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies with different efficacy. There are several 
factors that shape the incentives of Japanese firms to get in touch with EU policymakers. 
These factors underpinning the Europeanization of Japanese lobbying are not mutually 
exclusive. The normative structure of business-government relations is not fully captured 
if one only focuses on organizational characteristics of political institutions.  
Therefore, we aim to work towards a more holistic model, recognizing that 
various streams of factors must be taken into consideration. Drawing on a number of 
resource dependency and institutional views (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Bouwen 2002, 
McCathy and Zald 1978, Cress and Snow 1988, Boddewyn 1993, Boddewyn and Brewer 
1994, Hull 1993), we argue that Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies are shaped by the EU, 
sectoral and corporate factors. To be more precise, we focus on the nature of EU policies, 
the presence of European rivals in a sector, product diversification, and corporate 
resources. They are the independent variables of our analysis that affect the likelihood of 
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specific political action being formulated by firms. The interaction of these variables in 
the EU forms the central connecting thread of this study, and has generated a set of 
testable hypotheses for empirical testing. 
  The detailed case studies of Japanese firms in the EU provide the empirical 
evidence for our investigation and assess the validity of our hypotheses. We chose four 
case studies: automobile trade policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s, electronics 
trade policies during the same period, the End of Life Vehicle Directive of 2000, and the 
Waste Electronic and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) and Restrictions of the use of certain 
Hazardous Substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) Directives of 2003. 
The firms selected for the case studies are in the automobile and electronics industries, 
which are the two most internationally oriented sectors of Japanese industry and were the 
object of significant protectionist measures in Europe in the 1980s. Both automobile and 
electronics firms have developed the most fully-fledged European operations of all 
Japanese manufacturing sectors. Therefore, they are the prime examples of firms that are 
subject to a transnational convergence of lobbying practices. At the same time, these two 
sectors show some clear differences in terms of the presence of rival European firms and 
product diversification. In addition, the comparison between trade and environmental 
policies enables us to investigate whether or not the nature of policy has affected the way 
Japanese firms have developed a particular mix of lobbying patterns. 
Our research examines Japanese automobile and electronics firms in the EU from 
the late 1980s to 2003. The history of Japanese business lobbying can be divided into two 
stages: from the late 1980s to 1993 (pre-Treaty of European Union) and from 1994 
onwards (post-TEU). The first period is largely characterized by EU-Japan trade disputes, 
while the second period concerns the expanding EU regulatory competencies and an 
increasing number of firms’ direct lobbying at the EU level. Examination and comparison 
of these two periods allow the opportunity to provide the longitudinal analysis of 
Japanese lobbying. Besides, the period covered is both long and recent enough for 
contemporary relevance and yet it is sufficiently in the past to allow for marginally 
greater reflection and consideration, without falling into the trap of providing over 
speculative interpretations of current events. It is hoped that the argument developed will 
have currency for general debate on EU public policy and international business studies 
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in the 2000s, and also provide an empirical understanding of the Japanese firms in the EU 
during the chosen periods of the 1980s, 1990s, and the early 2000s.  
Empirical evidence for these case studies mainly came from 30 detailed 
interviews with a number of stakeholders, and secondary resources such as existing 
documents and archival records. The interviews were conducted in Brussels and Tokyo 
between 2003 and 2006 with sources from European, Japanese, and American business 
associations, individual Japanese automobile and electronics firms, the European 
Commission, Japanese Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), and other 
Japanese and EU governmental agencies, in English or Japanese. We managed to include 
three of the largest Japanese automobile firms (Toyota, Honda, and Nissan), and four 
Japanese electronics firms (Panasonic, Fujitsu, NEC, and Canon) which are constantly 
ranked high in a number of product fields such as consumer electronics and computer 
equipment. By incorporating a number of insights on Japanese lobbying from different 
actors and comparing them with each other, it is expected to provide comprehensive 
perspectives of the issues.  
Overall, the four cases identify fixed, adaptable and creatable lobbying strategies 
of Japanese firms common to both sectors through two timeframes, and assess the impact 
of institutional determinants, at EU, sectoral, and corporate levels, upon the firms’ 
varying degrees of embeddedness in traditional business practices and the development 
of European lobbying strategies. 
 
8.2.1 Empirical results 
 
The case studies provided a structured and focused comparison of Japanese 
automobile and electronics firms, in order to advance the existing explanatory framework 
of the Europeanization of business interests. The prime intention was to use detailed 
descriptive and comparative analysis to highlight how Japanese firms conduct lobbying 
in the EU and assess to what extent they are embedded in national lobbying patterns. The 
two main variables in our theoretical model are the form of interest representation and the 
instrument.  
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Individual or collective lobbying  
 
 Our analysis demonstrates that both Japanese automobile and electronics firms in 
the EU strongly prefer collective lobbying to individual lobbying in all case studies. In 
theory, large firms in the EU have bypassed the national channels and become 
independent political actors in the EU policymaking process. In an EU context, the 
Olson-style argument provides a micro-foundation for theories of elite pluralism or 
studies of the varying power of industry interests (Coen 1997, Jordan 1998). That is, both 
European and national business associations often fail to respond to the quickly changing 
and complex EU lobbying environment. Of course, there are still times when large firms 
do not want to take the lead on particular issues. For example, firms generally prefer that 
the industry associations speak out on European social policy matters. Sensitive issues 
can often be deflected to the association as opposed to the firms themselves. Yet, 
generally speaking, membership incentives for such traditional business associations have 
been reduced. As a result, firms have become more proactive and developed political 
capacities to utilize a wide variety of political channels either independently or 
collectively through ad-hoc alliances with other countervailing interests. Large firms in 
the EU are expected to prefer direct lobbying to traditional collective lobbying. Elite 
pluralism suggests that the preferred order of interest organizational form in the EU is 1) 
individual firms, 2) European associations, and 3) national associations. These forms of 
interest representation are not mutually exclusive, and successful firms are able to choose 
different forms depending on their strategies and issues.  
 However, this dynamic towards individual lobbying did not occur among 
Japanese automobile and electronics firms to the same degree as European firms. The 
increasing regulatory nature of EU policies did encourage Japanese firms to participate in 
the EU policymaking process more directly than in the pre-TEU period. Yet, they chose 
to collectively pursue their political interests at EU level through national business 
associations such as JAMA and the JBCE. The EU factors did not induce much 
individual lobbying among Japanese firms. In the automobile sector, JAMA opened their 
European office in 1990 and started to conduct direct lobbying at the EU level. Similarly, 
Japanese electronics firms established the JBCE in 1998 in order to deal with increasing 
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EU regulatory policies and to conduct lobbying. The shift from national lobbying 
channels, such as MITI and national business associations in Japan, to Brussels based 
business associations, shows that Japanese firms recognized the importance of direct 
participation in the EU policymaking process.  
Besides, the limited amount of individual lobbying among Japanese automobile 
firms was also strengthened by the presence of predominant European rival firms and 
ACEA. Japanese automobile firms did not belong to ACEA, which dominated the ELV 
policymaking process. Therefore, they were almost reconciled to their semi-outsider 
position in the EU, leading to a lack of desire to develop their individual lobbying 
strategy. In the electronics sector, due to a strong European market share in a number of 
product fields, Japanese firms enjoyed more autonomy than automobile firms and were 
members of EICTA as well. Yet, when Japanese electronics firms realized the limited 
lobbying ability of the European association, they decided to collectively represent their 
views through the JBCE, instead of individual lobbying or ad-hoc alliances. The number 
of individual lobbies by Japanese electronics firms was few. Japanese firms in both 
sectors mainly relied on business associations for lobbying. In this sense, different 
sectoral settings had little impact on the form of Japanese interest representation. They 
chose to lobby collectively regardless of the presence of European rivals.  
Corporate factors played an important role in the firms’ decision with regard to 
their form of interest representation. One of the major reasons why Japanese firms did not 
conduct lobbying for the EC trade policies was lack of resources. Although they had a 
wide range of manufacturing facilities across Europe, they did not have any public affairs 
functions in the EC. Since the 1990s, many Japanese firms opened lobbying offices in 
Brussels, and JAMA Europe and the JBCE were also established. They were equipped 
with experienced staff and had enough resources to lobby the Commission on the basis of 
their technical expertise. Most Japanese automobile and electronics firms enjoy high 
profiles in the EU, but, only firms with outstanding corporate resources such as Toyota 
and Sony, can afford an efficient in-house lobbying department and try to conduct 
individual lobbying. For example, Toyota set up its EU External Affairs office in 
Brussels in 1997. It consists of a team of roughly twenty staff who are mostly European 
and include former lobbyists of ACEA and Ford. They have contacts with the 
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Commission at many levels and hold regular meetings with the heads of the units in the 
Commission every three months. The EU affairs departments of other Japanese 
automobile firms usually have only one or two staffs. In this sense, Toyota has a 
significant resource advantage, compared with the others. Therefore, Toyota tried to 
initiate more individual lobbying without relying on JAMA and also applied for ACEA 
membership. Yet, the success of such individual lobbying was still very little.  
Overall, Japanese firms showed a strong preference for collective lobbying in the 
EU. Both JAMA and the JBCE were aware of the importance of the development of a 
European political identity in order to succeed in the EU. Especially, the JBCE tried to 
localize its political identity as European and become a political insider. In this sense, 
instead of individual lobbying, Japanese firms aimed to collectively participate in the EU 
policymaking process. However, such business associations showed some fundamental 
problems in order to become independent political actors in the EU. That is, JAMA often 
failed to respond to the EU policymakers quickly because of its decision-making process. 
Any decision regarding EU policies had to be decided in Tokyo and then reported back to 
JAMA’s European office. Such tortuous internal decision making procedures reduced the 
efficiency of its lobbying practice. Japanese automobile firms were aware of this problem, 
however they were still reluctant to conduct individual lobbying. The presence of 
European automobile rivals added an extra hurdle for Japanese firms to become more 
proactive. In the electronics sector, the JBCE tried to give itself strong initiatives and 
avoid traditional Japanese consensus-based decision making among its member firms. 
Inevitably, the JBCE could only focus on a limited number of common concerns that all 
member firms shared, thus failing to represent a wide range of interests. Japanese 
electronics firms could have mobilized EICTA or conducted individual lobbying, but 
such practice was not common.  
In the context of the logic of collective action advocated by Olson (1965), the 
collective action problems associated with the business associations inevitably reduced 
the membership incentives among firms and encouraged them to seek alternative form of 
interest representation. European firms have experienced similar problems with the 
business associations, and consequently begun to develop strategic political identities to 
initiate individual lobbying or form ad-hoc alliances with other actors with countervailing 
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interests (Coen 1997, 2001, Jordan 1998, Mahoney 2007, Pijnenburg 1998). However, 
despite these problems, Japanese firms in the EU still showed a strong embeddedness in 
collective lobbying through national business associations. Returning to our hypotheses 
with which we carried out the case studies, we find that there was not much variation in 
the form of interest representation among Japanese firms in the EU with very few 
exceptions. Various EU and corporate factors facilitated Japanese firms in both sectors to 
directly participate in the EU policymaking process without relying on MITI or other 
national actors. However, their strong preference for collective lobbying remained intact 
in the face of Europeanization. Also, turning to the organizational structure of JAMA 
Europe and the JBCE, Secretary Generals and some other staff were traditionally sent 
from MITI. These business associations were still tied closely to the national actors 
despite their conscious effort to gain European insider status. Both JAMA Europe and the 
JBCE possessed strong national characteristics such as consensus-based internal decision 
making procedures, personnel links with MITI and passive participation of member firms 
within the associations. In this sense, the legacy of the Japanese business-government 
relationship seemed to be the vital determinant in the firms’ decisions as to whether 
conduct collective or individual lobbying in the EU. The adaptation to the European style 
of interest representation was yet to occur among Japanese firms in the EU.  
 
Information or financial incentive lobbying 
 
 After a firm had decided to pursue lobbying individually or collectively, its next 
decision relates to the specific instruments it should employ. According to the exchange 
theories (Blau 1964, Levine and White 1961), the interaction of private and public 
organizations can be conceptualized as a series of inter-organizational exchanges. The 
organizations involved in the exchange make an implicit or explicit cost benefit analysis, 
on the basis of which they decide with whom to interact. The exchange relation is only 
likely to be durable when the exchange is reciprocal and both sides receive benefits from 
the exchange, which are equally distributed between the exchanging parties. Thus, the 
exchange theory suggests two general or generic political strategies that firms and interest 
groups may use to target policymakers and compete in the policymaking process based 
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on the fundamental resources exchanged: information and financial incentive (Hillman 
and Hitt 1999). In the EU, firms mainly exercise an information strategy to influence the 
policymakers whereas in Japan, firms mainly choose a financial incentive strategy such 
as financial contribution to the ruling party and amakudari. An information strategy is 
more common in the EU because custom and law limit the scope for corporate donations 
and other forms of financial incentive instruments.  
 Our analysis highlights that both Japanese automobile and electronics firms did 
not use financial incentive lobbying in order to access to the EU policymakers. Instead, 
they recognized that information and technical knowledge are more important to 
influence EU policies than financial incentive instruments. During the pre-TEU period, 
Japanese firms had little direct contact with the Commission, therefore they directed their 
lobbying instruments at the domestic actors. They used a wide range of financial 
incentive instruments to maintain a cooperative relationship with Japanese policymakers 
and let them negotiate with the EC at state level. Yet, the increasing regulatory nature of 
EU policies necessitated the Commission to open its doors to a wide range of private 
actors for detailed technical information. For the environmental policies, from the early 
stage of their lobbying campaigns Japanese firms did not try to personalize their networks 
with the EU policymakers by making political donations or any financial means. This is 
because the EU institutional setting and personnel have been constantly changing and it is 
very difficult to build lasting informal networks with particular EU officials. Instead, both 
Japanese automobile and electronics firms recognized that technical information was an 
asset to influence the EU policymakers. In this sense, they quickly learned the EU way of 
information lobbying and managed to apply such a technique into practice.  
Sectoral factors such as the presence of European rivals and product 
diversification did not affect the decision regarding their choice of instruments. Despite 
the sectoral differences, both Japanese automobile and electronics firms tried to utilize 
their technical expertise as their main lobbying instrument. However, because of the 
smaller scope of the ELV directive compared to the WEEE/RoHS directives, it was 
difficult for Japanese automobile firms to outweigh European rivals by utilizing their 
technical expertise. Japanese electronics firms were able to find some areas where they 
enjoyed an informational monopoly over other rival firms such as the application of lead, 
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due to the diversity of electronics products covered under the WEEE/RoHS directives. 
The JBCE and Japanese electronics firms concentrated on a limited number of core issues 
so that they could spend more resources on each topic, and managed to realize their 
policy objectives in the final directives. In this context, sectoral factors influenced the 
outcome of Japanese lobbying strategies across the sectors. However, both the 
automobile and electronics firms tried to utilize an information instrument.  
Corporate resources did not seem to be the defining factor for firms’ decisions 
about lobbying instruments either. During the pre-TEU period, there was not much 
variation in Japanese firms’ lobbying resources in Europe. Most large Japanese firms 
started directly investing in the EC in the 1980s. However, these EC based Japanese firms 
were essentially there to manage the local manufacturing plants, and not designed for 
active lobbying. Since the 1990s, some Japanese firms such as Toyota have gained more 
lobbying resources in the EU than others. Yet, our case studies show that Japanese firms 
quickly learned to conduct information strategies through the business associations and 
did not use a financial incentive instrument in the EU, regardless of the level of resource 
availability. There were some cases where Japanese firms used more informal 
instruments to gain access to the EU policymaking process. For example, JAMA and 
Japanese automobile firms spent a lot of resources creating favourable political 
conditions for themselves and improve their public image. Such efforts include 
organizing a big reception for other rival firms, the EU policymakers, the media and other 
business actors. This kind of informal networking provides a great opportunity for 
Japanese firms to exchange views with other stakeholders. Yet, such informal receptions 
and dinners were not the defining feature of Japanese firms’ lobbying instruments to 
influence the EU policymakers.  
 Overall, Japanese firms did not rely on financial incentive lobbying, which was 
prevalent in Japan, and mainly conducted information lobbying in a similar manner to 
other European firms. Therefore, in terms of the lobbying instrument, Japanese firms and 
business associations superficially conformed to the EU pattern. However, the way 
Japanese firms conducted information lobbying was often different from their European 
rivals. Their negotiation manner was often described as passive and non-confrontational 
by the EU policymakers. The Commission likes to receive as many business opinions as 
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possible when drafting the directives. However, Japanese firms were often internally 
scanned by their business associations and the Commission could not benefit from the 
diversity of Japanese business interests that might exist. In the automobile sector, 
Japanese firms were criticized as lacking the principle of “give and take” and did not 
provide as much information as the insider information they took from the others. This 
indicates that Japanese automobile firms could not utilize information instruments to the 
full. It is also true that their non-confrontational approach to information lobbying was 
partly attributed to the sensitive position of Japanese automobile firms in the European 
market. In other words, JAMA and Japanese firms could not initiate any aggressive 
information lobbying in order not to frustrate ACEA in any way. They deliberately chose 
to be non-confrontational in their usage of information instruments. Such a sectoral 
setting enhanced the non-confrontational approach to information lobbying among 
automobile firms, but Japanese electronics firms were also rather passive compared with 
their European rivals, even though they occupied a large market share in a number of 
products. In both sectors, their technical superiority in some aspects of environmental 
policies explained their eagerness to comply with the regulations to some extent. Japan 
generally has stricter environmental standards that the EU in many aspects, therefore, 
Japanese firms could sometimes manage to meet the EU requirements without much 
technical burden.  
In addition to the impact of several sectoral and corporate factors, the enduring 
impact of the national business-government relationship upon Japanese firms’ usage of 
information instruments is also evident. Proactive information lobbying is normally 
absent in Japanese business culture and firms often comply with the political authority 
without arguing. Such a trend can be also found within European and American firms, 
however there is a clear difference in the degree of willingness for compliance. Our case 
studies show that Japanese firms in the EU tended to avoid confrontation and comply to 
authority as much as they could. They often failed to understand the importance of 
proactive lobbying to change the EU regulatory framework for their long-term business 
operations. Japanese firms in the EU were still unable to use information lobbying to the 
full. This clearly indicates the strong persistence of traditional Japanese business culture 
within Japanese firms in the EU. At the same time, Japanese firms recognized that a 
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polite and non-confrontational manner sometimes leads to a positive response from the 
EU policymakers. They occasionally deliberately choose to conduct information lobbying 
in a Japanese non-confrontational way. Their decision to employ information lobbying 
shows that their lobbying strategy was transformed to adjust to the EU policymaking 
process. In this sense, the choice of lobbying instrument was more subject to 
Europeanization and less determined by the underlying nationality of the Japanese firms. 
However, it should be noted that both Japanese automobile and electronics firms still 
struggled to take full advantage of information lobbying strategies when turning them 
into practice. The ways in which Japanese firms used information instruments showed 
some clear differences from European firms.  
 
 
8.3 Normative implications of our study 
 
 This research seeks to begin to fill the gap between literature on the EU business-
government relationship and on Japanese firms’ political behaviour. The evidence we 
present about Japanese lobbying strategies in the EU provides compelling support for the 
persistence of national characteristics in the age of Europeanization. In light of these 
results, an important question arises. If in fact Japanese firms do not yet fully conform to 
the EU lobbying practice in the ways we argue they do, what are the normative 
implications? That is, what does our study teach us about the applicability of elite 
pluralism to non-European firms with regard to their lobbying behaviour?  
Most importantly, the evidence strongly rejects any claims that large firms’ 
lobbying strategies in the EU are automatically harmonized and show little national 
difference. It is a challenge to develop theoretical ideas in the field of European interest 
politics, which is known for its diversity and complexity. Yet, our investigation of 
lobbying strategy formulation helps us understand the impact of increasing European 
integration upon non-European business actors in the EU. Recognizing that many large 
European and American firms have become independent political actors (Coen 1997, 
1998; Bouwen 2002, 2004, Richardson 2000; Jordan 2002), our analysis assesses whether 
the Western concept of elite pluralism could be applied to Japanese firms as non-
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European actors in the policymaking process. By pushing the theoretical debates in this 
direction, we have highlighted that the underlying nationality of the firm remains as the 
vitally important determinant of the nature of its lobbying strategy formulation, and is 
much more persistent in the face of Europeanization than existing studies generally 
assume.  
To be more precise, there is no doubt that Japanese lobbying has undergone a 
substantial transformation over the years. However, the ways in which they have 
participated in the EU policymaking process are rather different from European firms. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, research on EU business lobbying tends to treat large 
multinational firms as a rather homogenous group, directly participating in the 
policymaking process in similar manners. Many institutional factors have induced the 
convergence of lobbying practices and created a distinctive EU business-government 
relationship. The particular focus on Japanese lobbying taken in this study contributes to 
an understanding of EU politics in several important ways. First and foremost, Japanese 
lobbying in the EU is still an under-studied topic, despite a number of existing pieces of 
research on Japanese FDI and state level interactions. We specifically disaggregate the 
lobbying strategies of firms into two levels: form of interest representation and 
instrument. As Japanese firms have become more important individual actors in a more 
interdependent international economy, their political capacities, such as seeking strategic 
alliances and negotiating with governments and other stakeholders, must be taken into 
account as ever more vital determinants of public policy outcomes in a changing EU 
order. The EU institutional environment does not affect the logic of Japanese lobbying to 
the same degree as European firms. Convergence of lobbying strategies may be apparent 
at the level of lobbying instruments, but below the surface, where the roots of leading 
Japanese firms remain lodged, our research suggests durable source of resistance. The 
Europeanization template upon which current theoretical and policy debate rests remains 
debatable in the context of Japanese firms.  
 In a wider sense, we aim to advance the understanding of the participation of non-
Western actors within the EU policymaking process. The concept of elite pluralism, 
which features the direct participation of firms based on the exchange of information 
within the EU policy making process, does not easily apply to non-European firms. In the 
 205 
age of Europeanization, the underlying nationality of firms and their national business 
culture constitute nevertheless powerful cultural norms which define appropriateness 
with regard to the way firms operate in the political system. Non-European firms may 
occupy a large share of the market and have wide spread FDI operations, but such market 
force does not automatically lead to the Europeanization of their political identities and 
behaviour.  
 
 
8.4 Directions for future research  
 
 The role of business interests in the EU policymaking process attracts a lot of 
academic interest. The main goal of this research has been to explain the opportunities 
and constraints that make up the institutional logic of Japanese lobbying in pursuing a 
more EU or Japanese type of lobbying practice in the age of Europeanization. Every 
study builds on previous work, and this one is no exception. Also, every study is 
incomplete, in the sense of containing gaps and identifying questions that future studies 
can address. In concluding this research, we propose several topics for future research.  
 There are several important ways in which the basic lobbying strategy 
formulation model presented here should be extended. Most notably, our model can be 
grouped as explanations for cultural differences. Culture, however, is a difficult concept 
to operationalize, especially since it had become something of a catch-all for observations 
of country-specific behaviour. A promising way of tapping into the effect of traditions or 
“ways of doing things” might be to explore the degree to which firms adapt to an existing 
kind of policy style. In this sense, Japanese firms’ lobbying strategies could be 
disaggregated in many different ways from our model that features two aspects: form of 
interest representation and instrument. By studying national traditions and identifying 
specific styles within and beyond Europe, such research would help to combine the 
central questions of the Europeanization literature with a more general research on the 
importance of national difference. The further theoretical elaboration and testing of the 
persistence of national characteristics at the level of the firm is definitely worthwhile.  
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 In addition, there are a variety of straightforward ways in which our empirical 
research could be extended. Future work could focus on some other sectors in which 
Japanese firms also actively operate and are at the vortex of interaction between 
Europeanization and national characteristics, such as chemical firms. Different sectoral 
variables do matter and affect the business organization of firms. Thus, firms that are 
active in other sectors and touched in varying degrees by the globalization of competition 
should be considered. Similarly, other policy areas such as block exemptions and 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) could 
also provide interesting case studies in order to enable the comprehensive analysis of 
Japanese lobbying in the EU. Moreover, there is the increasing presence of other non-
European firms in the EU as well. Most notably, South Korean and Chinese firms are 
expanding their operations in the EU in a number of sectors. In any case, each country 
has a unique, historically conditioned domestic structure inserted in different ways into 
its firms’ political behaviour. Therefore, it is interesting to explore the ways in which 
those firms conduct lobbying in the EU, and compare them with European and Japanese 
firms. Future research could also explore other variables that might affect the formulation 
of lobbying strategies of Japanese firms in the EU. Many non-European firms have 
rapidly built up a presence in the EU policy networks and communities, their political 
actions certainly need much more study at EU level. Considerable additional empirical 
research of the sort we have undertaken is therefore crucial to understanding the 
persistence of national characteristics and the ways they should be amended. In addition, 
given the difference between the EU and Japanese policymaking processes, it would be 
valid to investigate the ways in which European firms conduct lobbying in Japan. Many 
European firms now have offices in Tokyo and have occupied a substantial market share 
in many industrial sectors and products. Whether and, if so, how European firms 
transform their traditional lobbying strategies to participate in the Japanese policymaking 
process would provide an interesting analysis for convergence of lobbying practices 
across different political systems. In other words, the field of EU lobbying has matured 
and offers itself for interesting comparisons with other political systems.  
The empirical focus of this research has been on the Europeanization of Japanese 
lobbying. Although our theoretical model and evidence in this regard have interesting 
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implications for the study of EU public policy, theorizing of Japanese lobbying still needs 
to be advanced to keep track of the changing role of firms in the evolving EU 
policymaking process in the coming decade. Yet, such theorizing can only be of any real 
utility, for both scholars and practitioners, if it is predicated on solid and wide ranging 
empirical research. It is in this spirit that this research effort has been conducted as we try 
to understand the causes and consequences of multinational corporate behaviour.  
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I. Appendix 
 
1. List of Interviews 
 
 
Japanese firms: 
 
 • Canon:   
 
- Environmental Project Manager, Canon Europe, Brussels, 13/10/05 
 
• Fujitsu:  
 
- Representative of European Affairs, Fujitsu Ltd., Brussels, 17/07/03 
- Industry Relations Division, Tokyo, 10/02/05 
 
 • Horiba:  
 
- Representative of European Office, Brussels, 11/10/05 
 
• NEC:  
 
- Director, NEC Europe Ltd., Brussels, 16/07/03 
 
- Advisor Environmental Affair, NEC Europe Ltd., Brussels, 14/10/05 
 
 • Panasonic:  
 
- Director, Matsushita Electric Europe, Brussels, 16/07/03 
 
 
 • Honda:  
 
- Governmental Relations, Honda Motor Europe Ltd., Brussels, 
12/05/06 
  
• Nissan:  
 
- Environmental and Safety Manager, Nissan Technical Centre Europe 
Ltd., Brussels, 16/11/05 
  
 • Toyota:  
 
- Senior Manager (External Affairs and Communication), Toyota 
Europe, Brussels, 11/10/05 
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Japanese Business Associations: 
  
• Japan Business Council in Europe (JBCE):  
 
- Secretary General, Brussels, 16/07/03 and 7/06/04 
   
- Secretary General, Brussels, 11/10/05 
 
- Senior Manager, Brussels, 7/06/04 
 
• Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA):  
 
- Director General, Brussels, 7/06/04 
 
- Deputy Director General, Brussels, 12/10/05 
   
- Technical Affairs, Brussels, 12/10/05 
 
 
European and American Business Associations:  
 
 • American Electronics Association (AeA):  
 
- Managing Director, AeA Europe, Brussels, 12/10/05 
 
 • European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA):  
 
- Director, Regulatory Affairs, Brussels, 16/11/05 
    
- Director General, Tokyo Office, Tokyo, 2/02/05 
 
 
EU Institutions: 
 
• European Commission (Enterprise):  
 
- Japan Desk Officer, Brussels, 16/07/03 
 
• European Commission (Environment):  
 
- Administrator, Brussels, 11/10/05 
 
- Administrator (Sustainable Production and Consumption), Brussels, 
14/10/05 
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- Administrator, Brussels, 18/11/05 
  
- Administrator, Brussels, 14/10/05 
    
• European Commission (Internal Market):  
 
- Administrator, Brussels, 18/11/05 
 
 
Japanese Ministry: 
 
 • Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry:  
 
- Director, External Trade Research, Tokyo, 2/02/05 
 
 
Other Governmental Agencies:  
 
• Japan External Trade Relations Organization (JETRO):  
 
- Deputy Director General (EU Research), Brussels, 13/10/05 
 
- Senior Coordinator, Tokyo, 3/02/05 
   
 -      Strategy Coordination Officer (Europe), Tokyo, 3/02/05 
 
• EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation:  
 
- General Manager, Tokyo, 7/02/05 
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2. Questionnaires 
 
 
Questionnaire for Japanese firms regarding EU environmental policies  
 
Part A. 
 
1. What were your major concerns when lobbying the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive?  
 
2. How did you conduct lobbying for the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive? Based on 
your experiences, what is your overall impression of Japanese business lobbies in 
the following aspects? (If you have not had any dealings with the ELV 
(WEEE/RoHS) issues,  please answer for the EU environmental policies in 
general)  
 
- Who represented Japanese business interests regarding the ELV 
(WEEE/RoHS) directive at EU level?  
- How did Japanese business lobbies cultivate networks with the EU 
policymakers? How did Japanese automobile (electronics) 
firms/organizations participate in the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) policymaking 
process?  
- How did Japanese business lobbies bargain with the EU policymakers? 
What was your general impression of Japanese automobile (electronics) 
lobbies at the negotiation table regarding ELV (WEEE/RoHS) issues?  
 
3.  How did you deal with the Japanese actors when lobbying the ELV 
(WEEE/RoHS) directive? (Japanese government, Ministries, business 
organizations, and other Japanese firms) 
 
4. How did you deal with the European and American actors? (member states 
governments, European business organizations, and firms) 
 
 
Part B. 
 
5. How would you describe your political influence in the European automobile 
(electronics) sector since the 1990s, especially in relation to other firms? How did 
the power-relationship in the sector affect your lobbying strategy for the ELV 
(WEEE/RoHS) directive (or EU environmental policies in general)?  
 
6. How, and to what extent, have the increasing EU regulatory competencies 
affected your lobbying strategy in the EU since the 1990s?  
 
7. How would you describe your corporate culture in terms of international 
operations? Has your firm equipped with enough human/financial resource to 
conduct effective lobbying in the EU? 
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8. How, and in what ways, has your firm adopted a European corporate political 
identity, and to what extent is this recognized by the EU policymakers? Has this 
Europeanization improved your relationship with the EU policymakers?  
 
9. To what extent do you think Japanese automobile (electronics) 
firms/organizations have blended into the EU policymaking process in general? 
How would you like Japanese automobile (electronics) firms to participate in the 
EU policymaking process? 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for the Commission regarding EU environmental policies 
 
1. What do you think were the major concerns of Japanese business lobbies 
regarding the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive? How did these compare to 
European/American business lobbies?   
 
 
2. How did Japanese automobile (electronics) firms/organizations conduct lobbying 
for the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive? (Were there any differences in their 
practice from European/American firms/organizations?) 
 
- Who represented Japanese business interests regarding the ELV 
(WEEE/RoHS) directive at EU level? Were there any particular firms that 
were more proactive than others or were they all united under JAMA (the 
JBCE)? 
 
- How did Japanese business lobbies cultivate networks with the EU 
policymakers, such as yourself? How did Japanese automobile (electronics) 
firms/organizations participate in the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) policymaking 
process?  
 
 
- How did Japanese business lobbies bargain with the EU policymakers? 
What was your general impression of Japanese automobile (electronics) 
lobbies at the negotiation table regarding ELV (WEEE/RoHS) issues? 
Were they aggressive or rather cooperative/un-confrontational?  
 
 
3. To what extent do you think Japanese automobile (electronics) 
firms/organizations have blended into the EU policymaking process? How would 
you like Japanese automobile (electronics) firms to participate in the EU 
policymaking process? 
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Questionnaire for the ACEA (or AeA) regarding EU environmental policies 
 
1. What were your major concerns when lobbying the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive? 
 
2. How did you conduct lobbying for the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive, especially 
in relation to Japanese business lobbies? 
 
3. Based on your experiences, what is your overall impression of Japanese business 
lobbies?  
 
a. Who represented Japanese interests regarding the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) 
directive at EU level? 
b. How did Japanese lobbies cultivate networks with the EU policymakers? 
c. How did Japanese lobbies bargain with the EU policymakers?  
 
4. How would you describe your market share and political influence in the 
European market since the 1990s, especially in relation to other firms? How did 
these changes affect your lobbying strategy for the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive?  
 
5. How and to what extent have the changing EU regulatory competencies and 
policymaking process affected your lobbying strategy in the EU since the 1990s?  
 
6. Are there any global level policies/regulations (e.g. WTO, UN, etc) which affect 
your lobbying strategy in the EU? Were there any such factors when lobbying the 
ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive? 
 
7. How, and in what ways, has your firm/organization adopted a European corporate 
political identity, and to what extent is this recognized by the EU policymakers? 
Has this Europeanization improved your relationship with the EU policymakers?  
 
 
 
Questionnaire for JETRO/EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation regarding 
EU policies and Japanese business interests 
 
1. How did Japanese business lobbies typically respond to the EC trade policies?  
- Who represented Japanese business interests regarding the EC trade 
policies? 
- How did Japanese business lobbies cultivate networks with the 
EC/Japanese policymakers? 
- How did Japanese business lobbies bargain with the EC/Japanese 
policymakers?  
 
2. How did Japanese business lobbies typically conduct lobbying for the EU 
environmental policies?  
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- Who represented Japanese business interests regarding the ELV 
(WEEE/RoHS) directive at EU level? 
- How did Japanese business lobbies cultivate networks with the EU 
policymakers? 
- How did Japanese business lobbies bargain with the EU policymakers?  
 
2.  How did Japanese business lobbies deal with the Japanese actors when lobbying 
the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive? (Japanese government, Ministries, business 
organizations, and other Japanese firms) 
 
3. How did Japanese business lobbies deal with the EU institutions and 
policymakers? (the Commission, the EP, and individual Commission officials and 
MEPs) 
 
4. How did Japanese business lobbies deal with the European and American actors? 
(member states governments, European business organizations, and firms) 
 
5. How have the power-relationships between Japanese firms and other firms in 
European market changed since the 1990s? How did they affect Japanese 
lobbying strategy for the ELV (WEEE/RoHS) directive?  
 
6. How and to what extent have the changing EU regulatory competencies and 
policymaking process affected Japanese lobbying strategy in the EU since the 
1990s?  
 
7. Are there any global level policies/regulations (e.g. WTO, UN, etc) which affect 
Japanese lobbying strategy in the EU?  
 
8. To what extent have Japanese business lobbies blended into European corporate 
landscape and developed European identities?  
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